1. Introduction
1. The humanitarian situation
in Afghanistan has worsened since the Taliban seized power in August
2021, and has seen millions displaced within Afghanistan or seeking
safety in exile. Purely and simply, the most fundamental principles
of equal human rights for all and the rule of law are being trampled
on.
2. The situation in Afghanistan has led to one of the largest
protracted refugee situations for decades. For the third year in
a row, Afghans constitute the second largest displaced population
in the world equal to Ukrainians as of early 2023. Only Syrian refugee
numbers are greater.
In August 2021, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a
non-return
advisory on Afghanistan which is illustrative of the level of risk which civilians
are exposed to in this country. This advisory remains in force as
of today. UNHCR also recommends that Afghans should not be returned
to Iran and Pakistan which “have for decades generously hosted the
vast majority of the total global number of Afghan refugees.”
3. The magnitude of the crisis in Afghanistan makes the prospect
of durable return unforseeable in the near future. The international
community and the Council of Europe in particular should take stock
of the efforts made over the past two years, and urgently decide
on concrete co-ordinated efforts to address the immediate protection
needs as well as reflect on a vision beyond humanitarian engagement
in Afghanistan.
4. On 30 September 2021, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted
Resolution 2403 (2021) “The situation in Afghanistan: consequences for Europe
and the region” calling on member States “to make available political and
financial support to help” neighbouring countries to support Afghans
fleeing Afghanistan and on national parliaments of Council of Europe
member and observer States as well as parliaments of States enjoying observer
or partner for democracy status “to scrutinise their governments
and hold them to account for the way in which they respond to the
current situation.”
5. This report is based on exchanges with field actors at local,
international and diplomatic levels deployed in Europe, in Afghanistan
and in its neighbouring countries. It should be considered as a
direct continuum of the considerations and decisions made by the
Assembly in
Resolution
2403 (2021).
6. In April 2023, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced
Persons authorised my visit to Türkiye as rapporteur. I express
my gratitude to the Turkish authorities and the various political
parties I had the honour to meet in Ankara, as well as to refugee
rights organisations, the Bar Association, and the Metropolitan
Municipality of Istanbul who all shared insightful views about Afghans
as well as concrete avenues to enhance European solidarity to better
support Afghans in exile.
7. Between December 2022 and July 2023, I had the opportunity
to visit Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in my capacity as a member
of the Icelandic Parliament, visits which were distinguished from
my mandate as rapporteur for the Assembly, but which have contributed
to my understanding of the magnitude of the ongoing displacement
crisis in the region.
2. The protracted refugee crisis in Afghanistan:
a regional crisis
2.1. An unprecedented humanitarian crisis
8. In March 2023, it was estimated
that 6 million people were on the brink of famine in Afghanistan, according
to the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council. As of April 2023,
an estimated 40% of the Afghan population were experiencing high
levels of acute food insecurity
in a country-ranking 5th
among the countries most at risk due to the climate change worldwide,
as recalled by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in
their 2023 report entitled Afghanistan Socio-Economic Outlook.
9. The resuming of the financial support by the World Bank and
the Asia Development Bank to private actors operating health care
centres as of late 2021 is positive news. Yet, since the Taliban
decrees of May and October 2022 banning women from the public sector
and then from the UN and NGO placements, the entire aid and development
sector – not least the education and the health sector – is deprived
of female workers, severely impacting the capacity to meet needs
in the field of reproductive health and identification of and support
to victims of gender-based and domestic violence.
2.2. Security issues and systemic violations
of human rights
10. Widespread human rights violations
have been perpetrated in Afghanistan for decades as various factions
and armed groups have fought for leadership in the country. In 2019,
the International Criminal Court accepted that an investigation
be launched on the “alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003”.
11. The early days under the ruling of the
de
facto authorities may have initially led to a decrease
in security incidents and attacks, which has enabled the UN to reach
areas inaccessible to them in the previous years; however the various
reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan and the Country
Guidance on Afghanistan by the European Union Agency for Asylum
(EUAA) from January 2023
indicate that the situation remains
unstable with a number of security incidents recorded, including
attacks perpetrated by the Taliban, ISIS and other armed groups,
targeting civilians.
12. Attacks against the Hazara community members are regularly
reported by civil society
with
severe alerts that a genocidal intent may lie behind such attacks.
In June 2023, Amnesty
International released a report based on documented evidence from
the field accusing the Taliban of having “committed the war crime of
collective punishment against civilians in Afghanistan’s Panjshir
province.”
13. Measures such as the suspension of the 2004 Constitution or
the ousting of judges as from September 2021 have “precipitated
the collapse of the rule of law and judicial independence in Afghanistan”
according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers and to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in Afghanistan.
The Afghan Bar
Association’s office has been forced into exile and is now operating
from Brussels, Belgium.
14. Regular reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Afghanistan leave no doubt as to the extent of
the human rights violations and the gravity of the humanitarian
situation. As anticipated, the Taliban-led regime excludes entire
sections of the population who are therefore particularly vulnerable
to discrimination and targeted violence (ethnic and religious minorities
especially the Hazaras, the Tajiks and Christians, and the LGBTIQA+
communities).
2.3. A war on women
15. The Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights reported (OHCHR) in June 2023 that “[w]omen and
girls are systematically discriminated against in every aspect of
their lives.”
Since
March 2022, an edict prohibits healthcare institutions to provide
medical assistance to women not wearing the hijab.
According
to the Women Advisory Group whom I met in Kabul during a visit undertaken
in my capacity as a member of the Icelandic Parliament, women were
barred from working in the public sector and told to train male
staff to take over their position. Women are also banned from working
in the judiciary, in the non-governmental sector (December 2022),
and with the UN (April 2023).
16. Women are prohibited from accessing primary and thus secondary
education above the 6th grade and are
banned from public places such as parks. Their travel beyond 72
km is not authorised without being accompanied by a man legitimate
in his role. Men taking side for women’s rights are arrested and
jailed.
Women in rural areas
are particularly suffering from the severe restrictions on their
freedom of movement and right to interact with male counterparts.
This is severely impacting their access to aid and any form of support which
they or their family may need.
17. Community-based organisations and field research report alarming
suicide rates and suicidal ideation in women and girls,
alerting
to the fact that “mental health, well-being and sense of hope among
vulnerable Afghans plummeted in wake of Taliban takeover.”
In its latest
conclusions on Afghanistan, the Council of the European Union clearly
stated that human rights violations were systemic in Afghanistan.
18. The International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International
consider that such a “war on women” would justify that the International
Criminal Court investigate possible crimes against humanity.
2.4. Internally Displaced Persons and returnees:
displaced persons in need of particular support
19. Internally displaced persons
fall within UNHCR’s mandate. Internally forced displacement is not
new in Afghanistan for reasons of conflict or due to environmental
disasters (earthquakes, droughts, floods) forcing people to leave
their place of residence. As of 31 December 2022, UNHCR estimated
that 3.25 million Afghans were internally displaced by conflict
across the country.
Since August 2021, longer term
internally displaced persons are hosting the new arrivals. This
is putting households and regions with scarce resources under strain.
20. According to UNHCR, as of the end of 2022, a little more than
6 400 refugees had returned to Afghanistan, the vast majority from
Pakistan (94%).
As of 11 July 2023, UNHCR estimates
that 6 440 Afghan refugees voluntarily have returned to Afghanistan
since the start of the year 2023.
The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that between
1 January and 17 June 2023, at least 37 000 undocumented Afghans
have returned from Pakistan to Afghanistan through the two border-crossing
points, a number which is very likely to be lower than the actual
number of returnees according to the organisation.
21. Return is a costly process: IOM in Pakistan estimated that,
as of 3 June 2023, the average cost of travelling from Pakistan
to Afghanistan was PKR 58 619 (USD 206) per family.
Upon
arrival, most returnees are reliant on cash assistance for livelihood
(food and non-food item) and reintegration process to meet their immediate
needs: the amount of cash assistance provided to returnees by UNHCR
in Afghanistan from January-April 2023 alone was worth USD 621 000.
22. Afghans return to Afghanistan because they feel like there
is no durable solution for them elsewhere, not because they consider
that return is durable in Afghanistan. This is confirmed in interviews
run by UNHCR.
Afghans supported by UNHCR after
their return from Azerbaijan, and whom I met during my visit in
Afghanistan (not as part of my mandate as Assembly Rapporteur) shared
similar views with me. It is particularly concerning that the lack
of integration prospects for Afghans in some member States of the
Council of Europe leads to such decision to return.
2.5. Regional impact especially on Iran
and Pakistan
23. Pakistan has hosted Afghan
refugees for 43 years and proved to be the first country of asylum
for Afghans newly displaced since 2021. We can only appreciate this
immense effort. According to UNHCR and national NGO figures, Pakistan
is hosting approximately more than 4 million refugees and a large
number of undocumented stateless persons. Many of them are unaccompanied
children. Yet, to date, no law, clear policy or system has been
agreed upon in hosting this huge population including a system for
managing new arrivals. In Iran, according to UNHCR, as of February
2023, the total number of Afghans stood at 4.5 million including almost
2.1 million undocumented persons,
the vast majority of whom reside
in urban areas.
24. Pakistan and Iran have sheltered more than 95% of Afghan refugees
for a period spanning over three generations. This has weighed heavily
on the countries’ infrastructure and public services, relying massively on
international support. In both countries, Afghan children registered
with the authorities can access primary and secondary school free
of charge. Since 2015, a policy decision was made to allow Afghan
children living in Iran to access primary and secondary education
regardless of their documentation status. In Iran, all Afghan refugees
are provided free-of-charge primary health care. In Pakistan, undocumented
Afghans are not allowed to access the public healthcare system even
though some practitioners may allow access in practice on a discretionary
basis.
25. The arrival of Afghans since mid-2021 has coincided with severe
environmental disasters that hit both Iran and Pakistan. Devastating
floods in September and October 2022 impacted 33 million people.
Furthermore both
countries are experiencing significant economic hardship including
two-digit inflation, subsequent rise in food prices, and volatile
political contexts.
26. Mass delays in the management of registration cases have added
to the preceding backlog accumulated over the years, even though
significant numbers of newly arrived Afghans in either Iran or Pakistan
are reported to have registered with UNHCR. To some extent, some
of reception fatigue has been expressed by both countries’ State
authorities: registration with the authorities is more complicated
or often delayed, or people are simply denied entry into the territory
or forcibly returned if found undocumented in the country. Pushbacks
are also to be deplored at the Afghan-Tajik border.
27. In Iran, the authorities have conducted a registration operation
for undocumented foreign nationals between April and June 2022:
an estimated 2.6 million persons
received a headcount
slip which provides a form of temporary protection valid for three
months. According to local refugee-rights organisations, only a small
percentage of newly arrived Afghans were able to register. Anyone
considered undocumented may be deported if intercepted. For those
registered, the Amayesh card shall be renewed yearly at their own
expense, which they often cannot afford.
Afghans who need to
renew their work permit must pay about USD 100, which represents
more than one month of income. Importantly, nearly 50% of children
do not have Amayesh cards; such lack of documentation can pass down
over generations.
28. In Pakistan,1.3 million refugees have been issued proof of
registration cards following the Document Renewal and Information
Verification Exercise (DRIVE)
conducted by the
government until the end of 2022 in conjunction with UNHCR. DRIVE
targeted specifically refugees who had arrived before 2021 and were registered
by the Government of Pakistan. Those who arrived in 2021 and after
are still uncertain about their situation.
Indeed, according to
information shared by UNHCR’s office in Pakistan, since mid-January
2022, UNHCR was advised by the Pakistani Government to refer all
asylum applications to the relevant ministries and to halt issuing
documentation to asylum-seekers. The Pakistani authorities announced
that Afghans overstaying their visa beyond 31 December 2022 would
be fined or blacklisted – whilst stressing however that no deportation
and no imprisonment would be carried out, as initially announced
weeks earlier.
This is generating a general
climate of insecurity among the community, which is therefore less
prompt to make itself known when in need or to register with UNHCR.
29. The growing reluctance of Iran and Pakistan to let Afghans
in has translated into higher administrative requirements to cross
the border, or even to the turning down of people at the border.
In the case of women, this comes as an additional obstacle – and
brings additional risks – on the route of exile. In practice, Pakistani visas
are expensive, from USD 7 to USD 1 200. Most people get their application
rejected, with no reimbursement of the fees paid. Since June 2022,
Afghans can only be issued a visa if they have a letter of invitation
from a Pakistani national who shares their ID reference.
30. Pakistan is often a transit country onto further destinations
including Europe. This makes the situation more challenging for
people who want to travel to Pakistan to process their visa applications
– including humanitarian visas – onto other countries. Forced returns
and deportations have also not halted since the Taliban takeover.
According to UNHCR’s office in Pakistan, as of April 2023, 4 331
individuals had been deported to Afghanistan since 2021.
31. In Iran, Afghans face huge challenges, not least pushbacks.
Tens of thousands of undocumented Afghans are deported monthly.
UNHCR recorded an estimated number of 65 100 in April 2022. In April
2023 only, according to UNHCR border monitors, an estimated 45 500
undocumented Afghans were deported from Iran through the Islam Qala
and Zaranj crossing points. An estimated 61 970 Afghans were deportees
in March 2023.
In July
2023, an Iranian police official reported that almost 18 000 Afghans
were deported within a couple of weeks.
2.6. UNHCR’s non-return advisory
32. In August 2021, UNHCR issued
a
non-return
advisory on Afghanistan which is illustrative of the level of risk which civilians
are exposed to in Afghanistan. Importantly, UNHCR stressed that
it would not be appropriate to return Afghans to neighbouring countries
such as Iran and Pakistan which “have for decades generously hosted
the vast majority of the total global number of Afghan refugees.”
33. Certain State authorities sometimes argue that many of the
Afghans coming to Iran or Pakistan do not have a well-founded protection
claim and mostly emigrate to escape very dire economic conditions.
This is often an argument used with respect to Afghan male men,
including very young adults. If this cannot be excluded, it holds
also true that returning to a country when one is at risk of facing
extreme poverty and hunger may appear as a legitimate reason for
seeking opportunities elsewhere.
3. The European response: a forgotten
refugee crisis
3.1. Strong statements as early as August
2021
34. In August 2021, more than 100
countries, including at least 41 member States of the Council of
Europe, committed to supporting, “working to secure, and [called]
on all parties to respect and facilitate, the safe and orderly departure
of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country.”
35. On 23 August 2021, the president of the Consultative Council
of European Judges called on “the competent authorities of Council
of Europe member States to ensure that meaningful action is taken
to secure the safe passage, refuge and protection for Afghan judges
and other legal professionals, and for their family members, who
have well-founded fears of persecution in their country.”
36. Between 15 and 31 August 2021, more than 122 000 people were
evacuated in what several media described as “one of the largest
airlifts in history.”
Shortly after, several Afghan-specific
visa schemes were announced by many countries across the world,
including by several Council of Europe member States.
37. The issuance of UNHCR’s non-return advisory prompted most
member States of the Council of Europe to halt deportations of Afghans,
including undocumented persons. The IOM as well as Frontex have
suspended all activities aiming to facilitate or accompany return
operations. To my knowledge, only Türkiye has maintained a voluntary
return programme and is regularly sending back Afghans via charter
and commercial flights (Ariana Afghan Air) to Kabul airport.
38. In October 2021, the European Commission convened a High-Level
Forum on providing protection to Afghans at risk, meant to co-ordinate
efforts devised unilaterally to provide sufficient safe and legal
pathways for Afghans considered most at risk.
As
of April 2022, EU member States had reported to the European Commission
that almost 28 700 humanitarian admission arrivals had taken place
out of the 36 000 pledges announced for 2021/2022. These figures
include Afghans evacuated during the exceptional airlift in August 2021.
39. Across many European States, rejected asylum-seekers, Afghans
left undocumented or being granted a temporary form of protection
have been able to submit secondary application based on the situation
now prevailing in Afghanistan. Importantly, Denmark, Finland and
Sweden now consider women as a particularly vulnerable social group
entitled to protection because returning them to Afghanistan would
expose them to systemic and systematic gender-based persecution.
These decisions are aligned with the conclusions drawn by the EUAA
published in January 2023.
3.2. The challenge of materialising pledges
40. The evacuations conducted occurred
within a short period of time under exceptional circumstances, targeting
mostly nationals from the United States, its allies and Afghan nationals
who co-operated with or were employed by such foreign forces. Soon
after, the standard procedure for visa applications including for emergency
cases resumed except that most of the Western, and in fact European,
embassies had closed in Kabul with barely any consular services
remaining in the city.
41. Accessing protection for Afghans usually involves travelling
to Pakistan, and to a lesser extent to Iran. Many of those eligible
for international protection find it almost impossible to leave
Afghanistan. A passport at least is needed to travel across the
Pakistani border and most often a visa: both processes can cost
up to several thousand USD. For Afghans who manage to travel, the
waiting time needed for appointments to be booked and cases to be
processed, can take months if not years. Whether in Pakistan or
in Iran, UNHCR refugee registration is required before people may
be referred to embassies. All these steps require financial resources,
housing, and a permit to stay even temporarily. It also means that
women need to travel accompanied by a man, or, if travelling alone,
to face higher risks of arrest in Afghanistan, pushback at the border
or abuse on the way.
42. Processing time in Pakistan and to a lesser extent in Iran
is too long, prompting people into looking for alternatives to regular
means to proceed with their lives. Let us not forget that a vast
number of people dying en route to
Europe or stranded in hotspots are Afghans.
43. Most countries are not accepting humanitarian visa or other
legal pathways (family reunification, refugee sponsorship) for those
still within Afghanistan. People must leave Afghanistan to attend
an appointment in embassies still running outside of the country.
Decision to systematically grant asylum to Afghan women and girls
in Denmark, Finland and Sweden does not apply if visa requests are
lodged in one of these countries’ consulates: Afghan women must
already be present in these countries to apply.
44. Finally, despite the sincere efforts to process thousands
of cases at the fastest pace possible, over the past two years,
it has to be acknowledged that these efforts have been clearly insufficient
in comparison to the magnitude of the protection needs. In the case
of EU countries, there have been 65 000 pledges made by 17 EU member
States including 17 000 for resettlement between 2021/2022
and the year 2023.
These figures
contrast sharply with the estimated 600 000 Afghans present in Türkiye
(the majority of whom are unregistered). In a recent report, the
International Rescue Committee alerted on the fact that only 271
Afghans were resettled in an EU member State in the year 2022.
The suspension by the German authorities
of their programme in March 2023 due to suspected abuse of the procedure
is an illustration of the difficulties facing State authorities
in the materialisation of tangible and sound administrative procedures.
3.3. Fear of Afghans in Europe: varying
protection rates and pushbacks
45. The first instance recognition
rate for Afghans is very different depending on the European country
where they are present
from
16% in Switzerland to 100% in Portugal for the year 2022.
Overall, the protection rate
for Afghans has decreased across EU countries since 2021 according
to the EUAA (recognition rate refers here to EU-regulated forms
of protection). This should remain an issue of concern and is, at
the very least, illustrative of a lack of joint approach in the
asylum decision cases in violation of EU standards. Afghans granted
subsidiary protection have limited deriving rights including from
the perspective of family reunification.
46. Equally if not more strikingly: some Afghans have their asylum
claim rejected but cannot be returned due to the risks of undiscriminated
violence. The situation is also particularly concerning for unaccompanied
minors who may be registered as international protection holders
and may become irregular once the have turned 18 if they do not
lodge an asylum claim at this stage even after spending years in
a European country. Keeping them unregistered can also exclude them
from family reunification procedures accessible to refugees.
47. It is often the validity and the credibility of the protection
claim, and in some marginal cases some underlying discrimination
based on ethnic or religious-based prejudice, which seem to be at
stake. Afghans, and especially Afghan males, are more associated
with people escaping poverty and very dire socio-economic conditions
rather than conflict and human rights violations, as opposed to
Syrians or Ukrainians for example. This is also having consequences
on the material support available to Afghans in exile. Speaking
at a joint event convened by the Council of Europe Development Bank
(CEB) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) on the local integration of refugees, the IOM Head of mission
in Poland highlighted that the earmarked funding in support to Ukrainian
refugees made programmes and support inaccessible to other refugee
and migrant communities despite the needs.
Same considerations may apply in
Türkiye where the majority of the funding received, mostly deriving
from EU funding, is benefitting Syrian refugees who are the largest
refugee community in the country.
48. Over the years, Afghans have counted as one of the top nationalities
seeking protection in Europe, but pushbacks keep being reported
across Europe: at the Turkish-Iranian border, at the Turkish-Greek
border,
at the Belarusian-Polish
border,
across the Western
Balkan countries.
Data from the
Danish Refugee Council suggest that 40% of the victims of pushbacks
identified by them in 2021 were Afghans.
49. Importantly, some countries have decided not to comply with
UNHCR’s non-return advisory: this is the case of Türkiye which,
since early 2022, has resumed return flights to Kabul. The Turkish
authorities assured me that such returns were not forced and concerned
Afghan men arrested for being undocumented only. More than 57 000
Afghans were sent back in 2022 according to official statistics
shared by the Presidency of Migration Management.
At the time of my visit in
April 2023 to Ankara, there had been 22 return flights to Afghanistan
since the start of the year. According to official figures, 773
Afghans were deported between 2 and 8 June 2023.
Returns processed
at a heavier pace than in 2022 were a matter of concern according
to UNHCR’s representative whom I met in Türkiye.
50. Türkiye hosts the largest community of Afghans in Europe,
mainly due to its geographical position. The estimated 142 000 registered
Afghans according to the Presidency of Migration Management are
massively outnumbered by estimates of between 400 000 and 600 000
Afghans living in the country most of whom unregistered and thus
with no access to rights and no protection from deportation if apprehended.
51. In common with other asylum-seekers, I believe that Afghans
should be given access to regular forms of work to fend for themselves
instead of relying on their host communities and countries to sustain.
During my visit to Türkiye in April 2023, officials, representatives
of international organisations, and civil society actors I met stressed
that Afghans are considered a valuable workforce in Türkiye, often
filling out gaps in sectors where Turkish workers are hard to find
(shepherds, mechanics).
4. Protect Afghans in Europe
4.1. Halt forced removals to Afghanistan
53. According to the EUAA, “the number of first-time Afghan applicants
for international protection in EU+ countries doubled in 2021 compared
to the previous year, and the number of subsequent applications submitted
by Afghan nationals also increased”. In 2022, Afghans ranked second
after Syrians as the most represented nationality among asylum-seekers
in EU countries; the EUAA further stressed that “in 2022, the number
of applications by nationals of Syria and Afghanistan were the highest
since 2016.
54. The understanding of member States may vary as to whether
Afghans seeking international protection are at risk of persecution
in the sense of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees.
However, it is my belief that returning Afghans to Afghanistan is
likely to expose them to a violation of their economic, social,
and possibly civil and political rights. As a result, complying
with UNHCR’s Guidance Note on the International Protection Needs
of People Fleeing Afghanistan is essential. Equally important is
to monitor returns which occur nonetheless, to assess their durability
and whether the rights of returnees are respected in practice.
4.2. Prevent and sanction pushbacks
55. Efforts aiming to prevent individuals,
including Afghans, from seeking asylum on European territory must be
urgently halted and prosecuted. In this respect, the European Court
of Human Rights has recently declared some cases admissible with
respect to alleged pushbacks of Afghans at the Polish-Belarusian
border,
whilst interim
measures had already been applied by the Court to oppose the pushbacks
of Afghans stopped at the Belarus Poland border in August 2021.
56. In 2022, the Assembly voted in favour of preventing and sanctioning
pushbacks, pursuant
Resolution 2462
(2022) “Pushbacks on land and sea: illegal measures of migration
management”. Members of parliament should follow-up on this resolution
and ensure that “an individual assessment of protection needs and
of the safety of return” is conducted to prevent violation of Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and of
the prohibition of collective expulsions, as enshrined in Article
4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (ETS No. 46).
57. All efforts should be made by State authorities to facilitate
access to independent monitoring bodies in areas where people on
the move are known for coming, including border areas, as recommended
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
4.3. Increase protection pathways for Afghans
into Europe
58. Limited, if not restricted,
resources to UNHCR or to refugee resettlement will inevitably result
in a limited number of refugees being provided durable protection
prospects. In the context of a growing number of refugee and internally
displaced persons in urgent need of protection, this is not tenable
and inevitably leads to some form of prioritisation of some communities
over others which should be avoided by all means.
59. In the case of Afghans, I urge member States to co-ordinate
on joint processing criteria and to allocate more resources to effectively
increase access to resettlement and alternative pathways to protection particularly
for women and girls. This
involves greater human and financial resources dedicated to process resettlement
cases in consulates but also in the capitals of member States so
that quotas are increased, and cases can be dealt with in a timely
fashion (asylum administrations and courts, interpretation, access
to legal aid). At present, the processing time of visa requests
for Afghans lucky enough to see their case considered by the consular
services of a member State, can take months, if not years.
60. Procedures for resettlement and humanitarian visas should
be facilitated for women and girls in accordance with Recommendation
CM/Rec(2022)17 on protecting the rights of migrant, refugee and asylum-seeking
women and girls, especially its paragraph 64 encouraging member
States “to fund specific assistance and humanitarian resettlement
programmes for women and girls who are victims, or at risk, of violence
against women or trafficking in human beings, including for the
purpose of sexual exploitation.”
4.4. Protect Afghan children on the move
61. Member States should co-ordinate
their approach with the European Union to adopt a common approach
on family reunification and relocation of Afghans. Moreover, efforts
should be made to ensure that all Afghan children are registered
as needing international protection so that they can be reunited
with their family members in other countries through family reunification
whenever possible.
62. The lack of a harmonised approach across European States is
increasing the risk of unaccompanied children going missing. According
to the EUAA, in 2021, the absolute number of asylum applications
submitted by unaccompanied children from Afghanistan in EU countries
was the highest since 2015-2016 (more than 12 600) and represented
nearly half of all applications lodged by unaccompanied children
across the EU+ in 2021.
63. Joint efforts and co-ordinated policies should be explored
by member States, in co-ordination especially with the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on Migrants and
Refugees, on promoting good practices to protect the rights of unaccompanied
minors and children transiting to adulthood.
4.5. Alternative forms of registration
for Afghans who cannot be returned
64. Many Afghans are undocumented
in Europe either because their host State argues that their case should
be treated by another European State or because they turn 18 after
spending time unregistered as a child in a European country. There
may of course be also cases where Afghan individuals may want to
oppose registration in one European country which they consider
as a country of transit and not a country of destination. However,
whenever possible, ensuring that Afghans are provided a form of
registration in Europe should be considered a priority so that as
few people as possible are left in administrative limbo because
of a lack of documentation and given the impossibility of their
return. The situation of Afghan unaccompanied children and young
adults is particularly at stake.
65. For individuals whose protection requests have been rejected,
exploring alternative forms of legal residence pending the feasibility
of return under acceptable human rights standards may be worth considering. In
Türkiye for example, most Afghans are unregistered although, as
recognised by officials, their contribution to the workforce is
very much needed and appreciated in the country.
66. In cases where temporary forms of protection are impossible
to obtain based on a country’s fair and effective assessment of
individual cases, complying with UNHCR’s Guidance Note on the International Protection
Needs of People Fleeing Afghanistan may take the form of granting
a form of (temporary or seasonal) work permit for Afghans in sectors
where their labour force might be needed.
4.6. Genuine solidarity towards the reception
of Afghans across member States
67. My visit to Türkiye was very
revealing of the major challenges at stake for European countries,
especially first countries of asylum. EU member States cannot expect
Türkiye and front line countries to meet and manage alone the protection
and reception challenges associated with forced displacement crises
such as the one facing the Afghan people.
68. Concrete relocation and family reunification mechanisms must
be enacted and processed rapidly. The resettlement plan adopted
by the Slovenian Government in January 2023, facilitating the resettlement
of 50 refugees from Afghanistan and Syria to Slovenia, supported
by the EU’s Asylum Migration and Integration Fund, is one of the
few examples of such solidarity in action.
Such
initiatives should be furthered and developed more widely across
European States.
69. Sustained support to the CEB to enable it to further develop
its action in reception countries and regions is absolutely needed.
The various reception facilities, hospitals but also social cohesion
programmes funded through the Bank’s loans along the routes where
migrants and refugees transit or where they seek refuge are concrete
examples of the Council of Europe’s tangible engagement, thanks
as well to the European Union’s major support, to ensuring that
solidarity is maintained and effective access to rights is available.
Such programmes are essential and are rooted in the core mission
of the Bank.
5. Outside of Europe: a roadmap on Afghanistan
for member States
5.1. Resume consular services in Kabul
70. Diplomatic isolation is blocking
access to visa procedures for Afghans at risk of persecution and/or
who are eligible to family reunification. This is particularly the
case for women as well as for people who are on a wanted list because
of their professional occupation or their belonging to a particular
ethnic, religious or social group. Modalities may be explored across
member States for tackling this issue, for example by centralising the
lodging of visa requests in one or some embassies / consulates and
facilitating the processing of such requests according to common
standards based on the common country of origin information and
standards on Afghanistan. Co-ordination with the EUAA as well as
with UNHCR may be envisaged to initiate discussions with State authorities
favourable to such co-operation.
71. Some conditions imposed on Afghans to submit a (humanitarian,
family reunification) visa request should be eased in light of the
impossibility to meet certain criteria in practice (biometric data
),
this should be accompanied by measures to alleviate some of the
costs for highly vulnerable cases (perhaps by allocating specific
budgetary means aiming to support highly vulnerable and destitute
cases). The expertise of the Council of Europe may be useful, especially
when the educational background needs to be assessed to facilitate
the processing of student visas or access to scholarship provided
by some educational entities: in 2021, in the framework of the European
Qualifications Passport for Refugees initiative
, the Organisation has developed
training tools aimed to help assess the formal and informal educational
context in Afghanistan.
This programme
may provide a canvas for tailor-made education assessment certificates
to be issued by consulates as part of the visa processing from Kabul
or, alternatively, from Islamabad and Tehran.
5.2. Support local civil society and monitor
human rights
72. It is extremely important to
emphasise that a humble but coping grassroots network of civil society
actors has remained operational, sometimes underground in a heavily
sensitive context, providing essential services to Afghans in rural
and urban areas, even psycho-social support which is essential in
the case of forcibly displaced and persecuted communities. Local
actors have been severely impacted by the freezing of the assets
of the Central Bank of Afghanistan. Contrary to INGOs, grassroots
independent civil society actors face major challenges in accessing
and sustaining funding. In line with the United Nations Security
Council Resolution S/RES/2626 (2022) I believe that member States
should consider supporting local Afghan civil society, especially
those providing services to women and girls (education, shelters
for women, psycho-social support). A particular emphasis should
be laid on funding education programmes: access to education – especially
for women and girls – has been a challenge in Afghanistan way before
2021, and there is simply not enough schools in the country, especially
in rural areas. The diversity of the local authorities’ leadership
in different areas may provide leeway for supporting sectoral improvement
including in the field of women’s rights.
73. Engaging in support to the Afghan people in Afghanistan in
the long run may be possible for the Council of Europe itself in
its capacity as an organisation sharing an expertise in the global
promotion of human rights instruments and tools. In the absence
of a particular State authority to engage and co-operate with at
present, one might consider a co-ordination between the Council
of Europe and the UN in order to join forces on programmes on key
aspects such as global education or the prevention against gender-based
and domestic violence, developed through the external co-operation
activities of member States.
74. Additionally, external representations of member States may
facilitate the monitoring of returns to Afghanistan, and as to whether
return is a safe option in particular in accordance with the obligations
deriving from article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Such efforts should ideally complement and be co-ordinated with
the border monitoring conducted by UNHCR and IOM, as well as with
the European External Action Service, and with the Council of Europe’s
committees competent on issues related to trafficking of human beings,
violence against women and girls, and prevention against torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment.
75. Such assessment may provide valuable information on resettlement
needs and on member States’ possible approach to external co-operation
programmes. It could also provide a very valuable input to the Country
of Origin Information reports on Afghanistan adopted by each member
State as well as by the EUAA.
5.3. Engage with the de facto authorities
in Afghanistan – Give diplomacy a chance
76. Afghanistan is still a party
to some UN Conventions, not least the Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its
optional Protocol. It is undeniable that a large part of the decisions
made by the de facto authorities
are in direct breach of these texts. Nonetheless, UN Convention
monitoring is the only available tool to maintain an oversight over
the de facto authorities.
Consulates, as external representation of member States, can also
contribute to monitoring the human rights situation in Afghanistan.
77. Maintaining Afghanistan as part of the international human
rights system is a must for the Afghan people. Nevertheless, as
rightly stressed in the report by our colleague Sir Tony Lloyd:
“while dialogue with the Taliban is necessary, it should be limited
to a cautious, pragmatic, and operational engagement. Any possibility
for it be upgraded should be conditional upon several requirements.”
78. Based on my research and my engagement with many stakeholders
in Kabul including the Women Advisory Group as well as UN senior
officials, it is my firm belief that member States should find a
way to engage with the de facto authorities.
I myself had the occasion to meet with the Taliban during a visit
organised in co-ordination with the UN in Kabul. Let us be clear:
engaging does not mean recognising. However, maintaining a channel
of communication is essential to prevent further suffering of the
Afghan people.
79. International isolation will only hurt the people of Afghanistan.
My suggestion would be to give diplomacy a chance, grounded in uncompromising
human rights conditionality: member States should exert diplomatic pressure
on the de facto authorities
in order to influence policy change, especially towards the full
respect of the rights of women and girls. Diplomacy can move mountains.
80. Such an approach could be discussed and agreed upon by the
Committee of Ministers providing a framework and clear set of the
terms according to which members States of the Council of Europe
could engage in some form of dialogue with the interim administration
in Afghanistan. This framework and terms should without any doubt
include the unconditional respect of the human rights of women and
girls including unfettered access to education and employment, and
the respect of the rights of all ethnic, religious and minority
groups.
5.4. Aid is vital: increase funding and
resume development assistance
81. Over the past two years, a
lot has been undertaken, in very complex circumstances, to support
the Afghan people: no less than 65 partners (international organisations;
UN agencies; local, national and international NGOs) are part of
the Regional Refugee Response Plan on Afghanistan covering Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan; aid is being channelled unilaterally
(Turkish charity trains
) or regionally through the delivery
of humanitarian aid (for example, European Union and its member
States’ combined support amounts to €1.6 billion since summer 2021)
and through private initiatives.
82. External co-operation and aid agreed on by member States should
continue to benefit INGOs, international organisations and their
implementation partners whose deployment is making a crucial difference across
Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan and Iran. However, funding is
massively insufficient. In March 2023, UNHCR and humanitarian partners
launched the Regional Refugee Response Plan for the Afghanistan Situation
aiming to support 5.2 million Afghans and their host communities
in Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As
of mid-May 2023, the plan was only funded up to 13%.
83. Alarming prospects of decrease in support are anticipated
by the UNDP: “94% of 127 national organizations surveyed either
fully or partially ceased operations immediately after the ban [for
women to work in NGOs or international organisations] was imposed
in December 2022, and 150 NGOs and aid agencies have suspended all
or part of their work.”
UNDP warns that “humanitarian
aid to Afghanistan in 2023 will be lessened in response to the curtailment
of women’s rights as the Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 has received
significantly less amount of funding compared to a similar period
in 2022.”
84. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator at the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), whom I met in New-York in March
2023, agreed on the need for political engagement with political
forces in Afghanistan. He also stressed that UN Resolution S/RES/2626
(2022) mentioned the need for UN member States to “support efforts
to facilitate access to assets belonging to Afghanistan’s Central
Bank for the benefit of the Afghan people” and to help “provide
essential services to the Afghan population and contribute to creating
economic and social conditions that can lead to self-reliance and
stability”. In line with this resolution, there should be gradual
shift from a humanitarian approach to a development approach. Such
an approach is the only durable way to support Afghans especially
by fostering sustainable income generating activities notably in
the agricultural sector.
6. Conclusions
85. The gravity of the situation
in Afghanistan and the strain on first countries of asylum are such
that UNHCR has maintained its call on States to bar forcible returns
both to Afghanistan and to countries in the region. Persecutions
of religious and ethnic minorities, of LGBTIAQ+ community members
and of women persist on the part of the de
facto authorities and non-state actors, and the decisions
taken by the self-proclaimed regime leave no doubt as to the Taliban’s
intention to wage a war on women.
86. This report aims to give a clear picture of the extreme vulnerability
of the Afghan people inside and outside Afghanistan, be it in European
member States or in first countries of asylum in the region. It
also takes stock of the efforts made by member States to protect
Afghan refugees, and the limits of such response, in a context where
the recognition rate for Afghans remains highly volatile across
Europe.
87. Afghans represent the third largest nationality forcibly displaced
in the world. However, the protracted refugee crisis for Afghans
remains largely unaddressed, if not forgotten. From the rejection
of protection claims to pushbacks, the physical and administrative
obstacles faced by Afghan refugees who have managed to find their
way out of their homeland in search of safety and to rebuild their
lives are at odds with the consensual view that there can be no
durable and dignified return to Afghanistan at present.
88. Member States should urgently recognise that a structural
approach to the Afghan refugee crisis must involve durable rather
than temporary forms of protection in Europe, until conditions allowing
sustainable and dignified return arise for those Afghans willing
to return. The Council of Europe’s tools and standards provide a
framework to accompany the structuring of a human-rights based approach
to the protection and integration of Afghans in Europe.
89. Some of these tools and standards, such as the EQPR, can also
support the external engagement of member States and their co-ordination
in the context of resettlement and visa processing which are among
the main issues facing Afghan refugees in need of international
protection from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
90. Giving diplomacy a chance, grounded in uncompromising human
rights conditionality, is part of a pragmatic approach: using diplomatic
channels, member States may bring pressure to bear on the de facto authorities to influence
policy change, especially towards the full respect of the rights
of women and girls.