See related documentsElection observation report
| Doc. 12903
| 23 April 2012
Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (4 March 2012)
Author(s): Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
Rapporteur : Mr Tiny KOX,
Netherlands, UEL
1. Introduction
1. On 12 December 2011, the Bureau of the Parliamentary
Assembly decided – in principle, and subject to the receipt of an
invitation from the competent authorities of the Russian Federation
– to observe the presidential election in that country, on 4 March
2012, and decided to set up an ad hoc committee for this purpose,
comprising 30 members. It also authorised a pre-electoral mission
to take place approximately one month before the election.
2. On 17 January 2012, Mr Sergey Naryshkin, Speaker of the State
Duma of the Russian Federation, invited the Parliamentary Assembly
to observe the presidential election.
3. At its meeting on 23 January 2012, the Bureau of the Assembly
took note of the composition of the ad hoc committee and appointed
me as its Chairperson (see Appendix 1). In accordance with Article
15 of the co-operation agreement signed on 4 October 2004 between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), Mr Peter Paczolay and Ms Amaya
Ubeda de Torres were invited to join the ad hoc committee as legal
advisers.
4. The pre-electoral mission visited Moscow from 8 to 11 February
2012, in order to assess the state of preparations and the political
climate in the run-up to the presidential election of 4 March 2012
(see the programme of the visit in Appendix 2). The delegation met
four of the five candidates for the Presidency: Mr Sergey Mironov,
Mr Mikhail Prokhorov, Mr Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Mr Gennady Zyuganov.
It could not, however, meet Mr Vladimir Putin. The delegation also
met the Speaker of the State Duma, Mr Sergey Naryshkin, the Chair
of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Mr Vladimir Churov, Russia's
Human Rights Ombudsman, Mr Vladimir Lukin, members of the Russian
Federation's delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Ambassador
Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the Election Observation Mission of the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), and members
of the diplomatic corps in Moscow. The delegation met a representative
of Mr Grigory Yavlinsky, whose candidature had not been registered,
as well as representatives of the media and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs).
5. The findings of the pre-electoral mission are reflected in
its statement (see Appendix 3).
6. The ad hoc committee, which met in Moscow from 1 to 5 March
2012, acted as part of the International Election Observation Mission
(IEOM), which also included the election observation missions of
the OSCE/ODIHR, led by Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, and of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the OSCE, led by Mr Tonino Picula. The co-operation
between the three partners was excellent.
7. The ad hoc committee held meetings with all the presidential
candidates or their representatives, with the Chair of the Central
Election Commission, with the Head of the Election Observation Mission
of the OSCE/ODIHR and her staff, as well as with members of the
diplomatic corps in Moscow, and with representatives of civil society
and the mass media (see the programme in Appendix 4).
8. The Chairperson of the ad hoc committee also met representatives
of the observation team of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
9. On election day, the ad hoc committee split into 20 teams,
which observed the elections in and around Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Kazan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Astrakhan, Krasnodar and Petropavlovsk
Kamtchatski, as well as in the following regions: Vladimirskaya,
Iaroslavskaya, Tverskaya, Kalujskaya, Rizanskaya, Moscowskaya, Tulskaya
and Leningradskaya.
10. The joint press conference of the IEOM took place on Monday,
5 March 2012. The statement of preliminary findings and conclusions
was published, as well as the joint press release (see Appendix
5).
11. The ad hoc committee wishes to thank the Russian authorities,
in particular the State Duma, for the support and co-operation extended
to the ad hoc committee in accomplishing its mission.
2. Political and legal
context
12. On 25 November 2011, the Council of the Federation
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted the decree
on the holding of the presidential election on 4 March 2012. Two
months earlier, on 24 September 2011, President Medvedev had announced
that he would not seek re-election, while Prime Minister Putin announced
his intention to stand for a third non-consecutive term on behalf
of the governing United Russia party.
13. Five candidates for the presidential election were registered
by the Central Election Commission. Eleven applicants were denied
registration on the grounds of ineligibility or failure to comply
with the registration requirements (submission of an insufficient
number of signatures, non-compliance with the residency requirement,
failure to have the self-nomination endorsed by a nomination group
of 500 voters, prior extremism-related activities as established
by a court). Two applicants, self-nominated Dmitry Mezentsev and the
Yabloko party nominee Grigory Yavlinski, were denied registration
following verification of their support signatures.
14. There was a radical change in the situation in the wake of
the elections to the State Duma on 4 December 2011. Public opinion
and opposition political parties reacted strongly to the manipulations
and infringements of electoral legislation detected on 4 December.
People proved to be increasingly committed to ensuring that the
election of 4 March would be free and fair. Major demonstrations
were organised, mainly in Moscow and St Petersburg, but also in
other major cities, and everywhere demonstrators were calling for
fair elections.
15. The demonstrations were peaceful in nature; there were large
numbers of police and law enforcement officers present, who did
not, however, take any action to prevent the demonstrators from
expressing themselves freely – in contrast with the modus operandi in the run-up to
the Duma 2011 elections. Participants in demonstrations organised
by the opposition called on people to vote for any of the candidates
except for Mr Putin, while large pro-government demonstrations expressed
the desire for stability in the country, accusing the opposition
of preparing an “orange revolution”.
16. The real issue arising in respect of the presidential election,
according to some interlocutors of the delegation, was not who would
win the election, but whether there would be a second round of voting
and, in particular, what might happen after the election.
3. Election administration
and voter and candidate registration
17. The presidential election was administered by the
Central Election Commission (CEC), 83 subject election commissions
(SECs), 2 744 territorial election commissions (TECs) and 95 416
precinct election commissions (PECs) in the 83 federal subjects
of the Russian Federation. In addition to the regular polling stations,
385 polling stations were opened abroad. The Russian authorities
opened a number of polling stations in the breakaway regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to allow residents in these regions that
have Russian passports to vote in the Russian presidential election.
The presence of these polling stations in the break-away regions
raises two issues of concern. Firstly, the opening of polling stations
in these regions without the explicit consent of the de jure authorities in Tbilisi violated
Georgia’s territorial integrity as recognised by the international
community, including the Assembly. Secondly, most – if not all –
persons residing in those two regions had Russian passports as a
result of the “passportisation” policy that was implemented by the
Russian authorities. This passportisation policy was criticised
in the Tagliavini report, as well as by the Assembly in its resolutions
on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, as being
in violation of international law and norms.
18. According to information received from the CEC, after 18 January
2012 voters could obtain absentee voter certificates (AVCs) if they
were unable to attend their designated polling station on election
day. In this context, it should be recalled that the members of
the ad hoc committee, like other international observers, had noted
cases of fraudulent use of absentee voter certificates during the
elections to the State Duma on 4 December 2011.
19. The delegation was informed by the CEC that, in 63 federal
subjects of the Russian Federation, membership of the TECs was being
renewed after the Duma elections and that one third of the chairs
of the PECs was also to be replaced. The main reason for this was
said to be mistakes made by PEC chairs as a result of either lack
of experience, in the case of those appointed recently, or poor
practice, in the case of those still working in the same way as
in the Soviet era. The Chair of the CEC indicated that he was convinced
of the need to change the procedure for appointing PEC chairs, who
were currently appointed just one month prior to the elections.
He believed that it would be more efficient to appoint them for
a five-year term, to organise appropriate training courses for PEC
members and to simplify the procedure for drawing up protocols after
the ballot.
20. The candidates who met the ad hoc committee alleged that these
renewals and replacements, in general, were being done by the CEC
in order to exclude those persons who had not wished to commit irregularities
in favour of United Russia during the Duma elections.
21. Following the widespread allegations of fraud during the Duma
elections, webcams were installed in each polling station in order
to ensure greater transparency. One camera provided a general view
of the polling station and a second camera focused on the ballot
boxes. Access, in real time, to the video feed from these webcams
was free to registered users. Recorded data was due to be preserved
for one year and be available, upon a formal request, at no cost.
However some interlocutors raised questions about the legal aspects
of this procedure and about the risk of failure to respect the confidentiality
of the voting. In addition, in order to increase the transparency
of the electoral process, approximately 30% of polling stations
used new, transparent ballot boxes with a smaller opening, purportedly
in order to prevent ballot box stuffing.
22. Two types of new voting technologies were used: ballot scanning
machines (in 5 233 polling stations) and touch screen electronic
voting systems (in 333 polling stations, including 22 polling stations
abroad).
23. Voter lists were prepared on the basis of citizens’ residence
information, as provided by local administrations.
24. In order to have a candidacy registered for the presidential
election, candidates had to present his or her candidature on behalf
of a registered political party or, in the case of the self-nominated
candidates, to collect 2 000 000 signatures. Many interlocutors
of the ad hoc committee criticised the signature requirements as being
excessively burdensome and almost impossible to comply with within
the time frame provided.
25. One of the rejected candidates, Mr Grigory Yavlinsky, the
leader of the Yabloko Party, lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation against the CEC's decision. The
Supreme Court upheld the CEC's decision to reject Mr Yavlinsky's
candidature. According to the CEC's decision, among the 2 086 050
signatures collected, 600 000 were selected for verification, out
of which 153 938 were deemed not to be authentic and therefore invalid.
The other rejected candidates did not contest the CEC's decisions rejecting
their candidatures.
26. Some candidates the ad hoc committee met considered the electoral
legislation in force to be inadequate. In order to improve it, they
suggested a number of changes: a different procedure for appointing the
members of election commissions, at different levels of the electoral
administration, so that these bodies would be politically balanced;
a reduction of the threshold for election to the State Duma; the
elimination of the absentee voting procedure; a simplification of
the procedure of registration, both for political parties and presidential
candidates. According to the representatives of the Communist Party,
most of these proposals were accepted by all political parties,
with the exception of United Russia.
27. As stated in the Assembly’s report on the observation of the
parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation (
Doc. 12833), the
State Duma elections of 4 December 2011 were marked by a convergence
of the State and governing party, limited political competition
and a lack of fairness. On 28 February 2012, the Duma adopted, in
the first reading, three pieces of draft legislation submitted by
President Medvedev on 22 December 2011. These drafts could be regarded
as representing President Medvedev’s response to the protests that followed
the parliamentary elections as well as international criticism.
These proposals were aimed at simplifying the registration procedure
for political parties, at facilitating the procedure for collecting
signatures in order to be registered as a non-party candidate in
the presidential election, and at reintroducing direct gubernatorial
elections.
4. The campaign period
and the media environment
28. The campaign period was marked by unprecedented country-wide
demonstrations calling for fair elections, allowed by the authorities,
in line with their commitment to freedom of assembly. Some of the presidential
candidates took part in these rallies or otherwise endorsed them.
In reaction to these protests, rallies of Prime Minister Putin took
place, including a large rally in Moscow. Demands for honest elections
by citizens and candidates led to greater civic involvement in observation
efforts to enhance the integrity of the process.
29. All candidates emphasised in their campaigns how to deal with
social inequality, corruption and abuse of the rule of law. All
candidates addressed the need for electoral reform, although they
offered different solutions. Prime Minister Putin especially addressed
the need for maintaining stability through continuity.
30. Although candidates were able to campaign unhindered, conditions
were clearly skewed in favour of one candidate, Prime Minister Putin,
who was given a clear advantage in terms of media presence and,
in addition, State resources were mobilised at the regional level
in support for him. Public institutions, at various levels, instructed
subordinate structures to organise and facilitate Mr Putin’s campaign
events. Local authorities used official communication (institutional
websites or newspapers) for Mr Putin’s campaign.
31. Strong support for the Prime Minister also came from authors,
artists, sportspersons and Russian show business personalities,
who apparently feared the possibility of a return to the instability
of the 1990s should Mr Putin not win the election.
32. Representatives of NGOs involved in election observation emphasised
that large scale falsifications had occurred in the past, but that,
this time, people had decided not to be silent but to manifest their
discontent. Following the Duma elections, the number of volunteers,
mainly young people, wishing to observe the presidential election
had risen considerably.
33. As the law does not allow for domestic observers other than
those affiliated with candidates and parties, a number of NGOs approached
different candidates to have their members registered as observers
on their behalf. Another method used by NGOs in order to obtain
accreditations was to appoint observers as journalists. Some NGOs,
including the Golos Association, were said to be put under pressure
from the authorities because of their election observation activities.
34. Campaigning concentrated on television as the main means to
attract, inform and influence voters. The larger part of the campaign
budgets was spent on buying airtime on the many TV channels.
35. Most interlocutors acknowledged that the media situation had
generally improved. There were television debates between candidates,
in which all candidates participated, with the exception of Mr Putin,
who only sent his representatives. Interlocutors also pointed out
that, this time, there was a more balanced coverage of the opposition
and pro-government demonstrations than previously.
36. State-owned broadcast and print media complied with the legal
obligation to allocate free time and space to the candidates. However,
most of the free airtime was allocated outside of peak audience
periods. In addition to the allocation of free airtime for the candidates,
free airtime and space were granted to each political party which
had appointed a candidate. This resulted in significantly less free
airtime and space being allocated to the self-nominated candidate,
Mr Prokhorov.
37. All candidates whom the delegation met said that the significant
media coverage given to the Prime Minister's official activities
during the campaign by State-owned and private broadcast media was
seriously to their disadvantage. The media devoted considerable
airtime to the Prime Minister's official activities during the campaign,
clearly outweighing the other candidates. Televisions regularly
aired documentaries praising Mr Putin’s achievements. Seven articles
by Mr Putin, outlining his long-term strategy, were published during
the campaign period in a different newspaper every week. According
to the Communist Party representatives, this clearly infringed the
electoral legislation, since those articles had not been paid for
by the candidate's campaign budget.
5. Complaints and
appeals
38. Few complaints were filed with either the Central
Election Commission or lower-level commissions during the campaign
period, in contrast with the State Duma elections of 4 December
2011. The Chair of the CEC informed members of the pre-electoral
delegation that a "green paper" about breaches of the electoral legislation
during that campaign had been published on the CEC's website. Approximately
4 500 complaints about infringements of election rules had been
lodged with the territorial election commissions. Half of the complaints
had been lodged by the Communist Party and the Just Russia Party.
Investigations had revealed that some 10% of the complaints were
well-founded. Among the most widespread breaches of the rules was the
failure to comply with rules on political advertising and with the
candidate registration procedure. He stated, however, that the complaints
about falsification of results had not been proven. Among some 100
video recordings relating to falsification, only one case was said
to have been proven to be authentic by the investigating bodies.
39. The disbelief that effective remedies would be provided if
complaints were filed, was according to interlocutors the main explanation
for the low number of complaints. The election commissions and the
courts were generally perceived by these interlocutors as lacking
impartiality in election-related disputes.
40. Complaints were, however, filed concerning Mr Putin’s domination
of the campaign in the media because of his status of Prime Minister.
All such complaints were dismissed by the CEC as being unfounded.
6. Election day
41. On election day, the observers of the International
Election Observation Mission were able to visit over 1 000 polling
stations throughout the country. Opening and voting procedures were
duly followed in most of the polling stations visited.
42. Voting generally took place in a calm and relaxed atmosphere
and was assessed as “good” and “very good” in 95% of polling stations
visited.
43. Representatives of the candidates in the race were present
in 95% of polling stations and many of them proved to be attentive,
active and informed.
44. However, the process deteriorated during the count in a large
number of polling stations, due to procedural irregularities. Of
98 counts observed, 29 were assessed as “bad” or “very bad”.
45. There were a few instances of ballot box stuffing and some
indications of buses transporting groups to vote at multiple stations.
In 21 polling stations where the count was observed, completed protocol
results were not shown to web cameras as required and results were
not read out loud in 18 cases. The signed protocol was not posted
in 31 polling stations observed. The tabulation was observed by
the International Election Observation Mission in over 70 territorial
election commissions and the process in 11 of them was assessed as
“bad” or “very bad”. In these cases there was a poor organisation
of data entry, overcrowding, insufficient transparency and instances
of protocols having been changed by territorial elections commissions.
Formal complaints were filed in 4% of the polling stations observed.
46. Domestic observers informed one Assembly team about “carousel”
voting being observed in a polling station in central Moscow, where
a significant number of voters from remote areas of Russia arrived
in groups and voted with AVCs. This led to an unusually high (22%)
percentage of absentee voters in that polling station.
47. One Assembly team noticed that, in a polling station based
in a hospital, persons who were not registered on the voter lists
were allowed to vote without being asked for absentee voter certificates.
48. Another Assembly team was informed about the loss of a mobile
ballot box, with more than 80 ballots in it.
49. One Assembly team noticed that, in a polling station where
e-voting was used, the voting machines were close enough to compromise
the secrecy of the vote. In actual fact, the secrecy of the vote
was a more general issue, in particular in polling stations that
were too small (mainly in rural areas). Also, ballot papers were frequently
put into the ballot boxes without being folded; the voting patterns
were thus easy to identify, in particular in those polling stations
where transparent ballot boxes were in use.
50. During the counting, ad hoc committee members also observed
some skipping of essential procedural steps. However, the procedures
being rather complicated, this should not necessarily be considered
as having been done in bad faith.
51. In one polling station, the Assembly team noticed that the
opening of the ballot boxes was artificially delayed until after
the team had to leave due to time constraints.
52. On 8 March 2012, the official results were made public by
the CEC (see Appendix 6: CEC Decision No. 112/893-6, 7 March 2012).
Mr Putin obtained 63,60% of the votes cast; Mr Zyuganov 17.18%;
Mr Prokhorov 7.98%; Mr Zhirinovsky 6.22% and Mr Mironov 3,85%. The
turnout was 65.26%.
7. Conclusions
53. These elections showed a clear winner with an absolute
majority, avoiding a second round. However, the voter’s choice was
limited, the electoral competition lacked fairness and an impartial
referee was missing.
54. Due to increased citizen awareness and involvement, these
elections were more lively, better managed and more seriously observed.
55. The election campaign period was characterised by a broad
and large-scale call for fair elections, which was made manifest
in many mass rallies throughout the country, allowed by the authorities
in line with their commitment to freedom of assembly.
56. Although all candidates were able to campaign unhindered,
conditions were clearly skewed in favour of one of the contestants,
the current Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. He was given a clear
advantage over his competitors in terms of media presence and State
resources were mobilised in support of him, in particular at regional
level.
57. Genuine competition and voters’ choice were limited by overly
restrictive candidate registration requirements.
58. Administrative preparations for voting day were efficient
and the voting process itself was assessed positively overall. However,
procedural irregularities were noted, mainly during the vote counting,
which was assessed as “bad” or “very bad” in almost one third of
the polling stations observed.
59. The ad hoc committee recommends that the competent authorities
of the Russian Federation make use of the increase in civic awareness
and involvement and to take the necessary steps in order to build
public confidence in elections, by improving the transparency and
guaranteeing the fairness of the entire electoral process.
60. The changes in electoral legislation, now adopted by the State
Duma and the Council of the Federation, to modify and simplify registration
of political parties and presidential candidates are an important
condition for holding free and fair elections in the future. Therefore
these changes should be irreversible. About 85 parties have already
asked for registration under the new rules. The agreement on the
restoration of the Republican Party after the 2011 verdict of the
European Court of Human Rights is a good sign. It is hoped that
the registration of PARNAS, which has been, until now, denied, will
soon be made possible under the new rules, in order to avoid them
appealing to the European Court of Human Rights.
61. In order to have a more level playing field for all participants
in elections, strict rules are needed with regard to the use of
administrative resources in campaign periods.
62. Stricter rules are needed to guarantee equal media access
for all candidates in the future. President Medvedev’s proposal
to have an independent public broadcasting channel should now be
put into practice.
63. The need for an impartial, transparent and reliable Central
Election Commission remains imperative. A structural change is needed
in order to promote citizens' trust in the election results. Without
this trust, any election result will always be questioned.
64. The dialogue between government, parliament and non-parliamentary
parties and groups, which began during the election campaign period,
should continue in order to make political change substantial and sustainable.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee
(open)
Based on proposals by the political groups
in the Assembly, the ad hoc committee was composed as follows:
- Tiny KOX, Head of the Delegation
- Group of the European People’s
Party (EPP/CD)
- Miloš
ALIGRUDIĆ, Serbia
- Şaban DİŞLİ, Turkey
- Terence FLANAGAN, Ireland
- Olha HERASYM'YUK, Ukraine
- Andres HERKEL, Estonia
- Zaruhi POSTANJYAN, Armenia
- Marietta de POURBAIX-LUNDIN, Sweden
- Kimmo SASI, Finland
- Maria STAVROSITU, Romania
- Egidijus VAREIKIS, Lithuania
- Socialist Group (SOC)
- Lennart AXELSSON, Sweden
- Josette DURRIEU, France
- Gianni FARINA, Italy
- Andreas GROSS, Switzerland
- Sabir HAJIYEV, Azerbaijan
- Tadeusz IWIŃSKI, Poland
- Pietro MARCENARO, Italy
- Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria
- Dana VAHALOVA, Czech Republic
- European Democrat Group (EDG)
- Mevlüt CAVUŞOĞLU, Turkey
- Jana FISCHEROVÁ, Czech Republic
- Edward LEIGH, United Kingdom
- Giacomo STUCCHI, Italy
- Øyvind VAKSDAL, Norway
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
for Europe (ALDE)
- Marieluise
BECK, Germany
- Margus HANSON, Estonia
- Michael Aastrup JENSEN, Denmark
- Andrea RIGONI, Italy
- Group of the Unified European
Left (UEL)
- European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission)
- Secretariat
- Mr Vladimir Dronov, Head of
Secretariat, Interparliamentary Co-operation and Election Observation Unit
- Mr Chemavon Chahbazian, Deputy to the Head of the Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan Torcatoriu, Administrative Officer
- Mr Franck Daeschler, Principal Administrative Assistant
- Ms Daniele Gastl, Assistant
- Ms Amaya Ubeda de Torres, Venice Commission Secretariat
The pre-electoral mission was composed of five members, one
from each political group in the Assembly:
- Tiny KOX, Head of the Delegation
- Group of the European People’s
Party (EPP/CD)
- Egidijus
VAREIKIS, Lithuania
- Socialist Group (SOC)
- European Democrat Group (EDG)
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
for Europe (ALDE)
- Group of the Unified European
Left (UEL)
- Secretariat
- Mr Chemavon Chahbazian, Deputy
to the Head of the Secretariat, Interparliamentary Cooperation and
Election Observation Unit
- Mr Bogdan Torcatoriu, Administrative Officer
- Ms Daniele Gastl, Assistant
- Mr Angus Macdonald, Press officer
Appendix 2 – Programme of
the pre-electoral mission (Moscow, 8-11 February 2012)
(open)
Wednesday
8 February 2012
10:00-10:45 Ad hoc Committee meeting
10:45-12:30 Meetings with the diplomatic corps:
- Mr Denis Keefe, Deputy Head
of Mission, British Embassy, representing the Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers chairmanship
- Mr James Ford, British Embassy
- Ms Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission
- Mr Donald Bisson,OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission
- Mr Gavin Evans, European Union Delegation
- Mr Jonas Grinevičius, Embassy of Lithuania
- Mr Onno Elderenbosch, Embassy of the Netherlands
- Mr Baind I. Svendson, Embassy of Norway
- Mr Simone Landini, Embassy of Italy
- Mr Roman Kowalczuk, Embassy of Poland
15:00-15:45 Meeting
with Mr Vladimir Churov, Chair of the Central Election Commission
16:30-17.30 Meeting with representatives of the civil society:
- Ms Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Moscow
Helsinki Group
17:30-18.30 Meeting with Media
Representatives:
Thursday 9 February
2012
10:00-12:30 Meeting with presidential candidates:
10:00-11:00 Mr Vladimir Zhirinovski
11:30-12:30 Mr Serguei Mironov
12:30-14:30 Meeting with the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe:
- Mr Alexei Puchkov
- Mr Sergei Sobko
- Mr Valery Fedorov
- Ms Elena Nikolayeva
- Mr Leonid Slutzky
- Mr Andrei Klimov
- Mr Alexander Pochinok
15.00-15:45 Meeting
with Mr Sergey Naryshkin, Speaker of the State Duma
15:50 Meeting with presidential candidates (continued):
15:50-16:50 Mr Guennadi Zyuganov
Friday 10 February
2012
10:00 Meeting with presidential candidates (continued):
10:00-10:45 Mr Ivanenko Yabloko (disqualified from running)
11:30-12:15 Mr Mikhail Prokhorov
16:00-17:00 Meeting with Mr Vladimir Lukin, Human Rights Ombudsmen
Saturday 11 February
2012
13:00 Press Conference
Appendix 3 – Statement of
the pre-electoral mission
(open)
Russian Federation:
PACE pre-electoral delegation told of urgent need for a fair election
Strasbourg, 13.02.2012 – Russia on the eve of its Presidential
election remains a nation poised between hope and fear, where much
is possible but nothing is yet sure, according to a pre-electoral
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), concluding a four-day visit to Moscow.
The five-member delegation, in Moscow from 8 to 11 February
2012, met four of the five candidates: Sergey Mironov, Mikhail Prokhorov,
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Guennady Zyuganov. All stressed the urgent
need to meet widespread popular demands for a fair election, in
order to guarantee public confidence in the result, and put forward
detailed – though differing – programmes for achieving this.
Candidates pointed to the recent major peaceful rallies in
Moscow and elsewhere in the country as a wake-up call for change,
as well as vibrant online debate and greater grassroots activism,
which some described as a revival of real politics in Russia.
All welcomed President Medvedev’s significant proposals to
simplify the registration of political parties and presidential
candidates. However, it was noted that the proposed changes would
only enter into force after this presidential election. The delegation
was told by the Speaker of the State Duma that the draft laws implementing
these and other changes should have their first hearing in the State
Duma on 28 February. Some candidates called for deeper electoral
reform, for example to achieve more balanced and independent electoral committees.
The head of the Central Election Commission informed the delegation
about the installation of webcams in all polling stations, transparent
ballot boxes, and the need for simplified procedures and the ongoing
replacement of many heads of electoral commissions. Some candidates
expressed concern that this last step could be politically motivated,
however. The candidates met by the delegation also complained about
the continuing use of administrative resources by the candidate
who is now Prime Minister, as well as a biased media, and declared
their loss of confidence in the electoral administration.
Many interlocutors emphasised the crucial role of candidates’
observers in guaranteeing transparency on voting day, especially
as Russian law does not foresee NGO observers. They called for changes
to ensure that violations seen at the recent parliamentary elections,
such as expulsion of observers or restrictions on their work, do
not recur.
Most interlocutors acknowledged an improved media environment,
including television debates between the candidates. However, all
candidates met by the delegation felt that extensive coverage of
the Prime Minister’s official activities during the campaign period
left them at a significant disadvantage.
The delegation met all the presidential candidates, with the
exception of Vladimir Putin, as well as the Speaker of the State
Duma, Sergey Naryshkin, the Chair of the Central Election Commission,
Vladimir Churov, the Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, members
of the Russian delegation to PACE, Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission and members of the diplomatic
corps. It also met a representative of Grigory Yavlinsky, whose
candidacy was not registered, as well as representatives of media and
NGOs. The delegation wishes to thank the State Duma for its excellent
co-operation during the visit.
A full 30-member delegation from the Assembly will return
to the country to observe the voting on 4 March before making a
final assessment.
Appendix 4 – Programme of
the observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (Moscow, 1-5 March 2012)
(open)
Thursday
1 March 2012
08:45-09:45 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee:
- Opening of the meeting and presentation
of the pre-electoral mission by Mr Tiny Kox, Head of Delegation
- Statements by other members of the pre-electoral mission
- Recent developments in the field of electoral legislation
and the activities of the Venice Commission in the Russian Federation,
by the Venice Commission representative, Mr Peter Paczolay
- Practical arrangements and logistics, secretariat
11:00-17:30 Meetings with Presidential candidates or their
representatives:
- Mr Nikolai
Levichev, representing Mr Serguei Mironov, presidential candidate
from the Just Russia Party
- Mr Ivan Melnikov, representing Mr Guennady Zyuganov, presidential
candidate from the Communist Party
- Mr Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, presidential candidate from
Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party
- Mr Mikhail Prokhorov, self-nominated candidate
15:00-16.00 Meeting
with Mr Vladimir Churov, Chair of the Central Election Commission
Friday 2 March
2012
09:30-11:30 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission in the Russian Federation:
- Ms Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission
- Ms Ingrid Gössinger, political analyst
- Mr Don Bisson, legal analyst
- Mr Armen Mazmarian, civil society analyst
- Mr Egor Tilpunov, media analyst
- Mr Konrad Olszewski, election analyst
- Mr Anders Eriksson, statistics analyst
11:30-12:30 Meeting
with the diplomatic corps:
- Mr
Denis Keefe, Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy
- Mr Onno Elderenbosch, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy
of the Netherlands
- Ms Helene Sand Andersen, Counsellor, Embassy of Norway
- Mr Jonas Grinevicius, Minister plenipotentiary, Embassy
of Lithuania
14:30-15:30 Meeting with representatives
of the Civil Society:
15:30-16:30 Meeting with Media representatives:
- Rossiya/VGTRK – Mr Dmitry Kiselev
and Ms Zoya Matveevskaya
- Radio Liberty – Mr Danila Galperovich
- Novaya Gazeta – Mr Vitaly Jaroshevsky
- Moscow Times – Mr Nikolaus von Twickel
Saturday 3 March
2012
10:00 Meeting with drivers and interpreters
Departure to the regions for those members deployed outside
Moscow
Sunday 4 March
2012
All day Observation of the opening, voting and counting procedures
Monday 5 March
2012
09:00-10:00 Debriefing and preliminary findings of the ad
hoc committee
14:00 Press conference
Appendix 5 – Statement of
the electoral mission
(open)
Russia’s
presidential election marked by unequal campaign conditions, active
citizens’ engagement, international observers say
Strasbourg, 05.03.2012 – Although candidates in yesterday’s
presidential election in the Russian Federation were able to campaign
unhindered, conditions were clearly skewed in favour of one of the
contestants, current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the international
observers concluded in a statement issued today.
The observers noted that all candidates had access to the
media, but the Prime Minister was given a clear advantage over his
competitors in terms of media presence. In addition, state resources
were mobilised at the regional level in his support. Also, overly
restrictive candidate registration requirements limited genuine competition.
The election campaign was characterised by continuing and
generally unobstructed large-scale protests over allegations of
fraud during the December 2011 Duma elections. Demands for honest
elections by citizens and candidates led to greater civic involvement
in observation efforts to enhance the integrity of the process.
Voting on election day was assessed positively overall, but
the process deteriorated during the vote count which was assessed
negatively in almost one-third of polling stations observed due
to procedural irregularities.
This election showed a clear winner with an absolute majority,
avoiding a second round. However, the voter's choice was limited,
the electoral competition lacked fairness and an impartial referee
was missing. Due to increased citizen awareness and involvement,
the elections were more lively, better managed and more seriously
observed, whereas structural improvements in electoral regulation
have been proposed to Parliament – but not yet passed,” said Tiny
Kox “(Netherlands, UEL), the Head of the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE).
“There were serious problems from the very start of this election.
The point of elections is that the outcome should be uncertain.
This was not the case in Russia. There was no real competition and
abuse of government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of
the election was never in doubt,” said Tonino Picula, the Special Co-ordinator
to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission and Head of the delegation
of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.In this election, candidates
could not compete on an equal footing. Although the authorities
made some effort to improve transparency, there remained widespread
mistrust in the integrity of the election process. As a first step,
all allegations of electoral violations need to be thoroughly investigated.
In an encouraging development, we have seen a great number of citizens
taking part in overseeing the election. Their active involvement
can be a powerful vehicle for increasing confidence in future elections,”
said Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, the Head of the Election Observation
Mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR)
Appendix 6 – Resolution No.
112/893-6 of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (Moscow)
of 7 March 2012 on the results of the Russian Federation presidential
election
(open)
Published on
8 March 2012
In accordance with Articles 19, 76 and 79 of the Federal Law
“On the election of the President of the Russian Federation” and
on the basis of the Russian Federation Central Election Commission
protocol of 7 March 2012 on the results of the Russian Federation
presidential election, according to which 71 701 665 voters took
part in the election, the Central Election Commission of the Russian
Federation herebydecrees:
1. That the Russian Federation
presidential election shall be considered to have taken place and
to be valid.
2. That Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin shall be deemed to have
been elected to the office of President of the Russian Federation,
having secured 45 602 075 votes, which represents 63.6%, or over
half of the ballots cast by voters who took part in the election.
3. That the present resolution, together with information
on the number of votes cast for each of the registered candidates
for the office of President of the Russian Federation (appended
hereto), shall be published in “Rossiyskaya
gazeta”, “Parlamentskaya gazeta” and
in the journal “The Bulletin of the Central Election Commission
of the Russian Federation”.
Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian
Federation
V. Ye. Churov
Secretary of the Central Election Commission of the Russian
Federation
N. Ye. Konkin
Appendix
Information on the number of votes
cast for each of the registered candidates for the office of President of
the Russian Federation
Vladimir Vladimirovich
PUTIN
|
45 602 075
|
63.60%
|
Gennady Andreyevich ZYUGANOV
|
12 318 353
|
17.18%
|
Mikhail Dmitrievitch
PROKHOROV
|
5 722 508
|
7.98%
|
Vladimir Volfovich ZHIRINOVSKY
|
4 458 103
|
6.22%
|
Sergey Mikhailovich MIRONOV
|
2 763 935
|
3.85%
|