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COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, SCIENCE, EDUCATION AND MEDIA

Good football governance

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Information memorandum - FIFA

1. Introduction

1. The present document presents key elements of FIFA governance structures and rules, following the decisions – which FIFA defines “landmark” – adopted by the Extraordinary FIFA Congress on 26 February 2016.² The document is based on information provided by FIFA and resulting from FIFA legal texts. The text is not meant to be exhaustive and only includes elements (and changes) that are most relevant from the PACE perspective.

2. FIFA governance reform is an ongoing process which started some years ago. For practical reasons, the present document does not reproduce the analysis included in the previous committee report on “The reform of football governance” ([doc. 13738](#)); however, it is important to acknowledge from the outset that FIFA achieved significant reforms, such as the establishment of an independent Ethics committee (divided into two chambers) and comprehensive eligibility and integrity checks (see section 3 below). In particular, during the last two years, significant improvements have been made fostering good governance, transparency and accountability. Some noteworthy examples include: the statutory provision on a clear separation of powers between the FIFA Council (strategic function) and the General Secretariat (management function); the introduction of term limits for, among others, the FIFA President and the Council members; new provisions for eligibility checks for all members of the Council (including the President), of the FIFA committees and of the judicial bodies, as well as for the Secretary General.

3. Before entering into a more detailed analysis of aspects of FIFA governance which have been the focus of prior work of the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media, it could be worth recalling that the FIFA key policy-making bodies are:

- the Congress, composed by the member associations represented by their delegates;
- the President, who is elected by the Congress (Article 33.2 of the Statutes);
- the Council (which has replaced the Executive Committee) composed by the President plus 36 other members, including 8 vice-presidents (Article 33.1 of the Statutes). The members are elected by the member associations on the occasion of the respective confederation congresses.

FIFA governance structures also comprise nine standing committees (previously they were 26), including the Governance Committee, and four independent bodies, i.e. the Audit and Compliance Committee and three judicial bodies.

4. A table in Appendix 1 provides an overview of the state of implementation of specific recommendations (adopted on 27 January 2015) which our Committee addressed to FIFA.

¹ Document declassified by the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media at its meeting on 23 January 2018 in Strasbourg.

² [Infographics](#) on FIFA's governance reforms.

2. Separation of powers and system of checks and balances at FIFA

5. During previous work, one of the elements on FIFA governance that the committee had identified as problematic was the high concentration of power. The new FIFA Statutes provide today for a clear **separation of the strategic function** – performed by the FIFA Council (previously Executive Committee) – **from the management / executive function**, performed by the General Secretariat. The Council defines FIFA's mission, strategic direction, policies and values, in particular with regard to the organisation and development of football worldwide (Articles 34-37 of the FIFA Statutes and Articles 8-15 of the FIFA Governance Regulations).³ The FIFA General Secretariat is responsible for "*the negotiation, execution and performance of all commercial contracts, in accordance with the standards, policies and procedures established by the Council*" (Article 36.1 of the FIFA Statutes).

6. This is a development which goes in the right direction. However the control of the President on management functions – which are implemented under the authority of FIFA Secretary General (Article 36.1 of the Statutes), defined as the Chief Executive Officer of FIFA (Article 37.1) – seems to be as strong as under the previous leadership.

7. FIFA President and Council decision-making powers are extremely strong when it comes to the **appointment and removal of members of FIFA standing committees**. In particular, Article 39.4 of the Statutes provides that: "*4. The chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the Council on the proposal of the member associations, the President of FIFA or the confederations, except for the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Governance Committee, who are elected by the Congress upon the proposal of the Council. The Council shall ensure appropriate female representation on standing committees. Their terms shall last for four years, beginning upon the respective date of appointment by the Council. Members of the standing committees may be relieved of their duties at any time by the Council, except for the members of the Governance Committee, who may only be relieved of their duties by the Congress.*"

8. The principle as such sounds fine: it is not at all anomalous that the leading positions in standing committees, whose role is to advise and assist the Council in performing strategic policy-making, are in the hands of the FIFA Council. To understand the noticeable exception established for the Governance Committee, we should recall that the cornerstone of FIFA governance reform has been, from the very beginning, the independence of the following key FIFA bodies:

- the Audit and Compliance Committee;
- the Ethics Committee in its two articulations, the Investigatory Chamber and the Adjudicatory Chamber; and
- the Governance Committee.

9. Indeed the main pillar of the reform initiated by the FIFA Independent Governance Committee (IGC) – headed by Professor Mark Pieth – was to ensure the independence of the bodies entrusted with key supervisory functions and to be responsible to prevent, detect and sanction abuses and wrongdoings. True independence of their chairpersons was considered from the outset a necessary condition for these bodies to work properly.

10. In the current FIFA structure, there are **four bodies** that are **qualified as independent**: the Audit and Compliance committee (including the Compensation Sub-Committee) and the three judicial bodies, i.e. the Appeal, Disciplinary and Ethics Committees. A consequence is that the members of these bodies, including their chairpersons and deputy chairpersons, are not appointed by the Council: they are elected – and can be removed only – by the Congress and they cannot be members of other FIFA bodies.⁴ Moreover, they must fulfil the independence criteria as defined in Article 5 of FIFA Governance Regulations. These criteria also apply to at least half of the members of the Governance Committee (including the chairperson and deputy chairperson), of the Finance Committee, of the Development Committee and of its Bureau.

³ [FIFA Statutes; FIFA Governance Regulations.](#)

⁴ Article 51.3 of the Statutes states that "*The chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Audit and Compliance Committee shall be elected by the Congress*" and they "*may only be relieved of their duties by the Congress*". All of whom must not belong to any other FIFA body (Article 51.1). Similarly, Article 52.5 states that "*The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of the judicial bodies shall be elected by the Congress and shall not be members of any other FIFA body. [...]. The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of the judicial bodies may only be relieved of their duties by the Congress*".

11. Article 27.7 of FIFA Statutes provides that *“The Council shall submit proposals for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of each of the Audit and Compliance Committee, the Governance Committee and the judicial bodies to the Congress. (...) Proposals shall be submitted, in writing to the general secretariat at least four months before the start of the Congress. (...)”*

12. Though it is listed as a standing committee, the “Governance Committee” (which, after the end of the work of the Reform Committee chaired by Mr François Carrard, was institutionalised and integrated into FIFA internal structures) is considered as (or at least assimilated to) an independent body. Thus, the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Governance Committee are elected by the Congress upon the proposal of the Council (Article 39.4 of the Statutes) and they may not belong to the Council (Article 39.3 of the Statutes).⁵

13. However, independence cannot be merely formal; in addition to enshrining it in the Statutes, it should be substantially confirmed and upheld in practice. In this regard, proposals for the first chairmanships of the two chambers of the Ethics Committee and of the Audit and Compliance Committee came from the Independent Governance Committee itself and the persons eventually appointed had the agreement of this committee, these were:

- Mr Domenico Scala, who was elected chairperson of the Audit and Compliance Committee (upon a proposal by the IGC) ;
- Mr Hans-Joachim Eckert, who was elected chairperson of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee (upon a proposal by Professor Pieth, Chairperson of IGC);
- Mr Michael Garcia, who was elected chairperson of the Investigatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee (upon a proposal by Interpol).

14. Mr Garcia resigned from his functions after the publication, on 13 November 2014, of Mr Eckert’s statement on the enquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup country allocation and the refusal to make public the report Mr Garcia had delivered at the end of his investigations. Mr Cornel Borbély, who was his deputy chairperson, was then elected as the new chairperson.

15. On Friday, 13 May 2016, the FIFA Congress (meeting in Mexico City) authorised the FIFA Council to appoint the office holders for the remaining vacant positions of the independent committees and the Governance Committee and to dismiss any office holder of those committees until the successive 67th FIFA Congress. FIFA explained that this decision was made to allow for the appointment of members on an interim basis to the vacant positions of the new committees, so that these committees could start fulfilling their roles, and to allow for a swift removal of members having breached their obligations.

16. Mr Scala immediately resigned from his functions, as he considered that this decision was a clear threat to the independence of the concerned bodies, because such a power could have been used by the Council to impede investigations by dismissing the responsible committee members or by keeping them acquiescent through the threat of a dismissal. Mr Scala was replaced by Mr Tomaž Vesel, who has now been elected for a four-year term by the last FIFA Congress, which was held in Bahrain on 11-12 May 2017.⁶

17. The Congress in Bahrain, upon the proposal of the Council,⁷ decided (to widespread surprise) not to renew the mandate of Mr Borbély and Mr Eckert and elected Ms Maria Claudia Rojas (former president of the Council of State in Colombia) and Mr Vassilios Skouris (a Greek judge, former president of the European Court of Justice) as chairpersons of the Investigatory Chamber and of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee. Together with Mr Borbély and Mr Eckert, all but two members of the two Chambers were replaced. In addition, Mr Luís Miguel Maduro, a former European Court of Justice Advocate General, who had been chairing the Governance Committee and the Review Committee (which is, amongst other functions, responsible for eligibility checks and independence reviews)⁸ for only eight months,⁹ was also replaced with his former deputy, Mr Mukul Mudgal (former Chief Justice of the Indian High Court).⁹

⁵ Article 39.3 also states that the independent members of the Finance Committee and the independent members of the Development Committee may not belong to the Council.

⁶ Mr Tomaž Vesel is an international audit expert; Mr Christopher Mihm, Chair of the United Nations Independent Audit Advisory Committee was elected as deputy chairperson.

⁷ The official report says this was a “unanimous” proposal, and maybe formally it was; but some dissent was apparently there: Mr Reinhard Grindel, president of the German Football Association, reportedly stated that it was a decision of the FIFA president and there was no open decision. See: [UEFA duped over lack of transparency in process for picking new Ethics chiefs.](#)

⁸ As an example, Mr Maduro led the tough refusal of clearance to the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Vitaly Mutko, to stand again for the FIFA Council.

⁹ Mr Olli Rehn, former vice-president of the European Commission was elected as deputy-chairperson.

18. The replacement of Mr Borbély and Mr Eckert – whose work was instrumental, as that of the FBI, in sanctioning 70 officials, including Mr Blatter and Mr Platini – raised lots of questions. The two former chairpersons publicly claimed that the decision not to renew their mandate: was “politically motivated”, seriously hampered the pursuit of hundreds of pending investigations and meant the end of reform efforts at FIFA. FIFA replied that the new chairpersons were recognised, high-profile experts in their respective fields and that their election was also to better reflect geographic and gender diversity within FIFA bodies. Of course, I have no doubt about the high profile and competences of the newly elected chairpersons and members of the Ethics Committee.

19. Article 27.7 of FIFA Statutes provides that the Council proposals to the Congress for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Audit and Compliance Committee, of the Governance Committee and of the judicial bodies, shall be submitted in writing, to the general secretariat, at least four months before the start of the Congress. In the case of Ms Rojas, this deadline was not met. However, according to FIFA, this deadline is not mandatory; it is applied to ensure that the Review Committee and the Investigatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee have enough time to conduct the eligibility checks and proposals are therefore admissible also after the deadline elapses. However, it is not clear whether the Review Committee (i.e. the body responsible for the eligibility check in this case) was properly informed of Ms Rojas’s friendly connection with Mr Bedoya, a former FIFA executive committee and president of the Colombian Football Federation, who FIFA Ethics found guilty of wrongdoing including bribery and conflicts of interest imposing on him a life ban. Nevertheless, this cannot put into question Ms Rojas’s probity.

3. Length of mandates, eligibility checks and independence reviews

20. With regard to these questions, FIFA Statutes and Regulations are quite well thought out.

21. The new FIFA Statutes establish **term limits** of no more than three terms of office of four years (whether consecutive or not), i.e. 12 years, for:

- the FIFA President and Council members (Article 33.2 and 33.3 of the Statutes);
- all members of the FIFA judicial bodies (Article 52.5 and 52.6, of the Statutes);
- all members of the Audit and Compliance Committee (Article 51.3 and 51.4 of the Statutes).

This was one of our requests and we should praise this decision.

22. The President, all the members of the Council, of the standing committees and of the independent committees, as well as the Secretary General, must fulfil the **eligibility check** in accordance with Annexe 1 of the FIFA Governance Regulations. The eligibility checks are conducted:

- by the Investigatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee for the members of the Governance Committee (Article 39.5 and Article 52.8 of the Statutes), including the members of the Review Committee (which is composed by the chairperson, deputy chairperson and one independent member of the Governance Committee);
- by the Review Committee for the President (Article 27.1 of the Statutes, Articles 4 and 48.1.a and d of the Governance Regulations), the vice-presidents and the members of the Council (Article 30.6 of the Statutes, Article 4 of the Governance Regulations), the chairpersons, deputy chairperson and members of the Audit and Compliance Committee and of the judicial bodies (Article 27.8 of the Statutes and Articles 4, 37.1.c and 38.3 of the Governance Regulations), the members of the standing committees (Article 39.5. of the Statutes and Article 4 of the Governance Regulations) and the Secretary General (Article 37.3 of the Statutes and Article 4 of the Governance Regulations).

23. FIFA Governance Regulations defines in Article 5 the **independence criteria**. In particular, the following individuals shall fulfil the independence criteria:

- No fewer than half of the members of the Governance Committee, including the chairperson and the deputy chairperson. It could be noted here that the chairperson, the deputy chairperson and one independent member of the Governance Committee form the Review Committee (Article 40.1 and 40.2 of the Statutes and Article 27.1 and 27.2 of the Governance Regulations).
- No fewer than half of the members of the Finance Committee and of the Development Committee (Articles 41.2 and 42.1 of the Statutes and Articles 28.1.b and 29.1 of the Governance Regulations).
- Candidates for any position on the Audit and Compliance Committee as well as the incumbent members of the committee (Article 51.2 of the Statutes and Article 37.1.d of the Governance Regulations).
- The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and members of the judicial bodies (Article 52.4 of the Statutes and Article 38.4 of the Governance Regulations).

24. Additional provisions apply to the members of the FIFA Ethics Committee following article 34 of the FIFA Code of Ethics:¹⁰ they “*may not belong to any other FIFA bodies*” (Article 34.3) and “*shall manage their investigations and proceedings and render their decisions entirely independently and must avoid any third-party influence*” (Article 34.1). The same article provides that “*their immediate family members (as defined in this Code) may not belong to any other judicial body, the Executive Committee or another standing committee of FIFA.*” (Article 34.2).

25. Article 38.4 of the Governance Regulations requires **independent reviews** of the incumbent members of the judicial bodies, who “*shall, at least annually and prior to re-election or extension of the mandate, be subject to independence reviews.*” These reviews are entrusted to the Review Committee which shall conduct such reviews also “*in respect of candidates and incumbent members of the Audit and Compliance Committee and the judicial bodies as well as of candidates and incumbent members of the standing committees who must fulfil the independence criteria in accordance with the FIFA Governance Regulations, and shall review the Related-Party Declarations submitted by the members of the Council.*” (Article 40.5 of the Statutes).

26. The Investigatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee conducts the independence reviews in respect of candidates and incumbent members of the Governance Committee who shall fulfil the independence criteria in accordance with the FIFA Governance Regulations (52.8 of the Statutes).

4. Financial transparency, financial procedures and financial controls

27. FIFA has adopted a number of improvements to its annual report for 2016 with the aim to ensure increased transparency. The annual report now consists of three separate, although intertwined, reports: the Activity Report, the Financial Report and the Governance Report.¹¹

28. One of the most significant positive changes implemented by FIFA is the establishment of a **compensation policy** and the **disclosure of individual annual compensations** of the President, vice-presidents and members of the Council, and of the Secretary General, as well as of the chairpersons of the Audit and Compliance Committee, of the judicial bodies and of “independent” standing committees. These figures shall be published annually (Article 51.10 of the Statutes and Article 6 of the Governance Regulations).¹²

29. Council members are required to disclose, on an annual basis, all **related-party transactions** carried out or agreed upon between themselves, a close member of their family or a company or other entity significantly influenced by them on the one hand, and FIFA or a FIFA subsidiary on the other (Article 10.5 and Annexe 2 – Related-Party Declaration of the Governance Regulations).¹³

30. **Decisions on all commercial contracts** are taken by the FIFA administration and no longer by the FIFA Council. A designated **procurement or tender process** is applicable to any purchase over 10 000 USD (cumulated within one calendar year).¹⁴ A systematic tender process for all broadcasting contracts is being developed. An analysis is in progress on whether a model involving the outsourcing of sales activities to “external” agencies could enhance transparency compared to an in-house model.

31. **Systematic verification of FIFA finances** is performed by external auditors (currently PwC) and, internally, by the Audit and Compliance Committee and the Finance Committee. Annual financial reports are issued in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Swiss Law.¹⁵ All financial information and reports are publicly available on FIFA’s website.¹⁶

¹⁰ [FIFA Code of Ethics](#).

¹¹ These are the reports for 2016: [Activity Report 2016](#), the [Financial Report 2016](#) and [Governance Report 2016](#).

¹² Compensation figures for key management personnel are detailed in the annual FIFA Governance Report (cf. FIFA Governance Report 2016). See also the [media release with the rationale and compensation figures for the FIFA President and FIFA Secretary General](#).

¹³ Council members submit the Related-Party Declaration to the President and to the Review Committee and the President to the Secretary General and to the Review Committee (cf. Article 10.5 of the FIFA Governance Regulations).

¹⁴ The procurement process is currently under review.

¹⁵ In January 2017, the FIFA Council approved the early adoption of the new accounting standard IFRS 15 “Revenue from Contracts with Customers”, which specifies how and when revenue is recognised in IFRS reports and ensures the comparability of each year over the four-year cycle. FIFA is the first sports organisation to do so.

¹⁶ See [FIFA.com](#).

32. The **Audit and Compliance Committee** performs very significant functions: it advises and assists – but it also oversees – the Council in monitoring FIFA's financial and compliance matters, monitors compliance with the FIFA Governance Regulations and supervises the general secretariat (Article 51.7 of the Statutes). It is also entrusted to ensure the completeness and reliability of the financial accounting and review the financial statements, the consolidated financial statement and the external auditors' report. It monitors the distribution and flow of development-related funds and can suggest to the appropriate FIFA bodies any action that it deems necessary as a result of such monitoring (Article 51.8 of the Statutes).

33. Its **Compensation Sub-Committee** – which is composed of the chairperson of the Finance Committee, the chairperson of the Audit and Compliance Committee and a third independent member to be jointly appointed by the two chairpersons – defines the compensation rules and, in particular, determines the compensation of the FIFA President, of the vice-presidents and members of the Council and of the Secretary General (Articles 51.9 and 51.10 of the FIFA Statutes and Articles 37.2.b and 11.b of the FIFA Governance Regulations).

34. At the administration level, in addition to the **Chief Financial Officer**, a new internal **Compliance Division** has been established to ensure that zero tolerance towards wrongdoing becomes the norm; this division is entrusted with the responsibility to develop a thorough compliance programme, including elements such as anti-bribery and anti-corruption policies, employee training, monitoring the internal confidential whistle-blower hotline, compliance risk assessment and offering advice and support to FIFA employees. In addition, a new position of "**Chief Compliance Officer**" has been created. The Chief Compliance Officer is responsible, together with the FIFA Compliance Unit, for overseeing the compliance programme and reporting directly to the FIFA Secretary General as well as to the chairperson of the independent Audit and Compliance Committee.

35. FIFA is developing new operational policies and practices for **enhanced (direct) control of critical business operations**, including FIFA World Cup™ ticketing and FIFA World Cup™ organising activities.¹⁷ Steps already completed include the reinforcement of control, approval and audit rights with the external ticketing agency contracted for the FIFA World Cup™ in 2018 and the benchmarking of operational costs (including comparisons with UEFA and other global sports governing bodies). Work is in progress on:

- the elaboration of a new transparent ticketing model (to be finalised by the end of 2018);
- a fully centralised control and transparency on money flows related to Local Organising Committee contributions and expenses, as well as on FIFA expenses for the 2018 FIFA World Cup™;
- a new structure to be established for future World Cups (starting from the 2022 FIFA World Cup™), to guarantee full control of all money flows by FIFA.

36. Last but not least, article 78 of FIFA Governance Regulations provide for a **systematic auditing of FIFA member associations**. In particular, member associations shall submit themselves to yearly independent audits of their financial statements, to be carried out by local, external auditors with adequate qualifications in accordance with local law or by any qualified external auditors that the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee deems appropriate (Article 78.1). In addition, the auditors shall further undertake audit-related services on the use of development funds granted by FIFA (see section 9 below) on the basis of annual instructions provided by FIFA. Their reports shall be submitted to the FIFA administration by each member association by 31 March following the financial year under review (Article 78.2). Member associations shall supply all means of proof that FIFA and/or the auditors consider(s) necessary (Article 78.3). Audit and Compliance Committee and/or the Chief Compliance Officer may appoint a consultant for each member association concerned, who shall be given unrestricted access to all accounts, documents, etc. as deemed necessary (Article 78.4).

5. The Code of Ethics and the Ethics Committee

37. The revision of the FIFA Code of Ethics¹⁸ and the creation of the Ethics Committee (with its two Chambers) were part of the FIFA governance reform process from 2011 to 2013. The report of our committee on "The reform of football governance" provides a detailed analysis of key provisions.¹⁹

¹⁷ For details, see the FIFA [media release](#) of 13 October 2016.

¹⁸ [FIFA Code of Ethics](#).

¹⁹ [The reform of football governance](#), Doc. 13738 (adopted on 25 March 2015), Rapporteur Mr Michael Connarty, (United Kingdom, SOC). See in particular section 2. "The new FIFA Ethics Committee", paragraphs 13 to 58. For more information on the work of the Ethics Committee, see: [Profile of the independent Ethics Committee](#) and [Ethics Committee milestones 2012 - 2017](#).

38. A positive development has been the changes to Article 36 of the Code of Ethics adopted on 20 October 2015.²⁰ The previous text of Article 36.2 stated that: “*Only the final decisions already notified to the addressees may be made public*”. The Committee called for more transparency and the changes are heading in this direction. The new paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36 now establish that:

“2. (...) the investigatory chamber or the adjudicatory chamber may, if deemed necessary and in an appropriate form, inform the public about or confirm ongoing or closed proceedings, and also rectify wrong information or rumours. Any release of such information shall respect the presumption of innocence and the personality rights of those concerned3. The investigatory chamber or the adjudicatory chamber may, in an appropriate form, inform the public about the reasons for any decision.”

39. These new provisions allow the two chambers to inform the public about ongoing proceedings against accused parties upon request, and to justify decisions publicly, even if the decision has not yet become final and binding. The practice is that (short) information on decisions taken by the FIFA Ethics Committee is published on FIFA’s website.²¹

40. Although most recommendations by our Assembly have not been followed yet, a full revision of the FIFA Code of Ethics is ongoing and should be completed by the end of 2017 or beginning of 2018. Mr Skouris, the new chairperson of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee, indicated that many recommendations could be addressed in this framework.

6. Open and inclusive decision-making processes

41. Concerning transparency of decision-making, the Committee is focused on bids for the hosting of FIFA World Cup and other main events. FIFA has changed the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup making it more transparent and objective. According to the new process, FIFA will establish a Bid Evaluation Task Force formed by experts from within the administration and from its standing committees. Their appraisal of the candidates will be guided by clear and objective criteria, including criteria for sustainable event management, human rights and environmental protection. The task force will submit to the FIFA Council a report which will be public. A candidate shall be excluded if the task force determines a material failure to comply with the pre-determined minimum requirements. The FIFA Council will review the bids and the evaluation report and will shortlist the bids that qualify to then be voted on by the FIFA Congress. The result of each ballot and the related votes by the members of the FIFA Council will be open and made public (Article 3.5, 3.6 and 4.1 of the FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup).

42. Concerning inclusiveness in decision-making, one new **Football Stakeholders Committee** has been created (Article 44 of the Statutes): each confederation as well as the different stakeholders involved in association football (in particular: administrators, players, referees, coaches, clubs and leagues) shall be represented therein (Article 31 of the Governance Regulations). An additional tool for associate partners and experts to decision-making are the **working groups**, which the standing committees may set up to conduct specific tasks or examine specific problems; these working groups may include experts that are not members of the committees (cf. Article 21 of the FIFA Governance Regulations).²²

43. To better associate FIFA member associations, the new Statutes (Article 49) stipulate that FIFA shall organise at least once a year a **member association’s conference**, as a strategic advisory forum for FIFA. The president of each member association will be a member of the conference and may be accompanied by other top executives (cf. Article 7 of the FIFA Governance Regulations).

7. Consideration of Human Rights

44. As it is stated in the new article 3 of its Statutes, “*FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.*” FIFA also set up an independent Human Rights Advisory Board, which should provide FIFA with advice on its efforts to implement this provision.²³

²⁰ See FIFA [Circular 1507](#).

²¹ See [here](#).

²² An example has been the creation of a dedicated [working group on third-party ownership](#) under FIFA’s Players Status Committee, with a mandate to further consult all relevant stakeholders and to analyse all possible regulatory options (64th FIFA Congress in Sao Paolo, 2014).

²³ The Advisory Board held its first meeting on 13-14 March 2017; see the [media release](#)).

45. In the past three years, FIFA has engaged in a dedicated effort to strengthen and systematise its human rights work following guidance from the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (endorsed by the UN in June 2011).²⁴ In December 2015, FIFA asked Professor John G. Ruggie to provide advice on how FIFA should embed respect for human rights in its policies and practices. Professor Ruggie's independent report was published in April 2016.²⁵ FIFA developed a human rights policy, which was adopted by the FIFA Council in May 2017; the same month, FIFA delivered two key documents concerning this policy and its implementation.²⁶

46. The report on "The reform of football governance" – and the subsequent PACE Resolution 2053 (2015) – focused on the need to strengthen the consideration of Human Rights in bidding and hosting requirements and called FIFA to request the authority of Qatar to take all necessary measures to secure respect for the fundamental rights of all foreign migrant workers employed in their country. Concrete initiatives have been taken by FIFA in this respect, including the establishment of monitoring systems on working conditions in Russia and in Qatar, respectively for the 2018 and the 2022 FIFA World Cups™.

47. Concerning the 2018 FIFA World Cup™, the Sustainability Strategy developed by FIFA and the Local Organising Committee (LOC) covers various aspects of human rights, in particular decent work, inclusivity and equality.²⁷ FIFA and the LOC have launched a project to monitor working conditions at construction sites of FWC stadiums²⁸ and signed a Memorandum of Understanding²⁹ with the Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI), and the Russian Construction Workers Union (RBWU) to collaborate in ensuring decent and safe working conditions for the construction and renovation of the Russian stadiums. The 1st report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board (see below para. 65) says that, according to FIFA and the Building and Woodworkers' International (BWI), the monitoring system has led to improvements. However, the Advisory Board notes that there are no public available figures on the overall effectiveness of the system and that there is a lack of agreement on whether the system is properly addressing the root causes of incidents.³⁰

48. In Qatar, FIFA have engaged with the International Labour Organization (ILO), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Building and Woodworkers' International (BWI) and the Qatari authorities, to improve the working conditions at construction sites. FIFA is collaborating closely with the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, which is responsible for delivering the infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup™. The Supreme Committee has developed a comprehensive set of Workers' Welfare Standards (WWS) based on international standards. The WWS are an integral part of the tendering process and are contractually binding for all companies working on FIFA World Cup construction sites. The implementation of the standards is monitored by a four-tier monitoring system, including self-assessments by the contractors, audits by the Supreme Committee, audits by an independent third-party, the British company Impactt Ltd., and audits by the Qatari Ministry of Labour. In April 2017, Impactt Ltd. published its first public report based on inspections carried out in August and November 2016 and in January 2017. In November 2016, the Supreme Committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the BWI.³¹ The collaboration between the two entities includes joint inspections on stadium sites, training of staff from the Supreme Committee and contractors, as well as an assessment of the Supreme Committee's grievance mechanisms. The first two joint inspections were held in February and April 2017. Though the situation in Qatar still raises concerns, significant improvements have been acknowledged by Impactt Ltd.

49. At its meeting in May 2017, the FIFA Council decided to integrate human rights requirements in the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). This has been done: the "Guide to the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup" and "FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup" have been published.³² Key elements include a requirement for bidders and the selected host country or countries to make a public commitment to respect internationally recognised human rights in line with the UNGPs in all aspects of their activities relating to the hosting and staging of the competition and to provide a human rights strategy and concept, including a detailed risk assessment and strategy to address potential adverse human

²⁴ An overview of this work is given by the fact sheet on [FIFA's human rights approach](#).

²⁵ The report "[For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights](#)" lays out the relevant human rights context for FIFA and presents 25 detailed recommendations for action.

²⁶ [FIFA's Human Rights Policy](#); [FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights](#).

²⁷ [2018 FWC Sustainability Strategy](#).

²⁸ See the fact sheet on [Decent Working Conditions Monitoring System](#) and the [media release](#).

²⁹ [Memorandum of Understanding](#).

³⁰ [Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board](#).

³¹ See the [media release](#).

³² [Guide to the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup](#) ; [FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup](#);

rights impacts. An initial assessment and strategy proposal will have to be provided by the bidders as part of the bidding process. Human rights criteria and the information provided by the bidders will then be an integral part of the bid evaluation by the FIFA administration. Once the host(s) has/have been selected, relevant entities tasked with staging the event will be required to put an in-depth human rights due diligence process in place and to cooperate closely with FIFA in that regard.³³ In addition, FIFA has started to integrate human rights considerations into the bidding requirements for other FIFA tournaments. For example, since April 2016, FIFA has been assessing the bids for the FIFA Futsal World Cup 2020 based on human rights criteria.

50. In its Resolution 2053 (2015), PACE called on FIFA to “*strengthen co-operation with the relevant intergovernmental organisations to promote human rights through sport (...)*” (paragraph 15.2). In this respect, in addition to the above-mentioned co-operation with ILO, FIFA sought technical guidance and assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as part of a stakeholder consultation process, in order to develop the concept on the integration of human rights aspects in the organisation of its events. A representative of the OHCHR is a member of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board. At the occasion of the FIFA U-20 Women’s World Cup Papua New Guinea 2016, FIFA implemented a joint campaign with UNICEF to help combat violence against women and children in the country.

51. For further details on how FIFA is integrating human rights in its policies, see Appendix 2.

8. Promotion of gender equality: women in football and women’s’ football development

52. FIFA new Statutes set as a new objective: “to promote the development of women’s football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance” (cf. Article 2.f of the Statutes). In addition, Article 4 of the Statutes prohibits discrimination of any kind on account of gender (among others) punishing such a discrimination by suspension or expulsion. On this basis, important steps have taken place to promote women in football and women’s football.

53. Under the new FIFA Statutes (Article 33.5), the members of each confederation must ensure that they elect at least one female member to the Council; if a confederation does not elect a female candidate, the seat will remain vacant until the next election of members of the Council.³⁴ As a consequence, at present the Council includes 7 women (i.e. one female representative for each confederation plus the FIFA Secretary General). The Council is responsible for ensuring adequate female representation within the standing committees (Article 39.4 of the Statutes) and, when proposing chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of judicial bodies to the Congress, the Council shall take into account appropriate female representation (Article 52.2 of the Statutes). At present, women represent around 45% of FIFA administration and 28% of leadership positions therein.

54. The document “FIFA 2.0: the Vision for the Future” set the goal of doubling to 60 million the number of female football players worldwide by 2026 through the development and execution of a strategy to bring women’s football to the mainstream. A targeted leadership programme³⁵ is designed to identify, support and develop strong female leaders in football, while advocating for women’s access to senior decision-making positions globally. Within FIFA structures a dedicated Women’s Football Division has been established to build and execute a development and commercial strategy for the women’s game.³⁶

9. Football Development

55. The first objective listed in article 2 of FIFA Statutes is “*to improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly through youth and development programmes*”. In line with this objective, two main documents enshrine FIFA strategy for the development of football worldwide the “FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future” and the new “FIFA Forward Programme”.³⁷ A key figure is that FIFA plans to invest 4 billion USD over the next decade in football (including women’s football) development through FIFA’s 211 member associations under a new “FIFA Forward Programme” (which is underway) and additional funding initiatives.

³³ See in this respect the [Guide to the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup](#) and [FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup](#).

³⁴ In the former Executive Committee there was only one reserved seat for a female member.

³⁵ [FIFA Female Leadership Development Programme](#).

³⁶ See the relevant [press release](#).

³⁷ [FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future](#); [FIFA Forward Programme](#).

56. In particular, the FIFA Forward Programme is intended to provide tailor-made support for football development in each of the 211 member associations and of the six confederations. Previously, ten different programmes and six different sets of regulations existed for development programmes; thus it was extremely difficult to keep a transparent overview of different money flows to member associations. The Forward Programme is designed around three principles:

- More investment: FIFA is increasing the financial support for member associations and football development from 1.6 million USD to 5 million USD per a four-year cycle.
- More impact: to improve the impact and efficiency of its investments in development, FIFA will include the whole project support for each association into one tailor-made contract setting the strategy for development over two to four years, with agreed objectives and a development plan to meet the specific needs and challenges of each association. All projects must be linked to this contract.³⁸
- More oversight: clear conditions will have to be fulfilled in order to receive money and FIFA is introducing enhanced controls to ensure that spending is transparent, carefully managed and effective, so that funds are used in the correct way and have the maximum impact for football on the ground.³⁹

57. With regards to the latter aspect:

- the Development Committee (which is composed of a minimum of 50% of independent members) will oversee the Forward Programme and all projects above 300 000 USD will have to be approved by this committee, the Administration being responsible for decisions on projects under this ceiling;
- regulations will be improved to provide for greater powers of oversight and tougher compliance measures; special provisions will apply to fight against fraud and misuse of funds;
- FIFA administration will monitor the progress of projects;
- members associations will be required to report annually on the use of funds allocated by FIFA, publish annually independent audits of their finances and submit a final report on each project after its completion; independent financial audits of Forward funds will be carried out (so that in principle over a four-year cycle each association should be submitted to an audit).

58. In its Resolution 2053 (2015), PACE called FIFA not only to “*strengthen co-operation with the relevant intergovernmental organisations to promote human rights through sport (...)*” but also to “*foster their effective protection, in particular through their development programmes*” (paragraph 15.2). FIFA has developed concrete actions in this respect. In particular, through the Football for Hope programme, FIFA supports a wide range of NGOs that tackle social issues in their communities through football and contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights. Moreover, FIFA has now included human rights-related considerations in the regulations of the new Forward Programme.

10. Promotion of good governance principles

59. The new FIFA Statutes require that member associations and confederations include **good governance principles** in their Statutes and among others: be neutral in matters of politics and religion; prohibit all forms of discrimination; ensure that judicial bodies are independent (separation of powers); avoid conflicts of interest in decision-making; perform yearly independent audits of accounts; constitute their legislative bodies in accordance with the principles of representative democracy and taking into account the importance of gender equality in football (cf. Articles 15 and 23 of the Statutes). It is worth noting that good governance and integrity programmes are included among the areas for which member associations can apply for additional funding from the Forward Programme.

³⁸ FIFA will use the contracts of agreed objectives, which have been mandatory since 1 June 2017, to ensure that the recipients stay in line with the aims, schedules and processes agreed with FIFA.

³⁹ FIFA Forward regulations provide that FIFA must review the Forward expenditures of 20% of member associations annually. For 2016 (the current review year), FIFA reviewed over 35%. This percentage is expected to increase in 2017. The process is administered by an expert external provider who will review the expenditures based on agreed upon procedures. The results of this review are presented to FIFA management and the FIFA Audit & Compliance Committee. The member association and the external expert provider will agree on an action plan to mitigate any identified issues and the external provider will follow-up in 3 months to ensure the plan is being implemented. Educational component: the key focus of this is to help the member associations or confederations build sustainable processes and procedures so that the same issues are not identified year after year in a central review. This is where the support of FIFA is necessary to help the MA/Confederation grow and improve.

Appendix 1

Specific Recommendations to FIFA by the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media (adopted on 27 January 2015): State of implementation

NB: Concerning issues under sections 1 and 2 (items 1 to 17) a review of the FIFA Code of Ethics is in progress. FIFA indicated that PACE recommendations will be considered within this framework.

1. Ensure that all serious violations of the Code of Ethics are investigated and punished	
1. In Article 2 of the Code of Ethics, the words “on the day the infringement is committed” should be deleted.	Not done → The present text could be misleading; it could lead to an interpretation contradictory to Article 3 (“ <i>This Code shall apply to conduct whenever occurred including before the passing of the rules contained in this Code ...</i> ”). As an example, it could be interpreted as excluding the possibility of investigating an allegation of corruption or of bribery committed by someone who thereafter becomes a FIFA official, for example having paid money in order to become a FIFA official. It also seems to exclude corrupt acts which were committed before the code was set down.
2. Article 3 of the Code of Ethics should provide that any cases of corruption, bribery and match-fixing, even if the relevant facts were committed before the present Code of Ethics entered into force, are within its scope and can be investigated and punished.	Not done
3. Article 56.1 of the Code of Ethics should provide that the Ethics Committee remains competent to render a decision even when the person concerned has ceased his or her functions.	Not done → Article 56.1, while confirming the competence of the Ethics Committee to render a decision concerning the case of a person bound by the Code who “ <i>ceases to serve in his function during the proceedings</i> ”, seems to exclude, <i>a contrario</i> , the competence of the Ethics Committee to render a decision against someone who ceases to serve in his or her functions before the procedure starts. FIFA indicated that a review of article 56 is in progress.
4. Article 56.2 of the Code of Ethics should provide that, in cases of bribery, corruption and match-fixing, the Ethics Committee shall continue the procedure and take a decision as to the substance even if the person concerned has ceased his or her functions.	Not done → The provision in question gives a wide discretionary power on whether to continue or not a procedure against a person who ceases his or her functions. This room for manoeuvre is problematic, namely when investigations concern serious offences. FIFA indicated that a review of article 56 is in progress.
5. The Code of Ethics should establish a clear link between the most serious breaches and the most severe sanctions: when bribery, corruption and breaches against the integrity of matches and competitions are eventually established, the most severe sanctions, i.e. long-term or life ban, must be applied (the length of the ban allowing for the sanction to be tailored depending on the concrete circumstances of a given case).	Not done → According to Article 9.2: “ <i>The Ethics Committee shall decide the scope and duration of any sanction.</i> ”
6. The Code of Ethics should include a provision reflecting the entitlement of the Ethics Committee to apply article 47.1 by analogy to other cases when factual circumstances require the protection of a witness, and to conclude specific anonymity agreements with individual witnesses.	Not done → FIFA indicated that this matter could be considered within the framework of the review of the Code of Ethics.

2. Reinforce the independence of the members of the Ethics Committee and the transparency of its work	
7. The Congress should be given the sole competence to establish (and modify if need be) the number of members of the judicial bodies, and in particular of the Ethic Committee.	Not done → According to the new Article 27 of FIFA Statutes (almost identical to the former Article 24) this competence is to the Council.
8. The objective professional requirements for candidates for membership of the judicial bodies should be clearly listed.	Not done → Concerning eligibility criteria, the new Article 52 of FIFA Statutes is identical to the former Article 61. Article 52.3 (which is identical to former Article 61.3) states: “ <i>The judicial bodies are to be composed in such a way that the members, together, have the knowledge, abilities and specialist experience that is necessary for the due completion of their tasks. The chairpersons and deputy chairpersons for the judicial bodies shall be qualified to practise law.</i> ” This provision should be completed by more concrete objective professional requirements.
9. All members of the judicial bodies should fulfil the independence criteria as described in the Standing Orders of the Congress.	Done → The new Article 52.4 of FIFA Statutes refers to the restrictions resulting from the requirement of independence established by Article 5 of FIFA Governance Regulations. NB: the independence criteria also apply to all independent members of FIFA committees.
10. A transparent procedure should be established for the submission to the Congress (by the Confederations, FIFA members and possibly other stakeholders) of candidates for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and membership of both chambers of the Ethics Committee.	Not done → The submission of candidates appears as an exclusive (and largely discretionary) competence of the Council.
11. The Executive Committee (today the Council) should submit justified proposals to the Congress, so as to ensure that the Congress can proceed to an informed vote “for” or “against” each of the shortlisted candidates.	Not done → See above under 10.
12. The duration of the terms of office, in particular for chairpersons and deputies (of the judicial bodies), should be limited (for example six years, not renewable; or four years renewable only once).	Done → the new Article 52 of FIFA Statutes provides that the terms of all members of the judicial bodies shall last four years (paragraph 5) and a maximum of three terms may be served, whether consecutive or not (par. 6). The maximum duration of the terms of office (12 years) is higher than the one suggested (6 or 8 years) but it is in line with the maximum duration applied for the IOC chairpersonship.
13. The introduction of a “staggered board” membership principle (i.e. the renewal only of part of the members each time) should be considered.	Not done
14. Members should be removed by the Congress only upon receipt of a specific request from the Executive Committee (today the Council), which should clearly indicate the reasons for such a removal.	Not done → The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of the judicial bodies may only be relieved of their duties by the Congress (Article 52.5 of the FIFA Statutes). However there is no provision (to date) which requires for a “motivated” request from the Council.
15. At least in cases of bribery, corruption and match-fixing, once investigation ends, the report of the investigatory chamber should always be made public, including when the procedure is closed; data of a certain nature (for example bank account numbers or contact	Partially done / praxis to be monitored → According to new Article 36 of the FIFA Code of Ethics: « 2. (...) <i>the investigatory chamber or the adjudicatory chamber may, if deemed necessary and in an appropriate form, inform the public about or confirm ongoing or closed</i>

<p>details and personal data other than those strictly necessary to identify the persons concerned, except of course anonymous witnesses) could be redacted or removed.</p>	<p><i>proceedings, and also rectify wrong information or rumours. Any release of such information shall respect the presumption of innocence and the personality rights of those concerned.</i></p> <p><i>3. The investigatory chamber or the adjudicatory chamber may, in an appropriate form, inform the public about the reasons for any decision.”</i></p> <p>The two Chairpersons of the two chambers of the Ethics Committee have a discretionary power (not an obligation) to communicate the relevant elements of their decisions. The practise is however that (short) information on decisions taken by the Ethics Committee is published on FIFA website. FIFA has never opposed publication of full CAS decisions on FIFA related cases.</p>
<p>16. At least in cases of bribery, corruption and match-fixing, the procedure before the adjudicatory chamber should be public with the exception only to ensure the protection of vulnerable witnesses or to comply with an obligation of confidentiality imposed according to national law, in particular within the framework of the collaboration between disciplinary bodies and the judiciary.</p>	<p>Not done → FIFA considers that the respect of the rights of the party implies that only selective information is shared.</p>
<p>17. At least in cases of bribery, corruption and match-fixing, the reasons for the final decision (including when it is taken by the investigatory chamber) should be published.</p>	<p>Partially done / praxis to be monitored → see above under 15</p>
<p>3. Reinforce transparency, accountability and prevention of conflicts of interest</p>	
<p>18. The FIFA Statutes should establish the entitlement of the chairperson of the Audit and Compliance Committee to attend (with no voting rights) Executive Committee meetings and any meetings of other FIFA standing committees with decision-making powers in risk areas (for example the Development Committee).</p>	<p>Done → Article 37.7 c) of FIFA Governance Regulations provides that : <i>«Representatives of the committee may also take part, as observers, in all meetings and other activities of FIFA bodies and units at any time. These powers are subject to applicable confidentiality obligations. ».</i></p>
<p>19. Transparent decision-making on all bids for the hosting of FIFA international sports events (as it is now the case for the FIFA World Cup) should be ensured by requiring “open ballots” and the publication of the results of each ballot.</p>	<p>Done → FIFA has changed the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup making it more transparent and objective. According to the new process, FIFA will establish a Bid Evaluation Task Force formed by experts from within the administration and from its standing committees. Their appraisal of the candidates will be guided by clear and objective criteria, including criteria for sustainable event management, human rights and environmental protection. The task force will submit to the FIFA Council a report which will be public. A candidate shall be excluded if the task force determines a material failure to comply with the pre-determined minimum requirements. The FIFA Council will review the bids and the evaluation report and will shortlist the bids that qualify to then be voted on by the FIFA Congress. The result of each ballot and the related votes by the members of the FIFA Council will be open and made public (Article 3.5, 3.6 and 4.1 of the FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup).</p>

20. Concerning the FIFA World Cup, Article 80.2.c of the Statutes should provide that at least three bids are transmitted to the Congress, unless of course only one or two candidates fulfil the requirements.	Not done → The new art. 69 of the Statutes is identical to the previous provision (former art. 80).
21. FIFA should speed up the drafting, adoption and publication of the regulations on bids and of objective requirements and criteria for evaluating the bids for the hosting of FIFA World Cup and of the other FIFA international sports events.	Partially done / work in progress → On 9 May 2017, the FIFA Council endorsed a set of principles submitted by the FIFA administration as part of the process to select the host country/countries of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, including an overview of the content to be requested from bidding member associations and hosting requirements. The latter include stadium and infrastructure requirements, sustainable event management, human rights and environmental protection. A complete (more detailed) and public version of the bid criteria is not yet available. It is due to be finalised by FIFA by late September 2017.
22. FIFA should redesign its decision-making process for development projects and marketing and procurement activities. In particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all commercial contracts (TV rights, marketing, ticketing and sponsoring) should be put out to tender; • the bidding procedures should be transparent and based on objective criteria, and the corresponding policies should be reviewed by the Audit and Compliance Committee, which should ensure their consistency with the highest international standards in this domain. 	Work in progress → Introducing a systematic tender process for all broadcasting contracts is currently being studied. An analysis is being carried out to see whether a model involving the outsourcing of sales activities to external agencies offers a greater guarantee of transparency compared to an in-house model. Regarding TV rights, FIFA indicated that they are already all tendered.
23. FIFA should consider separating regulatory and commercial functions, by establishing a subsidiary company to manage commercial functions.	Partially done → The restructuring of the FIFA administration has led to the creation of a Commercial Division. The Commercial Director, subordinate to the Deputy Secretary General, oversees all commercial activities. However, the organisation has not yet set up a subsidiary company.
24. The salary grids for all key positions, as well as the level of per diems and expenses reimbursements, should be made public. 25. FIFA should ensure that the full costs for its President, each of the members of the Executive Committee (today the Council) and each of its most senior officials be made public.	Almost achieved / work in progress → The salaries of the FIFA President and all members of the FIFA Council, the Secretary General and the independent chairs of the standing committees, and the cost of the judicial bodies are published in the FIFA Governance report (see, for example, the FIFA 2016 Governance Report, pages 17 to 19). New regulations on remuneration are in preparation.
26. The provision whereby one of the three members of the Compensation Sub-Committee is the chairperson of the Finance Committee – who is necessarily a member of the Executive Committee (today the Council) and therefore has a direct interest at stake – is incongruous and should be reconsidered.	Not done → However, FIFA explained that the chairperson of the Finance Committee may be, but is not necessarily, a member of the FIFA Council.
27. The term of office of the President and other elected managers in governing bodies mentioned in the FIFA Statutes, including the Executive Committee (today the Council), should be limited. The relevant provisions in the Olympic Charter are, in this respect, a good	Done → The new Article 52 of FIFA Statutes provides that the terms shall last four years (paragraph 5) and a maximum of three terms may be served, whether consecutive or not (par. 6). The maximum duration of the terms of office (12 years) is higher than the one suggested (6 or 8 years) but it is in line with the maximum duration applied for the IOC

model.	chairpersonship.
28. A member of the Executive Committee (today the Council) should not have the right to vote when his or her country is a candidate for a FIFA award under discussion.	Done → According to Article 3.6. ii of FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, a member of the FIFA Council shall be considered to have a conflict of interest – and shall therefore decline to participate at the voting process – if (s)he represents a member association that submitted a bid or is a national of the country of this association.
29. Article 22 of the Code of Ethics should be amended to exclude with no exceptions the possibility of accepting commissions or promises of such commissions.	Not done → FIFA indicated that this matter could be considered within the framework of the review of the Code of Ethics.
30. Integrity checks on the members of the Executive Committee (today the Council) should be centralised at FIFA level and possibly entrusted to the Ethics Committee.	Done → According to art. 30 par. 6 of FIFA Statutes: “ <i>Each vice-president and each member of the Council shall be required to fulfil the eligibility check conducted by the Review Committee in accordance with the FIFA Governance Regulations.</i> ”
4. Gender equality	
31. FIFA should aim at encouraging female candidates to key positions and seek to have a knock-on effect on gender equality policies of the national football associations and federations.	FIFA is developing a gender equality policy. See also Appendix 2, section 3.

Appendix 2

Incorporating human rights in the FIFA Statutes and policies

Note by the rapporteur

The following table provides an overview of progress made in implementing three key recommendations concerning human rights addressed to FIFA by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Resolution 2053 (2015) “The Reform of football governance”; these recommendations appear at the beginning of the table.

The following sections of the table take stock of progress in implementation of some of the recommendations contained in:

- the 2016 report of the FIFA Reform Committee (under the direction of Dr François Carrard);
- the report “For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights” (published on 16 April 2016);
- PACE Resolution 1875 (2012) on good governance and ethics in sport concerning the protection of minors (relating to all sports and addressed in particular to the national authorities);
- FIFA Resolution on the fight against racism and discrimination, adopted by the 63rd FIFA Congress (30-31 May 2013).

The statutory provisions referred to are those to be found in the new FIFA Statutes, adopted in 2016. Other relevant regulations are also quoted in the text;

The information included in the present document is not exhaustive and does not capture the whole extent of FIFA policy and action in the field of human rights, which in the last period has been expanded and enhanced. FIFA delivered in May 2017 two key documents to which I refer for further information:

- [FIFA's Human Rights Policy](#);
- [FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights](#).

At this stage, this is just a preliminary analysis which could be subsequently amended.

Contents

- I. Resolution 2053 (2015) “The Reform of football governance”
- II. The institutional incorporation of respect for and promotion of human rights
- III. Protection of minors
- IV. Gender equality
- V. Combating discrimination and hate speech
- VI. Incorporating and promoting human rights in FIFA’s economic and commercial activities

I. Resolution 2053 (2015) “The Reform of football governance”	
Measure	Implementation/Comments
<p>1. Urgently requests the authorities of Qatar to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - take without delay all necessary measures to secure respect for the fundamental rights of all foreign migrant workers employed in their country; - co-operate with the International Labour Organization (ILO) in verifying the effective observance of these rights by both public and private enterprises operating in Qatar; - act with the utmost firmness to punish all abuses by companies or individuals and assure all victims of just redress for harm suffered. 	<p>Done</p> <p>In Qatar, FIFA have engaged with the International Labour Organization (ILO), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Building and Woodworkers’ International (BWI), as well as with Qatari authorities, to improve the working conditions at construction sites. FIFA is collaborating closely with the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (SC), which is responsible for delivering the infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (FWC). The SC has developed a comprehensive set of Workers’ Welfare Standards (WWS) based on international standards. The WWS are an integral part of the tendering process and are contractually binding for all companies working on FWC construction sites. The implementation of the standards is monitored by a four-tier monitoring system, including self-assessments by the contractors, audits by the SC, audits by an independent third-party (the British company Impactt Ltd.), and audits by the Qatari Ministry of Labour. In April 2017, Impactt Ltd. published its first public report based on inspections carried out in August and November 2016 and in January 2017. In November 2016, the SC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Building and Woodworkers’ International (BWI). The collaboration between the two entities includes joint inspections on 2022 FWC stadium sites, training of staff from SC and contractors, as well as an assessment of the SC’s grievance mechanisms. The first two joint inspections were held in February and April 2017. The SC has also published the Second Annual Workers’ Welfare Report covering the period January 2016 – February 2017.</p> <p>Though the situation in Qatar still raises concerns, significant improvements have been acknowledged by Impactt Ltd and these show that the mechanisms established are achieving concrete results.</p>
<p>2. Ensure that any country bidding for the organisation of major sports events undertakes, in all activities linked to the organisation and conduct of the event, to abide by international standards in respect of fundamental rights, including the standards of the ILO.</p> <p>[NB: also the Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 1.3., asks to include human rights within criteria for evaluating bids to host tournaments and make them substantive factor in host selection]</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>At its meeting in May 2017, the FIFA Council decided to integrate human rights requirements in the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). This has been done: the Guide to the bidding process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and FIFA Regulations for the selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup have been published.</p> <p>Key elements include a requirement for bidders and the selected host country or countries to make a public commitment to respect internationally recognised human rights in line with the UNGPs in all aspects of their activities relating to the hosting and staging of the competition and to provide a human rights strategy and concept, including a detailed risk assessment and strategy to address potential adverse human rights impacts. An initial assessment and strategy proposal will have to be provided by the bidders as part of the bidding process. Human rights criteria and the information provided by the bidders will then be an integral part of the bid evaluation by the FIFA administration. Once the host(s) has/have been selected, relevant entities tasked with staging the event will be required to put an in-depth human rights due diligence process in place and to cooperate closely with FIFA in that regard.</p>

	<p>In addition, FIFA has started to integrate human rights considerations into the bidding requirements for other FIFA tournaments. For example, since April 2016, FIFA has been assessing the bids for the FIFA Futsal World Cup 2020 based on human rights criteria. FIFA has now started the first bidding processes that include these requirements, i.e. the youth tournaments of 2019 that were launched early August 2017.</p> <p>It is worth adding that FIFA is committed to help protecting the rights of human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA and media representatives covering FIFA's events and activities and to take appropriate measures if and when their freedoms – in relation to FIFA activities – are jeopardised.</p>
<p>3. Strengthen co-operation with the relevant intergovernmental organisations to promote human rights through sport and foster their effective protection, in particular through their development programmes.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>In addition to the above-mentioned co-operation with ILO (n. 1), FIFA sought technical guidance and assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as part of a stakeholder consultation process, in order to develop the concept on the integration of human rights aspects in the organisation of its events. A representative of the OHCHR is member of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board (see below n. 4).</p> <p>At the occasion of the FIFA U-20 Women's World Cup Papua New Guinea 2016, FIFA implemented a joint campaign with UNICEF to help combat violence against women and children in the country.</p> <p>FIFA has now included human rights-related considerations in the regulations of the new Forward Programme, through which FIFA supports the football development activities and projects of member associations.</p> <p>FIFA established the Football for Hope programme in 2005, through which it supports a wide range of NGOs that tackle social issues in their communities through football and contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights.</p>
<p>II. The institutional incorporation of respect for and promotion of human rights</p>	
<p>Measure</p>	<p>Implementation/Comments</p>
<p>4. Human rights as values to be respected and promoted.</p> <p>2016 report of the FIFA Reform Committee, principle point 19.</p> <p>Report "<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>", p. 5 and seq.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>Article 3 of the Statutes is worded as follows: "<i>FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.</i>"</p> <p>In Article 4, a reference has been added to gender equality and to combating any discrimination on the ground of disability.</p> <p>The promotion of human rights and humanitarian values, non-discrimination, gender equality, equal treatment in general and the stance against racism are stipulated as coming under the role and duties of the FIFA President (Article 14.2, subparagraphs b) and c), of the FIFA Governance Regulations).</p> <p>FIFA's commitment embraces all internationally recognised human rights, including those contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on</p>

	<p>Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.</p> <p>In line with the UNGPs, FIFA is committed to taking measures, based on in-depth due-diligence processes, to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through its own activities and to remediating such impacts when they occur. In addition, FIFA seeks to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships.</p> <p>FIFA’s efforts to embed respect for human rights throughout the organisation are supported by its independent Human Rights Advisory Board. The advisory board includes experts from the UN System, trade unions, civil society organisations and FIFA sponsors (see the terms of reference).</p>
<p>5. FIFA should formally designate a member of top management with accountability for the organisation’s human rights performance</p> <p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 2.1.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>Article 35.2 of the Statutes provides that “<i>The President shall (...) ensure that FIFA’s mission, strategic direction, policies and values (...) are protected and advanced.</i>”</p> <p>Article 14.2 of the FIFA Governance Regulations stipulates that “<i>the President shall be, and thus contribute to FIFA being, a vanguard for promoting the following principles, rights and values in particular: a) integrity, ethics and fair-play; b) human rights and humanitarian values; c) non-discrimination, gender equality, equal treatment in general, and the stance against racism; d) solidarity and mutual respect in football as well as in society in general</i>”.</p> <p>The report on “FIFA’s Human Rights Policy” explains that the FIFA Council is responsible for the overall strategic direction. Operationally, the overall responsibility for the implementation of FIFA’s statutory human rights commitment lies with the FIFA Secretary General.</p>
<p>6. The human rights commitment in Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes should be mirrored in the requirements of the Statutes for member associations</p> <p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 1.3.</p>	<p>Partially done; work in progress</p> <p>The new Article 15 of the Statutes⁴⁰ (a provision undoubtedly to be welcomed) stipulates the principles of good governance which member associations must uphold, and requires that these Statutes specify, in particular, a prohibition of all forms of discrimination. The requirement for an explicit reference to respect for and promotion of human rights is absent. However, when engaging with Member Associations in the revision of their statutes, FIFA uses as reference the “standard statutes”; in early 2017, a provision equivalent to Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes has been included in the working document of the standard statutes.</p>

⁴⁰ “Member associations’ statutes must comply with the principles of good governance, and shall in particular contain, at a minimum, provisions relating to the following matters: a) to be neutral in matters of politics and religion; b) to prohibit all forms of discrimination; c) to be independent and avoid any form of political interference; d) to ensure that judicial bodies are independent (separation of powers); e) all relevant stakeholders must agree to respect the Laws of the Game, the principles of loyalty, integrity, sportsmanship and fair play as well as the Statutes, regulations and decisions of FIFA and of the respective confederation; f) all relevant stakeholders must agree to recognise the jurisdiction and authority of CAS and give priority to arbitration as a means of dispute resolution; g) that the member association has the primary responsibility to regulate matters relating to refereeing, the fight against doping, the registration of players, club licensing, the imposition of disciplinary measures, including for ethical misconduct, and measures required to protect the integrity of competitions; h) definition of the competences of the decision-making bodies; i) to avoid conflicts of interests in decision-making; j) legislative bodies must be constituted in accordance with the principles of representative democracy and taking into account the importance of gender equality in football; and k) yearly independent audits of accounts.”

<p>7. FIFA should use its annual member associations' conferences to raise awareness of member associations' own human rights responsibilities, and should use its existing mentoring activities to help them understand and implement them</p> <p>Report <i>"For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights"</i>, Recommendation 4.5.</p>	<p>Statutory provision adopted; work in progress</p> <p>The new Article 49 of the Statutes provides that: <i>"FIFA shall organise at least once a year, at its own cost, a member associations conference for the presidents of the member associations and/or their top executives, in order to address issues of high relevance for the football world, such as, for instance, football development, integrity, social responsibility, governance, human rights, racism, match-fixing, gender equality, protection of clean athletes and youth, and security."</i></p> <p>Article 7 of the FIFA Governance Regulations does not contain an explicit reference to human rights in the list of issues of high relevance, though "social responsibility" issues could also cover human rights issues.</p> <p>The promotion of human rights among member associations is one of the salient human rights issues identified by FIFA. In line with the human rights policy, FIFA is engaging in a process of analysing the current activities in relation to members associations and will take steps to systematise and expand them in the coming months.</p>
<p>III. Protection of minors</p>	
<p>Measure</p>	<p>Comments on progress with implementation</p>
<p>8. Prohibit commercial transfers of athletes under the age of 16.</p> <p>Resolution 1875 (2012)</p>	<p>FIFA rule satisfactory</p> <p>Article 19 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players provides that <i>"International transfers of players are only permitted if the player is over the age of 18."</i></p> <p>There are four exceptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the player's family moves to the new country for reasons not linked to football; - transfer within the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA), but only for players aged between 16 and 18; - cross-border minors (the player's domicile and the new club are within 50km of their common borders and the distance between the two is under 100km); - The foreign player has lived continuously for the last five years in the country of intended first registration prior to the request. <p>Besides these four exceptions, in recent times, the competent bodies of FIFA granted authorisations for very specific cases, such as minor players who had moved for humanitarian reasons and "exchange student players", with extreme reservation.</p> <p>If a minor player joins a club (normally its academy) for training purposes only (i.e. he/she will not participate in organised football, but only train with the club) and thus will not be registered for the club, then Article 19bis of the Regulations needs to be taken into consideration; its paragraph 6 provides that <i>"Article 19 shall also apply to the reporting of all minor players who are not nationals of the country in which they wish to be reported."</i></p>

<p>9. Prohibit remuneration of intermediaries for athletes aged under 16.</p> <p>Resolution 1875 (2012)</p>	<p>FIFA rule satisfactory</p> <p>Article 7.8 of the Regulation on Working with Intermediaries provides that “<i>Players and/or clubs that engage the services of an intermediary when negotiating an employment contract and/or a transfer agreement are prohibited from making any payments to such intermediary if the player concerned is a minor, as defined in point 11 of the Definitions section of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players</i>” (i.e. a player who has not yet reached the age of 18).</p>
<p>10. Give binding force (for all sports) to measures derived from the 10 recommendations issued by France’s Union of Professional Football Clubs (UCPF) on looking after foreign players who are minors.</p> <p>Resolution 1875 (2012)</p>	<p>No specific action to require from FIFA</p> <p>Article 19 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players applies to introductory training programmes (see n. 11 below). In this area, it should also be considered what the national level should do.</p>
<p>11. Make compulsory the combining of sport with schooling/vocational training, failing which a change of club should be null and void, whatever legal form it may take (transfer, loan, etc.).</p> <p>Resolution 1875 (2012)</p>	<p>FIFA rule satisfactory</p> <p>Article 19.2, sub-paragraph b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players provides that for players aged between 16 and 18 “<i>i. [the club] shall provide the player with an adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national standards; ii. It shall guarantee the player an academic and/or school and/or vocational education and/or training, in addition to his football education and/or training, which will allow the player to pursue a career other than football should he cease playing professional football; iii. It shall make all the necessary arrangements to ensure that the player is looked after in the best possible way (optimum living standards with a host family or in club accommodation, appointment of a mentor at the club, etc.)</i>.” On the basis of Article 19.3 of the Regulations, the same applies to the first registration of a foreign minor player. If these minimum obligations are not met, the transfer will not be approved.</p>
<p>12. Promote the adoption of charters which aim to prevent any moral or physical ill-treatment of athletes who are minors and establish the requisite monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with these charters.</p> <p>Resolution 1875 (2012)</p>	<p>No specific rule</p> <p>This was a national level recommendation. Consideration should be given to whether it would be desirable to improve/strengthen control procedures and enhance responsibility at various levels (FIFA, confederations, national federations).</p>

IV. Gender equality	
Measure	Comments on progress with implementation
<p>13. Ensure fair representation of women in management bodies.</p> <p>14. Encourage female candidates to key positions and seek to have a knock-on effect on the gender equality policies of national football associations and federations.</p> <p>Resolution 2053 (2015)</p>	<p>Work in progress / Follow-up to the recommendation fully satisfactory</p> <p>Article 2 sub-paragraph f. of the Statutes states that one of FIFA's objectives is <i>"to promote the development of women's football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance"</i>. In accordance with Article 22.3 sub-paragraph b. of the Statutes, each confederation is required <i>"to work closely with FIFA in every domain"</i> to achieve this objective.</p> <p>Article 33.5 of the Statutes provides that each confederation must elect at least one female member to the FIFA Council. It also stipulates that any confederation which fails to observe this obligation will forfeit the seat of one representative on the FIFA Council.</p> <p>There has been some improvement in women holding positions in the management bodies, but they are still very much in a minority:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FIFA Council, 6 out of 37; - Development Committee, 3 out of 17; - Finance Committee, 2 out of 8; - Football Stakeholders Committee, 1 out of 22; - Governance and Review Committee, 2 out of 9; - Medical Committee, 1 out of 11; - Member Associations Committee, 3 out of 17; - Organising Committee of FIFA Competitions, 6 out of 23; - Players' Status Committee, 1 out of 22; - Referees Committee, 1 out of 11. <p>FIFA Task Force for Women's Football introduced a set of ten key development principles for women's football, which include the following: <i>"Member Associations to involve women at all decision-making levels, including the executive committee"</i>.</p> <p>FIFA launched in 2015 its Female Leadership Development Programme, an initiative which is intended to provide support to women across the globe, who are looking to become future leaders in football. It is worth noting that FIFA supports Women's Football through its development programmes.</p> <p>The gap to be bridged is significant and the efforts to achieve greater equality (not only on paper but also in practice) must continue; nonetheless, there is no doubt that FIFA is on the right track.</p>

V. Combating discrimination and hate speech	
Measure	Comments on progress with implementation
<p>15. Specific plan of action to combat all forms of racism and discrimination amongst players, officials and supporters.</p> <p>FIFA Resolution on the fight against racism and discrimination (2013)</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>Article 4 of FIFA Statutes condemns all kind of discriminatory practices.</p> <p>FIFA has not formally adopted a plan of action in this field, but developed a strategic approach on anti-discrimination (see here). In 2013 it set up a Task Force Against Racism and Discrimination and, based on the recommendations delivered by this task force, among other actions FIFA adopted in 2015 a Good Practice Guide on Diversity and Anti-Discrimination.</p> <p>On the basis of the Resolution on the fight against racism and discrimination, FIFA calls on competition organisers to draw up a practical plan of action showing their determination to combat all forms of racism and discrimination.</p> <p>See also the specific measures below.</p>
<p>16. Introduction of a system to prevent and punish racism and discrimination.</p> <p>FIFA Resolution on the fight against racism and discrimination (2013)</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>The Resolution on the fight against racism and discrimination provides for an anti-discrimination officer. Every competition must make provision for a specialised official to be in the stadium to identify potential acts of racism or discrimination with the aim of easing pressure on referees and facilitating the availability of evidence for judicial bodies to take decisions.</p> <p>An Anti-Discrimination Monitoring System was launched in May 2015 and has been operational since mid-2016. The system includes the deployment of Anti-Discrimination Match Observers to monitor and report issues of discrimination at matches. It is co-ordinated by FIFA and implemented in collaboration with the Fare network, an organisation with long experience in the fight against discrimination in football and the deployment of match observers.</p>
VI. Incorporating and promoting human rights in FIFA's economic and commercial activities	
Measure	Comments on progress with implementation
<p>17. Adopt and make publicly available a human rights policy that applies to its leadership, staff, commercial subsidiaries, and to its relationships with member associations, business partners and other relevant parties</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>On 13 October 2016, Mr Infantino, FIFA President, unveiled the document "<i>FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future</i>". It sets out a number of key components of a policy to uphold and promote human rights in the economic field, in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - application of international standards to protect workers in the preparation and organisation of the World Cup (see also Nos. 21 and 22); - taking greater ownership of the business operations for FIFA's showcase events;

<p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 1.1.</p>	<p>In May 2017, FIFA published two key documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FIFA’s Human Rights Policy; • FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights.
<p>18. Establish a cross-functional structure, involving those departments that deal with commercial contracts (including licensing), competitions, compliance, development, governmental affairs, human resources, member associations, security and sustainability.</p> <p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 2.3.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>Responsibility for ensuring the day-to-day management of FIFA’s human rights work rests with the Head of the Sustainability & Diversity Department, who reports directly to the FIFA Secretary General and who receives and coordinates with the competent FIFA divisions or bodies, any enquiries regarding human rights.</p> <p>As a platform for cross-departmental collaboration, the Sustainability & Diversity Department holds regular cross-departmental meetings on human rights.</p> <p>In addition, in September 2016, FIFA hired a Human Rights Manager to work within the Sustainability & Diversity Department, who leads the day-to-day planning, coordination and implementation of FIFA’s work on human rights and liaises closely with representatives from other FIFA departments.</p>
<p>19. Include risks of human rights violations in systems for identifying and assessing risks associated with its activities and business relations (incorporating these risks into all levels of assessment, from project management to business relationships).</p> <p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, Recommendation 3.1.</p>	<p>Almost Done; work in progress</p> <p>FIFA has identified what it currently considers the ten most salient human rights issues related to its own activities or business relationships; these are grouped in three categories: issues related to events, issues related to football governance, and issues related to FIFA’s in-house operations. Of the ten issues, five are related to FIFA’s events. They include adverse human rights impacts linked to the construction of infrastructure, supply chains, recruitment and working conditions of local staff and volunteers, the provision of safety and security, and discrimination.</p> <p>FIFA is currently in the process of evaluating all related measures and has committed itself to engage in the development of action plans in order to address any identified gaps starting in the second half of 2017.</p>
<p>20. Provide for the mandatory application of the “<i>UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and international best practice</i>” for all of FIFA’s economic and commercial relationships.</p> <p>Report “<i>For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights</i>”, p. 8 and seq.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>FIFA is now including comprehensive human rights clauses based on the <i>UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</i> in all new relevant commercial relationships. FIFA also includes human rights considerations in its procurement process in a systematic manner.</p>

<p>21. Lay down specific obligations on World Cup local organisation committees regarding the economic dimension of tournaments and provide advice in this connection.</p> <p>Report “For the Game, For the World: FIFA and Human Rights”, p. 18 and seq., Recommendation 4.1.</p>	<p>Done</p> <p>The Sustainability Strategy of the 2018 FIFA World Cup covers various human rights-related aspects, in particular with regard to decent work, inclusivity and equality and ethical business practices.</p> <p>FIFA and the 2018 World Cup Russia Local Organising Committee have developed a system to verify working conditions, the main objective of which is to ascertain whether the stadium building sites for the 2018 World Cup offer decent working conditions that comply with the applicable conventions of the International Labour Organisation, the laws of the Russian Federation and best practice. FIFA has also signed an agreement with the Building and Wood Workers International (BWI) and the Russian Building Workers Union (RBWU).</p> <p>Since 2015, ensuring decent working conditions and the introduction of a formal framework to provide advice and supervision in this regard have been key components of agreements between FIFA and the World Cup Local Organising Committee.</p> <p>Regulatory provisions applicable to all FIFA-organised events, laying down conditions relating in greater detail to the human rights situation in bidding countries are being implemented (see also n. 1 and n. 2).</p>
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