Committee Opinion | Doc. 11731 | 01 October 2008
The consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
A. Conclusions of the committee:
(open)The Political Affairs Committee decided to propose the following amendments.
B. Proposed amendments by the Political Affairs Committee:
(open)Amendment A (to the draft resolution)
In paragraph 1, after “The Assembly is firmly committed to” add the words “the pursuit of peace,”
Amendment B (to the draft resolution)
After paragraph 29, add a new paragraph as follows: “with a view to minimising the risk of further outbreaks of violence involving its member states, the Assembly should play a role in the field of conflict prevention and resolution, as without peace there cannot be genuine respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It decides, therefore, to ask the Bureau to study mechanisms by which it could conduct parliamentary diplomacy in the context of frozen conflicts in Europe and other situations liable to undermine peace and stability.”
Amendment C (to the draft recommendation)
In paragraph 3.2, after “both Georgia and Russia, including” add the following words: “the enhanced monitoring of the commitments and obligations of the two countries, as recommended by the Swedish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers,”.
C. Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Lindblad
(open)1. This war: a reason for alarm
2. Each one has its share of responsibility
- there is a responsibility for causing the war, which is the most difficult aspect to define. Once and if evidence were to prove the exact sequence of events in the night between 7 and 8 August, it would be possible to say who the aggressor was that night. And yet, it would be unfair to attribute to this aggressor the entire responsibility for the war as that night was the culmination of a process which had started long before;
- there is a responsibility for the way in which the war was conducted which, as described by the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, falls on both countries as the scale of their military action, the targets and the kind of weapons employed were disproportionate to the aim which the parties claimed to pursue;
- there is also a responsibility for creating the conditions for a peaceful, lasting and lawful settlement of the conflict, which implies complying with the terms of the ceasefire, protecting civilians against violence and human rights violations in the areas subjected to a country’s de facto control, and refraining from any act acknowledging the mutilation of Georgia’s territorial integrity outside a peaceful negotiation process. This responsibility falls mainly on Russia.
2.1. The run-up to the war
- repeated provocations, or acts perceived as such, from both sides;
- continued skirmishes and exchanges of fire between the Georgian forces and the South Ossetian militias;
- a lull in the negotiations for the settlement of the conflicts, which each part attributes to the lack of interest of the other side;
- the announcement made by the Russian authorities in April 2008 that they would establish formal relations with the separatist de facto authorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi;
- the strengthening of Russian military forces in the region, in terms of troops and material.
- the peacekeeping mechanism established by the 1992 Sochi agreement was not workable. This agreement resulted in entrusting Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops with peacekeeping tasks. It was predictable that, if tensions surpassed a critical threshold, these troops would drop their peacekeeping uniforms to wage war against each other;
- similarly, it was not difficult to predict that the unilateral bestowing of Russian citizenship on the majority of the population of South Ossetia could be used by Russia to legitimise the use of force to protect its citizens.
2.2. The war
- the Russian 58th Army was brought into South Ossetia in response to the indiscriminate and massive shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian artillery – as the Russian authorities maintain – or;
- the shelling of Tskhinvali was in reaction to the massive arrival in South Ossetia of Russian military contingents – as the Georgian authorities argue.
2.3. The aftermath of the war
- Russian troops failed to comply with the commitment to withdraw immediately to the positions they held prior to the hostilities. According to the EU-brokered ceasefire implementation agreement, their withdrawal should now be undertaken by 10 October. However, the Russian authorities declare themselves ready to withdraw their troops to be replaced by EU monitors only from the so-called “buffer zone”, while they argue that, since Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now two independent states, the deployment of monitors in their territories is their sovereign decision. Similarly, the withdrawal or deployment of troops is a separate issue regulated by bilateral agreements;
- in this context, Russia’s recognition of the two separatist regions as independent states defies European values and standards and makes the return to the situation quo ante more difficult to attain;
- Russian troops still de facto present in the so-called “buffer zone” and South Ossetia are failing in their responsibility for protecting people against violence, human rights violations and ethnic cleansing.
3. Kosovo as a precedent: a prediction or an announcement?
3.1. Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- these regions have a history of statehood and neither of them was part of Georgia at the time of the Soviet Union;
- the population of these regions wants, and is ready for, independence; in addition there are functioning institutions in place;
- after the genocide attempt by the Georgians against the population of these territories, it is inconceivable that they could return under Georgia’s sovereignty.
- Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence following more than two years of painstaking negotiations, after that a UN envoy had recommended independence as the only possible outcome, and after a deadlock had emerged in the UN Security Council due to Russia’s refusal to accept the solution recommended by the envoy;
- Kosovo’s independence should be seen in the context of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia;
- Kosovo declared its independence after nine years of international administration during which the sovereignty of Serbia over this territory was purely formal;
- Kosovo Albanians had been subjected to ethnic cleansing at the hands of Serbia, which made it inconceivable for them to return under Serbia’s sovereignty.
3.2. More consequences in Russia’s near-abroad?
3.3. Consequences in the Russian Federation?
4. Strategic interests: defence and energy
4.1. Defence
- the guarantee of having military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the dismantlement of Georgia’s military capability;
- in addition, despite the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission straight after the conflict, the war might have instilled doubts in some NATO members about the wisdom of expanding NATO membership to states such as Georgia and Ukraine, for fear of being dragged into an armed conflict due to the reckless behaviour of some political leaders. The war, therefore, might have led to a set-back to some European countries’ aspirations to NATO membership.
4.2. Energy
- as one of the main world suppliers, Russia’s confidence in its international relations is bolstered by European dependency. On previous occasions, Russia has shown that “it can close the tap”, which is an enormous means of pressure;
- due to the evident volatility of the security situation in the region, customers and investors might tend to be more wary of Georgia as a reliable transit country, which, on the one hand, negatively affects Georgia’s economy and, on the other hand, increases reliance upon Russian routes;
- the energy dependency on Russia is an element which divides European states in their foreign policy towards this country. It has not gone unnoticed during this crisis that countries which are more dependent tend to be less critical than the others, and are less prepared to agree to the enforcement of sanctions. This divide undermines the unity of a common European position and diminishes its strength;
- the simultaneous closure of all Georgian transit routes has led another country in the region, Azerbaijan, to abstain from taking an open position.
5. A new cold war?
6. What the Council of Europe should do
- be firm as regards its principles and values while preserving dialogue with all the parties involved in the war;
- establish an enhanced monitoring procedure by the Committee of Ministers of Russia’s and Georgia’s commitments and obligations, as proposed by the Swedish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers;
- enhance co-operation with the countries concerned, with a view to strengthening the implementation of democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
- equip itself to act swiftly and flexibly to prevent tensions between its member states from escalating beyond a critical level. For instance, PACE could set up ad hoc committees of parliamentarians drawn from different PACE committees with different specialisations, with the task of parliamentary diplomacy, to promote the implementation of previous PACE resolutions, or to mediate between the parties. In a nutshell, the Council of Europe, and its Assembly, should develop a role in the field of conflict prevention;
- naturally, having a role in the field of conflict prevention implies having the political courage to address frozen conflicts and other conflict situations affecting the close national interests of some member states, including “old democracies”;
- envisage a new system of sanctions, which enables the Organisation to exercise leverage without excluding the country which is sanctioned from dialogue.
7. Conclusions of the rapporteur
I share the main views expressed by the rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee. However, I would like to add the following considerations:
- both Georgia and Russia share a part of the responsibility for the conflict and the prospects of its solution;
- at the same time, this share of responsibility is not equal, weighing more heavily on Russia, namely as regards its line of conduct after the cessation of the hostilities;
- Russia should withdraw the recognition of the independence of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- the territorial integrity of Georgia cannot be questioned, cannot be subjected to any negotiations, and must be preserved by refusing to do anything which might lead to the acquiescence of the secession of parts of Georgian territory;
- in its foreign policy, Russia should refrain from any temptation to consider its neighbouring countries as having limited sovereignty: each state should be free to choose its alliances and its course of foreign affairs;
- Russia should immediately put an end to its policy of granting passports to citizens of other member states who have not requested it;
- Russia should refrain from using citizenship and energy as means to advance its political objectives;
- the Council of Europe should acknowledge its responsibility for not having being able to prevent the war;
- the Assembly should:
- preserve dialogue with all the parties involved in the war;
- develop an active role in the field of conflict prevention and conflict resolution and, to this end, set up mechanisms for parliamentary diplomacy;
- address systematically the question of frozen conflicts in Europe;
- envisage a new system of sanctions, which enables the Organisation to exercise leverage without excluding the country which is sanctioned from dialogue.
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee).
Committee for opinion: Political Affairs Committee. Reference to committee: Reference No. 3489 on 29 September 2008.
Opinion approved by the committee on 1 October 2008. See Resolution 1633 and Recommendation 1846 (35th Sitting, 2 October 2008).