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Report | Doc. 14830 | 14 February 2019

Development co-operation: a tool for preventing migration crises

Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons

Rapporteur : Mr Pierre-Alain FRIDEZ, Switzerland, SOC

Origin - Reference to committee: Doc. 14310, Reference 4301 of 30 June 2017. 2019 - March Standing Committee

Summary

In 2015, 8.6 million out of a total of 12.4 million displaced persons moved within their own country, showing that the causes of mass migration should be addressed in the countries where poverty, conflict and climate conditions are forcing whole communities to flee. The war in Syria has tipped the scales to critical levels, but other conflicts have contributed to increasing the gravity of the crisis. These countries should be the focus of financial aid for sustainable development.

The world population is continuing to rise. That of Africa is expected to double and to reach over 2 billion by 2050. By 2030, the number of young jobseekers in Africa will create an ever-growing incentive to migrate to neighbouring countries and, directly or by a knock-on effect, to Europe. Again, development aid and support within the countries concerned should enable sustainable political, economic and social structures to be established or renovated and give prospects for the future to the populations concerned, especially to young people and women.

The premise of this report is that development co-operation not only reduces inequalities but could at the same time contribute to avoiding future sharp rises in migratory flows, through regional capacity-building and assistance with economic development in less developed countries.

A. Draft resolution 
			(1) 
			Draft resolution adopted
unanimously by the committee on 22 January 2019.

(open)
1. The 21st century has brought with it even greater challenges for developing countries, in particular those of the African continent, related to rising population levels, climate change and political instability, coupled with problems of poor infrastructure and exacerbated by the digital divide. One consequence of these phenomena has been large-scale displacement of populations, both within the continent and towards Europe.
2. European countries have always shown great support for underdeveloped regions, motivated by humanitarian concerns but also by their recognition that the indispensable markets for goods and reservoirs of natural resources they represent require stable societies and a certain standard of living to be operational. Economic and cultural ties with former colonies and protectorates often help favour preferences. Development funding has steadily increased in recent years, as recorded by the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD).
3. The work of international organisations, principally the United Nations, has done much to change the attitudes of donors and beneficiaries, by transforming the notion of aid into multi-sectoral approaches involving real co-operation for development. In addition, poverty eradication is at the core of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which declares that the whole world should be put on a more prosperous and sustainable development path. By adopting the Agenda, member States have undertaken to co-operate to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration as a means of strengthening the resilience of host communities, particularly in developing countries. Goal 10 of the agenda aims to “reduce inequality within and among countries”.
4. Development co-operation has a two-fold role in relation to migration in Africa: firstly in empowering the more stable countries to manage the arrival, reception and integration of migrants from conflict or poverty-affected neighbouring countries and, secondly, in providing hope for a viable future at home for people who would otherwise migrate to Europe. In the longer term, investment in education, health and social and cultural community-building are also contributing to a measure of demographic regulation, in particular by providing women with alternative choices to their traditional domestic roles.
5. The European Union’s development policies, based on the United Nations goals, make the European Union and its member States providers of 50% of the world’s development aid. The recent reinforcement of security and border control measures, and the funding offered to countries in exchange for migration management without sufficient support for governance and host communities, should not detract from sustainable development programmes.
6. Given the importance of development co-operation for migration, the Parliamentary Assembly calls on member States to:
6.1. at international level:
6.1.1. work together to fulfil the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular Goal 10 “Reduce inequality within and among countries”, as well as Target 10.7 “Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”;
6.1.2. for those countries having signed the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, contribute to its implementation, and in this context in particular Objectives 18, 19 and 20 on skills development, conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries and faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances;
6.1.3. use the tools and programmes of international organisations such as the United Nations, the OECD and the European Union to better co-ordinate their development co-operation, evaluate needs and assess implementation;
6.2. at national level:
6.2.1. continue and step up their development co-operation and diversify funding, putting emphasis on sustainable programmes for education, health services and infrastructure, with the understanding that results may only be tangible in the long term;
6.2.2. not apply conditions to development co-operation such as returns on investment, access to markets and resources or migration management, or apply the equivalent of “gag rules” which eliminate some forms of assistance on ideological grounds, especially with respect to women’s health care and reproductive rights;
6.2.3. invest in particular in education as a means of increasing the skills, resilience, employability and capacity for innovative adaptation of young people and future generations, as well as of helping them to understand and respond to today’s global challenges;
6.2.4. use historic and linguistic links with developing countries to facilitate co-operation, while taking into account that some regions of the world, such as the Sahel, are neglected as they do not have strong ties with Europe or any particular economic interest;
6.2.5. stand ready to react swiftly to situations of extreme poverty resulting from conflict or drought, and ensure that development programmes are tailored to the regions and communities for which they are destined and take them into account, using the international checklists for development devised by the United Nations and the OECD;
6.3. at regional and civil society levels:
6.3.1. understand the importance of small-scale projects tailored to immediate, specific needs and consequently foster civil society initiatives, partnerships and physical exchanges which benefit all parties socially and culturally and provide capacity-building opportunities;
6.3.2. implement policies which encourage and support civil society bodies and private initiatives to co-operate with developing countries, including tax reduction measures, facilitating remittances and fostering relations of diaspora communities with their countries of origin.
7. In addition, the Assembly calls on all member States to invest globally in efforts to contain climate change which it is estimated will force 50 million people to leave their homes in African countries by 2050.

B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez, rapporteur

(open)

1. Introduction

1. In 2015, 8.6 million out of a total of 12.4 million displaced persons moved internally within their own country, which shows that the causes of mass migration need to be addressed in the countries where poverty, conflict and climate conditions are forcing whole communities to flee. The war in Syria has tipped the scales to critical levels, but other conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Iraq, Libya, Niger and Nigeria, Central Africa, Congo, South Sudan and Yemen amongst others have contributed to increasing the gravity of the crisis. These countries should be the focus of financial aid for sustainable development.
2. In parallel, the world population is continuing to rise. That of Africa is expected to double and to reach over 2 billion by 2050. By 2030, the number of young jobseekers in Africa will create an ever-growing major incentive to migrate to neighbouring countries and, directly or by a knock-on effect, to Europe. Again, development aid and support programmes within the countries concerned should enable sustainable political, economic and social structures to be established or renovated and give prospects for the future to the populations concerned.
3. The premise of this report is that one of the important characteristics of development co-operation, although its first objective should be to reduce inequalities and share wealth, is also a major tool for regulating mass migration from the poorer countries of the African continent. As such it is an investment which will contribute to avoiding future sharp rises in migratory flows, through regional capacity-building and assistance with economic development in less developed countries. Through my research, however, it became clear that the equation is not a simple one, as poverty itself is one of the biggest obstacles to mobility, and one of the benefits of surmounting poverty is the possibility to travel and move. Therefore, results for migratory flows are to be seen over the long term, and other results of development considered, such as reduction in birth rates by offering education and employment to women and changing traditional views of women’s role in society
4. In an ideal world, migration would be a true exercise of the right to “freedom of movement”, rather than a last resort for populations subjected to life-threatening conflict and hardship. In developed countries this is largely the case, but evidently not for those who are part of the recent radical increase in migratory flows, for whom much greater efforts should be made towards this ideal.
5. My main research was gained from my visit to Burkina Faso from 10 to 13 July 2018. This west African country is among the poorest in the world, lacking in substantial natural resources and with climatic extremes which complicate agricultural exploitation. However, its comparatively stable governance and the success, in particular, of some of the many small-scale local development projects in the country allowed me to assess many of the challenges of development present in the region as well as to compare the sustainability of different types of initiative.
6. I would like to thank the Parliament of Burkina Faso for organising the visit, especially Mr Antoine Elysée Zong-Naba, Advisor to the President, and for the indispensable guidance of my colleague in the Swiss Parliament, Ms Isabelle Chevalley, who has been implementing co-operation projects with the country for many years. In this context I was able to meet with several key ministers, ministerial departments, among them the Minister for Youth and the Minister of Women, National Solidarity and Family; I was given an audience with President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré with whom I had a substantial discussion about both Burkina Faso’s international involvement (such as forthcoming presidency of the African-G7) and about the country’s own challenges. Ms Chevalley also made a presentation to the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons in January 2018. Relevant findings during the visit are included below. The country has served as a case study for the report and enabled me to develop some of the practical recommendations contained in the draft resolution.
7. Another important contribution to the report was made by a hearing with Ms Rachel Scott, Head of the team Conflict, Fragility, and Resilience, Development Co-operation Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) in Paris on 4 June 2018. Her insights and the ensuing discussion explored the main trends in development co-operation and helped to understand some of the requirements for its successful implementation.

2. Definitions

8. The OECD’s Development Aid Committee (DAC) defines development aid as financial flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of Official Development Aid (ODA) Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including State and local governments, or by their executive agencies. Each transaction of aid is administered with the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, has a concessional nature and conveys a grant element of at least 25%. No military equipment or services may be defined as ODA. Anti-terrorism activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible. Most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded from the definition.
9. During my research, it was brought to my attention that a better term for the type of assistance given and requiring stepping up is “co-operation”, rather than “aid”, implying full involvement of recipient countries in the conception, planning and implementation phases of programmes, based on reliable and accurate needs assessment using data from the field. For this reason, I obtained the committee’s authorisation to change the title of the report to replace the term aid by that of co-operation.
10. The report examines development co-operation through international institutions which are the main channels of implementation for which member States have decision-making power, but also looks at smaller-scale projects which may serve as examples of good practice. Private initiatives also play a major role in development, as do individual remittances by beneficiaries’ diasporas. Although these are more complicated to analyse, national policies can contribute to facilitating these individual and entrepreneurial relations across continents while seeking to ensure that activities are carried out legally and in the best interests of the people of the countries concerned.

3. Issues with development co-operation

3.1. From humanitarian assistance to development co-operation

11. The transition from humanitarian assistance in emergencies to programmes targeting both sustainable migration management and help towards providing a future for young people in their own countries have been examined to some extent in Mr Cezar Florin Preda’s 2017 report on “Possible ways to improve the funding of emergency refugee situations”. 
			(2) 
			Doc 14283. See also Resolution
2164 (2017). He underlined the difficulties of financial responsibility-sharing and the efficient targeting and spending of funds made available. Most of the recommendations made in Resolution 2164 (2017) can be applied equally to the area of development aid: greater transparency and simplified reporting requirements; data streamlining and impartial needs assessments, support and funding for local and national actors, increased use and co-ordination of cash-based programming; as well as more participation by local actors and beneficiaries.
12. The resolution called for “enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors”, which refers to the difficult transition in some countries and contexts between emergency crisis-response programmes and longer-term sustainable development projects, which should be more carefully planned and supervised. Organisations such as the OECD also call for more cross-cutting activities and co-operation between the different actors assisting with long-term crises and capacity-building.

3.2. The negative consequences of prolonged humanitarian assistance

13. Development aid is at the nexus of several complex questions related to migration management, as part of the potential solution to the management of migratory flows into Europe. The definition of development aid as a means of helping developing, post-conflict and climate-affected countries to build sustainable societies and eradicate poverty is necessarily used in contrast to that of humanitarian assistance, considered as an emergency response to major catastrophes and crises as they arise.
14. Looking at the effect on local economies of the free distribution of humanitarian aid is a good example of why emergency life-saving action needs to be rapidly replaced by measures to contribute to development. Where refugee camps and reception centres for migrants are located at a distance from urban settlements, free distribution of food and other goods is often seen as a necessity and a means of controlling the daily lives of migrants, refugees and displaced persons. This has led in some cases to trafficking and organised re-sale of aid. Where migrants and refugees live among communities, any free assistance quickly leads to major disruptions of local, regional and even national markets for goods and produce.
15. Free distributions should therefore be used only in situations of emergency as a first life-saving measure. Voucher systems and cash payments provide a much more sustainable means of ensuring basic living standards and have the potential to become an economic driver for the country of transit or destination, reducing at the same time, at least to some extent, the risk of trafficking in goods and corruption on a large scale. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has experienced this transition and bases its assistance on these types of assistance in refugee centres and camps. We were able to see this at work on our visit to the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan in March.

3.3. Selective co-operation: the “Global Gag Rule” and other restrictions on co-operation

16. Some countries make their assistance conditional on certain economic or ideological conditions being fulfilled. The most serious problem in this respect is the so-called “Global Gag Rule” applied by the United States. This rule prohibits NGOs who receive United States global health assistance from providing legal abortion services or referrals, while also barring advocacy for abortion law reform. In 2017, President Donald Trump’s Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance policy took the global gag rule further and applied it to all US$8.8 billion of United States global health funding, including for HIV and AIDS, health systems capacity-building, and even water, sanitation, and hygiene programming. This results in incomplete reproductive health services for women, unintended pregnancies, higher rates of maternal mortality, and an increase in unsafe abortions. In addition, the global gag rule has not decreased rates of abortions overall while increasing the number of unsafe abortions.
17. Other, less radical, restrictions are applied by some countries. Others make development aid conditional on exclusive access to markets or natural or manufactured resources, which can result in the economic success of recipient countries being bound to that of donor countries well beyond the end of funding for programmes. Although some reciprocity may be envisaged and indeed help to structure commercial channels and outlets for innovation, expected returns should be proportional to the assistance provided. The problems related to what is termed “investment migration”, ie. citizenship or residence rights to a country given in exchange for investment, will be dealt with in a new report on the subject currently being prepared in the committee. 
			(3) 
			Motion for a resolution
on “Investment migration: trends, advantages, standards”, Doc. 14441 (rapporteur: Mr Aleksander Pociej, Poland, EPP/CD).

3.4. Use and misuse of development aid for the reception and integration of migrants

18. A 1988 DAC rule allows donor countries to count certain refugee expenses as ODA for the first year after their arrival. ODA has played a crucial role in supporting the costs of providing refugees with temporary sustenance in the least developed countries, which host 86% of the world's refugees. Austria, Germany, Greece and Italy, for example, used 20% of ODA for refugee costs.
19. Migration management is now used as justification to the public of spending on aid and co-operation and presented as a means of reducing immigration to Europe, by the same token avoiding entry of terrorists and violent extremism. The first goal of development in aiming to make the world better by eliminating poverty no longer suffices to explain funding. This reasoning has had an impact on development and on aid, for a time it even reduced amounts earmarked for programmes unrelated to migration. According to Rachel Scott of the OECD, this trend has stabilised. At the same time, the refugee and migrant populations in the poorest countries are affecting coping mechanisms and it is a reality that aid to migration can contribute to development where investment takes all stakeholders into account.
20. One of the problems of development co-operation is its uneven distribution and diverse success according to the governance structures of the beneficiary countries. Donor States with a colonial past will have retained relations with their former subjects and will therefore tend to prefer to contribute to development in these countries, whereas international development assistance will either concentrate on geo-strategical targets or go to countries in need regardless of the political and democratic structures in place to ensure fair and efficient implementation.
21. In several European Union member States, the costs of receiving refugees have been paid from the budget for development co-operation – precisely the funds reserved for tackling poverty and inequality. In the last few years, countries like the Netherlands and Italy have spent 25% to 30% of their development aid budgets on the first year of receiving asylum seekers. This is to some extent understandable, as around 1.5 million people claimed asylum in OECD countries in 2015 at the peak of the migration management crisis – the highest number ever recorded.
22. In France, military activities are complemented by development aid, which according to President Emmanuel Macron is too little appreciated in counteracting Islamist radicalisation. The Alliance for the Sahel was recently established to launch programmes supporting agriculture, investment and education in the region. The French Government announced a gradual increase in spending on development aid in Africa and the Middle East from the current 0.38% of gross domestic product (GDP) up to 0.55% by 2022. However, there are some signs (and criticisms) that spending on development outside the country has led to a reduction in budget spent to eliminate poverty nationally.

3.5. Developing countries as destination countries as well as countries of origin

23. Another way in which development can serve as a powerful tool for migration management is in helping poor countries to implement efficient migration policies and to benefit from the potential of migration from neighbouring countries rather than increasing the pressure on their weak economies.
24. Three African countries, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia (respectively recipients of 3.2%, 4.9% and 7% of aid from OECD DAC member States) are responding to migration management needs very positively. Uganda is one of the most progressive refugee-hosting countries in the world, allowing refugees the right to work and freedom of movement. Enabling rural refugees to cultivate under-populated plots of land has offered a means to support national development. By the 1990s, the approach had been formalised as “the self-reliance strategy”. Both refugees and the host community benefit: refugees can set up businesses, and many trade with and employ host nationals. The number of refugees in the country rose to 1.4 million during the recent South Sudanese and Congolese conflicts, but the government has maintained its policies and as new camps have been set up the right to work has encouraged the development of new local market towns which create opportunities for many Ugandans.
25. Kenya’s “encampment policy” does not allow the 500 000 refugees the right to work or move freely, but recent progress has seen the opening of a new refugee camp in Kalobeyei along a similar self-reliance model to that of Uganda. The camp has provided greater opportunities for agriculture and entrepreneurship and a shared marketplace for refugees and the local population, leading to higher incomes and better food security. Ethiopia is also gradually moving towards self-reliance in planning to allow its 900 000 refugees to work and move freely. With the help of development co-operation, Africa is thus now increasingly able to manage intra-African migration while empowering host communities.

4. International organisations and development co-operation

4.1. United Nations

26. On 21 October 2015, the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which recognised the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development and international migration as “a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses”.
27. Member States undertook to co-operate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration. This co-operation is seen as a means of strengthening the resilience of host communities, particularly in developing countries. Goal 10 of the agenda aims to “reduce inequality within and among countries”.
28. The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals came into effect in January 2016 to provide policy and funding guidance over 15 years. They build on the Millennium Development Goals to include new areas such as climate change, economic inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice. They are designed as implementing objectives of the “5 Ps” of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. 
			(4) 
			<a href='http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/resources.html'>www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/resources.html</a>. The declared aim of poverty eradication is at the centre of the 2030 Agenda, as is the idea that the whole world should be put on a more prosperous and sustainable development path. The report will examine how the United Nations’ new policies will be implemented by the Organisation.

4.2. European Union

29. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals set out the framework for the action of the European Union and its member States in their efforts to combat poverty and promote gender equality and environmental sustainability. The new Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in September 2015, have constituted a further step in this direction, broadening and deepening the targets set, as well as rendering them applicable to both developing countries and developed countries. To achieve this, policy coherence for development should become a driver of EU policy-making, reinforcing the consistency both of external policies themselves, through more coherent and better-coordinated financial instruments, and of the European Union’s internal and external policies.
30. The European Union’s Development Cooperation Instrument has an annual budget of 19 700 million euros and the item for humanitarian aid is endowed with a budget of 6 621 million euros. Finally, the European Development Fund (EDF), with a budget of 30 506 million euros for the period 2014-2020 financed directly by the member States and outside the EU budget, is the main financial instrument of the European Union’s development co-operation policy.
31. Criticism of the European Union’s recent priority given to security emphasises the need to ensure that development aid is used in accordance with its original purpose, with due consideration of aid and development effectiveness principles. Monitoring and evaluation systems are also inefficient, which makes it difficult to measure results, although auditors’ reports have pointed out positive findings related to EU development policies. Despite the European Union’s constant support for development co-operation, it is a fact that the increased budget allocated for the protection of Europe’s borders has a negative effect on budgets for assistance to countries outside Europe.
32. According to an EUobserver report, 
			(5) 
			Bob van Dillen in EUobserver, 15 May 2017: “Development
serving the purpose of migration control”: <a href='https://euobserver.com/opinion/137932'>https://euobserver.com/opinion/137932</a>. the European Commission’s proposal for a European Investment Plan for Africa was presented in 2017 as a means of containing migration from Africa to Europe by promoting economic growth, employment and private sector development. The idea would be to use €3.35 billion of official development assistance to foster up to €44 billion worth of private investment in Africa “as a key contribution to addressing the root causes of migration”.
33. This seems to indicate that containing migration has become the primary objective of EU development co-operation, which would be in breach of the European Union's Lisbon Treaty, which states: “Development co-operation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.” Sacrificing development aid to serve short-term migration interests comes at a time when the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda is urgently called for, especially in view of the 750 million poor and vulnerable people, half of whom live in Africa.
34. Taking Burkina Faso as an example, however, the objectives and programmes of the partnership with the European Union under the 11th European Development Fund and the achievements of the €708 million 10th Development Fund in upgrading infrastructure and access to water and sanitation, as well as promoting political, democratic and local governance, appear in line with the development goals and to focus on capacity-building in the country. I feel obliged to say, however, that I did not see sufficient signs of these improvements, which does not mean they are inexistent but rather that much more investment is needed.
35. These apparently contradictory analyses demonstrate the need to balance Europe’s budget spending and for cross-cutting programme planning – if development is to make a difference to migratory flows by providing future prospects in underdeveloped countries, then money cannot be reduced to pay for the consequences of that migration.

5. The role of civil society and private initiatives

36. During my visit to Burkina Faso, I was able to see the positive effect of associative and even individual action on the ground.
37. Since my visit, I was delighted to note that one of the 2018 “Right Livelihood Award” (known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) winners, Yacouba Sawadogo, is a farmer from Burkina Faso who used a traditional technique of capturing water in pits in the earth to reverse desertification. I saw the implementation of several initiatives of this type on local and regional levels, in particular those of the Northern Regional Chamber of Agriculture with its project “Promoting Sustainable Agriculture in the Northern Region: Needs Supporting Producers”, and the agricultural collective “Burkina Vert”, which is allowing farmers to use water resources more efficiently. I also met with a group of women working on food transformation for export, which was employing over 20 women, and through them their families. All of the interlocutors I met with stressed the need for increased resources for education and vocational training.
38. It is evident from the above examples that development funding needs to be more concentrated on supporting local and regional projects which are already well-defined by local actors and functioning in the beneficiary territories, rather than importing new schemes less adapted to realities on the ground. These projects appeared to depend rather on periodic support from civil society actors and/or private donors. More international support would come alongside these sources of funding and provide greater sustainability.
39. During discussions in our committee and through our meeting held in Jordan in March 2018, we were also informed of small civil society organisations organising for instance courses for Syrian and Jordanian women on starting businesses.

5.1. Remittances

40. Other types of financial flows are affecting migration; remittances are both a product of and a reason to solve the migration problem. Goal 10.c of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals undertakes to “[b]y 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%”. 
			(6) 
			<a href='http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E'>www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E</a>. This shows the organisation’s acknowledgement of the important of remittances for developing countries (see Mr Preda’s report, which shows that remittances, taken as a whole, amount to more than all other types of development budgets for the African Continent).

5.2. Loans and micro-credits

41. Although not specifically related to development co-operation, the increased use of cash-based assistance to migrants is also a means of ensuring decent living conditions for migrants in developing countries while benefiting host economies at the same time. The UNHCR’s Mobile Money programmes are of particular interest in this respect, for instance in Niger and other parts of western Africa. This is also an example of the successful coordination of different types of action towards coherent development plans.
42. During my visit to Burkina Faso, I learned that micro-credits were available in the country, but that the conditions for access were often too restrictive – means-based granting and interest rates prohibited these facilities, especially for women. This impressed upon me the need to adapt development to the needs present and to evaluate accessibility in every context.

6. Conclusions

43. There is a real need to work further on a coherent narrative on migration and development, to achieve both development impact and regular, orderly and safe migration. National parliaments should work to promote development policies on international, national and regional scales. Investment in the improvement of lives in the least developed countries should remain a priority over the more immediate concerns of security, which to a great extent are a consequence of the failure to help countries of origin to deal with problems at their source.
44. I also wish to underline that prevention is the solution. In Burkina Faso, much emphasis was put on the need for better, more accessible education and training. The vocational training centre I visited was not operating at full capacity due to course fees which without being very high were still prohibitive for many potential young students. The need for more accessible, generalised and vocation-oriented education was stressed everywhere I went in the country. It is also a key to overcoming traditional behaviours which are an obstacle to progress, such as inefficient farming methods and rising birthrates, having many children being seen as both a sign of successful womanhood and a source of future sustenance for families through employment.
45. There is also a need to implement development programmes without giving the governments of recipient countries the impression they do not need to invest in social welfare themselves. Several countries have fallen into this regime of “subsidisation” and more care is required in decision-making on where investments should be made and what incentives should be provided. This is where the concept of “co-operation” is the most important, and where lessons should be learned from earlier failures by thorough impact evaluation.
46. Governments and organisations alike must distribute budgets as swiftly as possible, and give more attention to best practices as well as new innovative projects.
47. Finally, my recommendations aim to show that aid will not be effective unless there is more multilateral and multi-sector coherence between all the actors working on the ground and in different policy areas.