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A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 15939 | 16 March 2024
Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list"
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Summary
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights pays tribute to Russian political prisoner Vladimir Kara-Murza, an opposition politician, journalist, documentary filmmaker, historian and writer.
In April 2023, Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison for criticising the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. He is subjected to particularly harsh prison conditions, which are putting his life and health at serious risk, particularly given the long-term effects of two earlier poisonings that came close to killing him.
Vladimir Kara-Murza was handed down a particularly harsh prison sentence also in retaliation for his long-standing vocal support for “Magnitsky laws” on targeted sanctions against human rights violators.
“Magnitsky laws” adopted by numerous States and by the European Union allow for imposing targeted sanctions against perpetrators of serious human rights violations who enjoy impunity in their own country.
The persons participating in the persecution of Vladimir Kara-Murza are well known. A link to the detailed list is included in the report. It includes prison staff, police officers, prosecutors and judges involved in the gross abuse of the Russian justice system for the purpose of silencing Mr Kara-Murza. The committee calls for them all to be subjected to personal sanctions.
The tragic death in prison in February 2024 of Alexei Navalny highlights the urgency of ensuring the release of Vladimir Kara-Murza from prison.
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
pays tribute to Russian political prisoner Vladimir Kara-Murza,
an opposition politician, journalist, documentary filmmaker, historian
and writer.
2. In April 2023, Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in
prison for criticising the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.
He is subjected to particularly harsh prison conditions, which are
putting his life and health at serious risk, particularly given
the long-term effects of two earlier poisonings that came close
to killing him.
3. Vladimir Kara-Murza was handed down a particularly long prison
sentence, compared to those meted out to other critics of the Russian
war of aggression, most of whom have been sentenced to 5 to 10 years
in prison. Mr Kara-Murza’s supporters consider the particularly
harsh sentence as retaliation for his long-standing vocal support
for “Magnitsky laws” on targeted sanctions against human rights
violators.
4. “Magnitsky laws” such as those adopted by the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, numerous central and eastern European
countries and not least by the European Union allow for imposing
targeted sanctions against perpetrators of serious human rights
violations who enjoy impunity in their own country, including police
and State security officials. Vladimir Putin has made the elimination
of “Magnitsky sanctions” against his supporters one of his foreign
policy priorities.
5. The persons directly responsible for and participating in
the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir Kara-Murza are well
known. A detailed list can be found via this link “Kara-Murza
list”. It includes prison staff, police officers, prosecutors
and judges involved, in their respective roles, in the gross abuse
of the Russian justice system for the purpose of silencing Mr Kara-Murza.
6. These persons should be included in sanctions lists naming
individuals, established under the existing and future Magnitsky-type
sanctions laws.
7. The life of Vladimir Kara-Murza is threatened by the solitary
confinement to which he is arbitrarily subjected, despite his weakened
state of health following two poisonings which he narrowly survived.
8. The tragic and sudden death in prison in February 2024 of
Alexei Navalny, an outspoken Kremlin critic and anti-corruption
activist, who had similarly been subject to and narrowly survived
poisoning by a nerve agent, highlights the urgency of ensuring the
release of Vladimir Kara-Murza from prison and of holding to account
on a personal and individual basis all those involved in his persecution.
9. As a dual citizen of the Russian Federation and the United
Kingdom, Mr Kara-Murza could be included in any exchange of Russian
spies held by Western States against political prisoners and other
persons, including citizens of foreign States that are being held
hostage by the Russian Federation.
10. The Assembly, therefore:
10.1. invites
all States that have not yet adopted Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions
laws to do so without further delay;
10.2. calls on the European Union and all States having laws
on targeted sanctions to include in their sanctions lists the persons
directly responsible for the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir
Kara-Murza and the persecution, ill-treatment and death of Alexei
Navalny, and those participating in them;
10.3. urges all States negotiating exchanges of prisoners with
the Russian Federation to include Vladimir Kara-Murza in any such
exchange;
10.4. calls on the authorities of the Russian Federation to
release Vladimir Kara-Murza without delay, while immediately rectifying
his current conditions of detention until such release so as not
to further jeopardise his health and his life
B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
1. Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian
opposition politician, journalist, documentary filmmaker, historian
and writer, a political ally of Boris Nemtsov, the prominent opponent
of Vladimir Putin gunned down in front of the Kremlin walls in February
2015, was twice nearly
fatally poisoned, reportedly by the same banned chemical nerve agent,
which is strongly suspected of having been used to poison Alexei
Navalny. Shortly after his testimony on the
issue of political prisoners in the Russian Federation before the
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
on 4 April 2022 in Paris, Mr Kara-Murza was unlawfully arrested and
detained in Moscow by the authorities of the Russian Federation.
He was first charged with “spreading false information about the
Russian military”; in July 2022, new charges of “co-operating with
an undesirable foreign NGO” were brought against him, and in October
2022, charges for “treason” were added. On 10 October 2022, the
Assembly awarded to Vladimir Kara-Murza the 2022 Václav Havel Human
Rights Prize precisely for the activities for which he was imprisoned.
On 17 April 2023, after a trial behind closed doors, he was sentenced
to 25 years in prison.
was twice nearly
fatally poisoned, reportedly by the same banned chemical nerve agent,
which is strongly suspected of having been used to poison Alexei
Navalny. Shortly after his testimony on the
issue of political prisoners in the Russian Federation before the
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
on 4 April 2022 in Paris, Mr Kara-Murza was unlawfully arrested and
detained in Moscow by the authorities of the Russian Federation.
He was first charged with “spreading false information about the
Russian military”; in July 2022, new charges of “co-operating with
an undesirable foreign NGO” were brought against him, and in October
2022, charges for “treason” were added. On 10 October 2022, the
Assembly awarded to Vladimir Kara-Murza the 2022 Václav Havel Human
Rights Prize precisely for the activities for which he was imprisoned.
On 17 April 2023, after a trial behind closed doors, he was sentenced
to 25 years in prison.2. The persecution of Vladimir Kara-Murza and of numerous other
prominent and less prominent anti-war protesters in the Russian
Federation is the subject of another report under preparation by
Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir. The Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights held a hearing on this topic at its meeting in Larnaca
(Cyprus) on 22 May 2023. The invited experts included Evgenia Kara-Murza,
Vladimir Kara-Murza’s spouse, who has been working tirelessly on
the international scene to ensure that her husband is not forgotten. Being
forgotten is the fate political prisoners fear the most, as Vladimir
Kara-Murza stressed in his last testimony before our committee,
in April 2022 in Paris, just before his own arrest.
The Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights held a hearing on this topic at its meeting in Larnaca
(Cyprus) on 22 May 2023. The invited experts included Evgenia Kara-Murza,
Vladimir Kara-Murza’s spouse, who has been working tirelessly on
the international scene to ensure that her husband is not forgotten. Being
forgotten is the fate political prisoners fear the most, as Vladimir
Kara-Murza stressed in his last testimony before our committee,
in April 2022 in Paris, just before his own arrest.3. The arbitrary detention and persecution of Vladimir Kara-Murza
as such will be covered in appropriate detail in the report by Ms
Ævarsdóttir. The present report will therefore
focus entirely on the issue of targeted sanctions (“Magnitsky sanctions”)
against the persons responsible for the numerous human rights violations inflicted
upon Mr Kara-Murza.
The present report will therefore
focus entirely on the issue of targeted sanctions (“Magnitsky sanctions”)
against the persons responsible for the numerous human rights violations inflicted
upon Mr Kara-Murza.2. “Magnitsky Laws”: smart sanctions targeting human rights violators enjoying impunity
2.1. Rationale
4. The idea of targeting individual
perpetrators suspected of serious human rights violations with “smart sanctions”
(for example, visa/travel bans, account freezes, confiscation of
assets) was first put into practice in Europe by the European Union
against senior representatives of the Belarusian authorities in
2004, when the European Union enacted its first targeted restrictive
measures against several Belarusian officials allegedly responsible
for forced disappearances of two key political figures, one businessman
and one journalist in 1999-2000. The sanctions against MM. Sheyman,
Sivakov and Pavlichenko were based on the Assembly’s report entitled
“Disappeared persons in Belarus” by Christos Pourgourides (Cyprus,
EPP/CD). The three officials were named as suspects in Resolution 1371 (2004), on the basis of evidence collected and analysed by
the rapporteur.
The sanctions against MM. Sheyman,
Sivakov and Pavlichenko were based on the Assembly’s report entitled
“Disappeared persons in Belarus” by Christos Pourgourides (Cyprus,
EPP/CD). The three officials were named as suspects in Resolution 1371 (2004), on the basis of evidence collected and analysed by
the rapporteur.5. Following the report by Andreas Gross (Switzerland, SOC) entitled
“Refusing impunity for
the killers of Sergei Magnitsky”, the Assembly called for targeted sanctions against
those involved in the arrest, ill-treatment and ultimate killing
of Sergei Magnitsky, or in its cover-up. The Assembly called for
targeted sanctions as a last resort, after all attempts to encourage
the Russian authorities to hold the perpetrators to account themselves would
have failed.
6. As stated in Resolution
2252 (2019) “Sergei Magnitsky and beyond – fighting impunity by
targeted sanctions”:
“The Assembly considers targeted (“smart”) sanctions against individuals and affiliated companies to be preferable to general economic or other sanctions against entire countries:
- countries adopting targeted sanctions send a clear message that individual perpetrators of serious human rights violations are not welcome on their territory and that they will not aid and abet such perpetrators in committing their reprehensible actions by allowing them to use their financial institutions or letting them enjoy the proceeds of their crime”.
7. In the same Resolution (paragraph 13), the Assembly called
on all member States of the Council of Europe, the European Union
and States having observer or any other co-operative status with
the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly to:
“– consider enacting legislation or other legal instruments enabling their executive, under the general supervision of parliament, to impose targeted sanctions such as visa bans and account freezes on individuals reasonably believed to be personally responsible for serious human rights violations for which they enjoy impunity on political grounds or owing to corrupt practices;
– ensure that such legislation or legal instruments lay down a fair and transparent procedure for the imposition of targeted sanctions, as indicated in respect of terrorist offences in Resolution 1597 (2008), in particular by making sure that:
- targeted persons are informed of the imposition of sanctions and of the full and specific reasons for this decision, and that they are given the opportunity to respond within a reasonable time to the case made in support of the sanctions;
- the instance taking the decision on imposing sanctions is independent of the body collecting information and proposing to include a person in the sanctions list;
- the initial decision to impose sanctions may be challenged before a court of law or an appeals body that enjoys sufficient independence and decision-making powers, including the power to remove a targeted person from the list and to provide them with adequate compensation in case of erroneous sanctions;
– co-operate with one another in identifying appropriate target persons, including the use of relevant European Union mechanisms and by sharing information on persons included in sanctions lists and the grounds for their reasonable belief that these persons are responsible for serious human rights violations and benefit from impunity on political grounds or owing to corrupt practices”.
2.2. Sanctions against judges do not violate the independence of the judiciary
8. The Assembly has always strongly
defended the independence of the judiciary as a condition for the
rule of law. Judges must assess the facts and apply the law without
undue influence, or the justice system becomes arbitrary and turns
into another instrument of repression. The principle of independence
of judges is not meant to grant them personal privileges or advantages;
its rationale is to protect individuals against abuses of power. Judges
as well as lawyers and prosecutors are essential to the right to
a fair trial.
9. Several Russian and Belarusian judges have already been included
in various sanctions lists. The purpose
of targeted sanctions is to deter certain types of behaviour. In
the case of judges, it has therefore been argued that the purpose
of the sanctions is to influence the exercise of their judicial
functions, which may affect the judges’ independence. But in light
of the universally accepted principles referred to above, the legitimate exercise
of judicial functions that must be protected from undue influence
clearly does not include the abuse by judges of the powers they
have been entrusted with in such a way as to intentionally deprive
innocent persons of their liberty. When judges and prosecutors themselves
violate human rights, their responsibility is greater, not lesser
than that of others who do not have the same responsibilities. Intentional
bending of the law (also known as denial of justice, or perversion
of the course of justice) committed by judges is a serious crime
in several member States such as Spain, Republic of Moldova and
Germany. In Germany, section 339 of the Criminal
Code (Rechtsbeugung) has given rise to a number of prosecutions
(for example, after the fall of the Nazi and Communist regimes) . Other States allow the prosecution
of judges for unlawful deprivation of liberty when they intentionally
convict innocent persons or hand down excessive sentences.
The purpose
of targeted sanctions is to deter certain types of behaviour. In
the case of judges, it has therefore been argued that the purpose
of the sanctions is to influence the exercise of their judicial
functions, which may affect the judges’ independence. But in light
of the universally accepted principles referred to above, the legitimate exercise
of judicial functions that must be protected from undue influence
clearly does not include the abuse by judges of the powers they
have been entrusted with in such a way as to intentionally deprive
innocent persons of their liberty. When judges and prosecutors themselves
violate human rights, their responsibility is greater, not lesser
than that of others who do not have the same responsibilities. Intentional
bending of the law (also known as denial of justice, or perversion
of the course of justice) committed by judges is a serious crime
in several member States such as Spain, Republic of Moldova and
Germany. In Germany, section 339 of the Criminal
Code (Rechtsbeugung) has given rise to a number of prosecutions
(for example, after the fall of the Nazi and Communist regimes) . Other States allow the prosecution
of judges for unlawful deprivation of liberty when they intentionally
convict innocent persons or hand down excessive sentences.10. Interestingly, the Russian Criminal Code, too, includes an
array of provisions penalising the actions performed by the persons
on the “Kara-Murza list”, including judges, prosecutors and police
officers. Article 305 penalises judges “knowingly giving an unjust
judgment, decision or any other juridical act”. The basic punishment
of a fine or term of imprisonment of up to four years is increased
to a term of imprisonment of three to ten years when the unjust
sentence involves the deprivation of liberty or entails other serious
consequences. Article 299 penalises “knowingly bringing an innocent
person to criminal responsibility”, Article 301 penalises “illegal
detention, taking into custody or keeping in custody”, Article 303
the “falsification of evidence” and Article 306 the “knowingly false
denunciation”. These provisions easily cover the deeds of all the
individuals listed for their contributions to the persecution of
Vladimir Kara-Murza, including the judges involved in the various
stages of the mock judicial proceedings against him.
11. These precedents show that such prosecutions are not seen
as interferences with the independence of the courts. The main difficulty
for the prosecution in such cases is the requirement to establish
the accused judge’s intention (mens rea)
to bend the law – mere mistakes, even serious ones, rightly do not
give rise to criminal liability. But intentionality can be presumed
when the law is objectively misapplied in such an obvious and egregious
way that a bona fide mistake
can be excluded beyond reasonable doubt. In my view, these considerations
apply, mutatis mutandis, with
regard to targeted sanctions. If judges who intentionally abuse human
rights can even be criminally prosecuted, they can even more so
be subjected to the milder “Magnitsky sanctions”, which are not
criminal in nature.
2.3. Examples of “Magnitsky laws” and their application
12. “Magnitsky laws” enabling the
imposition of targeted sanctions against suspected perpetrators
of serious human rights violations enjoying impunity in their own
countries have been enacted by numerous States and by the European
Union itself, as shown in the attached chronological table (see
appendix 1). The persons sanctioned so far include the police officers,
prison officials, prosecutors and judges directly involved in the unlawful
arrest and ultimate death of Sergei Magnitsky, but also a number
of persons from other countries than the Russian Federation who
are strongly suspected of human rights crimes whilst enjoying impunity
in their countries, such as generals from Myanmar and Venezuela
and Belarusian officials involved in the ongoing repression against
protesters since the stolen presidential election in August 2020.
3. Imposition of “Magnitsky sanctions” on those responsible for the persecution of Vladimir Kara-Murza: persons of interest
13. The signatories of the motion
for a resolution underlying my mandate would clearly like to see
all the Russian officials responsible for and participating in different
ways in the politically motivated persecution of Vladimir Kara-Murza
to be subjected to targeted sanctions under the “Magnitsky laws”
existing in a number of countries and at the level of the European
Union. As rapporteur, I have been tasked with establishing a list
of these persons, by collecting relevant information on the roles
played by different officials (police officers, prosecutors, judges,
prison guards, special services) in the human rights violations
inflicted upon Mr Kara-Murza.
14. My attention has been drawn to the “Kara-Murza
list” researched and published by the British philanthropist
William Browder, who has led a global campaign in favour of the
adoption of “Magnitsky laws” after the death in prison of his Russian
lawyer and tax adviser Sergei Magnitsky. Mr Browder made me aware of
the fact that Mr Kara-Murza has received a far harsher prison sentence
(25 years) than others who were found guilty of similar “crimes”
such as speaking up against the Russian aggression against Ukraine
and defending political prisoners in the Russian Federation. Mr Browder
is convinced that in reality this particularly harsh treatment of
Mr Kara Murza is in retaliation for having helped him campaign for
“Magnitsky laws” all over the world. Mr Browder pointed out that
Mr Kara-Murza participated in over 40 high-profile events in support
of Magnitsky sanctions. As
early as May 2018, one of the initiators of the Russian legislation
which is seen as a response to Western sanctions against Russian
officials, Duma Deputy Andrei Isayev, specifically identified Vladimir
Kara-Murza as a potential target for the authorities under this
legislation.
As
early as May 2018, one of the initiators of the Russian legislation
which is seen as a response to Western sanctions against Russian
officials, Duma Deputy Andrei Isayev, specifically identified Vladimir
Kara-Murza as a potential target for the authorities under this
legislation. 15. With the help of the secretariat, I have cross-referenced
the information provided in the “Kara-Murza list” with information
available in the public domain, via open sources, in particular
some court decisions, which are still publicly available. All the
scanned documents referenced in the “Kara-Murza list” were provided
by Mr Vadim Prokhorov, Mr Kara-Murza’s lawyer. I have not found
any discrepancies or any other reasons to doubt the truthfulness
of the information summed-up in the Kara-Murza list. I am therefore
satisfied that 41 of the 45 persons named in the list were directly
involved in the unlawful arrest, prosecution and conviction of Vladimir
Kara-Murza after his testimony before the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights in April 2022.
16. The first thirteen individuals on the list are judges who
authorised Mr Kara-Murza’s arrest, pre-trial detention and its prolongations
and other procedural motions, appeals and the final verdict of 25
years in prison. The following eight individuals listed are members
of the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation, followed by
ten officials of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
and ten officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
17. Two other persons on the “Kara-Murza list”, FSB agents Alexander
Samofal and Konstantin Kudryatsev, have been shown to shadow Mr Kara-Murza
in the weeks before the two poisonings that almost killed him and permanently
weakened his health, the first in 2015, shortly after his friend
and political ally Boris Nemtsov was assassinated, and then again
in 2017. Interestingly, these are the same
agents who reportedly followed Alexei Navalny before he was poisoned.
Mr Kudryatsev, a known chemical weapons specialist, was reportedly tricked by Mr Navalny posing as a
superior officer into admitting his involvement in the poisoning. According
to another Bellingcat investigation, Mr Kudryatsev was also involved in
the poisoning of three other Russian journalists and activists.
The well-known high quality of the Bellingcat investigations also
in other cases, such as the downing of flight MH17 in 2014 over
the Donbas region, which was the subject of a report by our colleague
Titus Corlăţean, has convinced me to also include
Mr Samofal and Mr Kudryatsev in the list of “persons of interest”
who should be subjected to Magnitsky sanctions.
Interestingly, these are the same
agents who reportedly followed Alexei Navalny before he was poisoned.
Mr Kudryatsev, a known chemical weapons specialist, was reportedly tricked by Mr Navalny posing as a
superior officer into admitting his involvement in the poisoning. According
to another Bellingcat investigation, Mr Kudryatsev was also involved in
the poisoning of three other Russian journalists and activists.
The well-known high quality of the Bellingcat investigations also
in other cases, such as the downing of flight MH17 in 2014 over
the Donbas region, which was the subject of a report by our colleague
Titus Corlăţean, has convinced me to also include
Mr Samofal and Mr Kudryatsev in the list of “persons of interest”
who should be subjected to Magnitsky sanctions.18. The final two listed persons are an “independent expert” on
“products of speech activity”, whose expert opinion the court relied
on to find that speeches of Mr Kara-Murza “presented fake information
as facts” (about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine); and
the head of the pre-trial detention centre SIZO-5, who reportedly
ordered Mr Kara-Murza to be sent to a punishment cell for having
sat down on the bunk in his cell after the wake-up call.
19. The brief description of the roles played in the violation
of Mr Kara-Murza’s human rights by the persons included in the “Kara-Murza
list” shows that their contributions to the persecution of the opponent
are quite dissimilar and were made at different levels of hierarchy.
The question therefore arises whether they should all be treated
in the same way, namely subjected to the same sanctions. In my view,
this is justified as they all readily “played their role” in the
brutal system of repression designed to destroy any person daring
to resist – everyone at their assigned place. Without such obedient
servants willingly fulfilling the expectations of their superiors,
the repressive machinery would come to a grinding halt. As they
all chose to deliver what was expected from them, in return for
a nice career and a comfortable life provided by the regime, they
should also all be sent the same signal – that they are not welcome
in our countries, that we will not allow them to enjoy the fruits
of their actions violating Vladimir Kara-Murza’s fundamental rights.
Finally, targeted sanctions are not criminal sentences, which would
indeed have to be proportionate to the importance of each participant’s contribution.
The issue of the precise apportionment and weighting of responsibilities
will arise when perpetrators of human rights violations will no
longer enjoy impunity and will be held to account in the criminal courts
of a future democratic Russia that we all hope will emerge one day.
20. During the committee hearing in December 2023, Yevgenia Kara-Murza
and Bill Browder strongly confirmed the approach summed up above.
21. Ms Kara-Murza noted that Russia has many hundreds of political
prisoners, who are subjected to appalling measures. Her husband,
Vladimir Kara-Murza, has been sentenced to 25 years in a maximum security
prison, with the aim of silencing him. His was currently the only
occupied cell in an entire punishment block, because even in prison
he was regarded as a threat. He had called for a special tribunal
and other measures against the leadership of the Russian Federation.
For years, her husband had emphasised the need for measures to hold
to account those who violate human rights. In 2010, together with
Boris Nemtsov, he joined the campaign for Magnitsky sanctions, which
had provided the world with a revolutionary and powerful tool. The
Kremlin had recognised the implications of this tool and thus persecuted
those who championed Magnitsky sanctions. Her husband had been poisoned
twice. Thanks to a Bellingcat investigation, those responsible are
known. The poisoning had left her husband with permanent nerve damage,
which was worsening under his present prison conditions. His prosecution
and imprisonment had been handled by certain individuals who are
on the Magnitsky list. Ms Kara-Murza considered it poetic justice
that sanctions are being imposed on those who have persecuted her
husband for advocating them. She considered these sanctions as a
clear signal that the free world does not equate the regime with
the entire country.
22. Mr Browder explained that he and Vladimir Kara-Murza met in
2010, the year Sergei Magnitsky was killed. Mr Kara-Murza and Mr Nemtsov
recognised the extraordinary nature of the murder and that sanctions could
go beyond one individual case. They joined the campaign, visiting
parliaments, explaining the value of such sanctions. The campaign
clearly angered Vladimir Putin. He started a concerted effort to
overturn it, then to attack its champions. Mr Browder noted that
Mr Nemtsov was killed, Mr Kara-Murza was poisoned and that he himself
was subjected to criminal arrest warrants. When Mr Kara-Murza returned
to Russia, he championed the anti-war cause and was sentenced to
25 years in prison for “treason”. Mr Browder argued that the free
world had a duty to help Mr Kara-Murza and other Russians who stand
up against the war. He agreed with Ms Kara-Murza that it was indeed
poetic justice that people who persecuted Mr Kara Murza for supporting
Magnitsky sanctions were themselves subjected to them. At present,
the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, the United States
and Estonia were sanctioning some of Vladimir Kara-Murza’s persecutors.
Mr Browder pleaded for sanctioning more of them, along with any
others who were carrying out similar persecution against opponents
of the regime. He stressed the importance of continuing to publicise
and speak about the names of persecuted individuals, noted that
political prisoners in Russia would not be released unless there
was some benefit to Vladimir Putin’s government in the form of a
prisoner swap. He proposed the exchange of political prisoners against
individuals carrying out espionage under unofficial conditions,
suggesting that the United Kingdom could play a lead role, as Mr Kara-Murza
was also a British citizen.
4. Alexei Navalny’s death in prison – added urgency for protecting Vladimir Kara-Murza
23. Alexei Navalny’s death in prison
on 15 February 2024 – allegedly caused by sudden heart failure,
but surrounded by ominous information filtering from fellow detainees,
shortly after his relatives found him in reasonably sound health
and in good spirits – is an outrage, which must have serious consequences. Mr Navalny’s
death clearly requires a close analysis of all information as and
when it becomes available, with the aim of establishing the real
facts.
24. I have prepared a draft motion for a resolution concerning
the death of Mr Navalny and it is clear that we must hold to account
all those involved in his poisoning in 2021, in his subsequent trial
and imprisonment on obviously trumped-up charges, and in his ill-treatment
and as yet unexplained death in custody. In my view, the chain of
responsibility reaches all the way up to Vladimir Putin. Mr Navalny’s
sudden death underscores still further the urgent need to protect
Mr Kara-Murza and to ensure his rapid release, if need be as part
of a prisoner exchange.
5. Conclusions
25. It is obvious that Vladimir
Kara-Murza is a victim of a series of grave human rights violations
orchestrated by the Kremlin for political reasons and executed by
a large number of State officials who willingly played the roles
assigned to them. I am also convinced that Mr Kara-Murza was treated
especially harshly as retaliation for his engagement with the world-wide
campaign in favour of the adoption of “Magnitsky laws”. These allow for
targeted sanctions to be imposed on persons strongly suspected of
involvement in serious human rights violations, who benefit from
impunity in their own countries. Fighting these laws was declared
a key foreign policy objective of the Russian Federation by Vladimir
Putin himself.
26. In my view, a strong case can therefore be made to subject
all the persons figuring on the “Kara-Murza list” to targeted sanctions
under the existing “Magnitsky laws”, in particular the relevant
provisions enacted by the European Union. As indicated above, the
“Kara-Murza list” includes judges, prosecutors, investigators, police
officers, FSB operatives, a private “expert” and a senior prison
official. As argued above, there is no compelling reason to differentiate
between them according to the nature and importance of their contributions, even
as judges, and according to their position in the hierarchy of the
system of oppression they serve.
27. I strongly underline also that all those involved in any way
in the poisoning, persecution, trumped-up criminal prosecution and
conviction of Alexei Navalny, followed by his ill-treatment and
subsequent death in prison must immediately be identified and included
in the Magnitsky sanctions lists. For the sake of all Russian opposition
figures and anti-war activists who are currently in prison, we must
send an unambiguous and public message that there will be severe
and personal consequences for all those involved at any level in
these egregious human rights violations committed in abuse of their
positions and their power.
Appendix 1 – Countries and institutions who have passed Magnitsky sanctions
(open)Appendix 2 – Examples of events and publications in which Mr Vladimir Kara-Murza advocated for “Magnitsky laws” alongside Mr William Browder
(open)The Magnitsky Sanctions in Canada (December 2012), https://imrussia.org/en/law/348-the-magnitsky-sanctions-in-canada
FAAE (Foreign Affairs and International Development) Committee of the House of Commons (Canada), (10 March, 2016) – www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/faae/meeting-5/evidence
Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, March 2016, https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/AEFA/reports/AEFA2ndreport_e.pdf
Henry Jackson Society, Towards a UK Magnitsky Law? Lessons from Canada and Elsewhere (November 2017), https://henryjacksonsociety.org/members-content/towards-a-uk-magnitsky-law-lessons-from-canada-and-elsewhere/
United States Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress (Hearing before the commission on security and cooperation in Europe, 14 December 2017), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115jhrg28314/html/CHRG-115jhrg28314.htm
University of Chicago (November 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ux51Bqc3Un0&ab_channel=UChicagoInstituteofPolitics (starts from 15:40)
Senate of Canada (November 2022), https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/441/AEFA/55849-E
Op-ed in the Washington Post by Vladimir Kara-Murza (Jul 2018), www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/news/what-s-really-behind-putin-s-obsession-magnitsky-act
American Enterprise Institute (December 2017), www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9557EySy40&ab_channel=AmericanEnterpriseInstitute
French National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 and 15 May 2019, www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/presse/espace-presse/communiques-de-presse/mai-2019/commission-des-affaires-etrangeres-reunions-des-mardi-14-et-mercredi-15-mai-2019
Henry Jackson Society, 18 November 2021, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/event/magnitsky-annual/
CNN, 7 May 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/07/politics/vladimir-putin-kara-murza-axe-files/index.html
10th Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, February 2018, Award of the 2018 Geneva Summit Courage Award, Vladimir Kara-Murza on punishing corrupt abusers with Magnitsky sanctions, www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFe0Tlqb06M
The CBC Radio “The Current” (Canada), 19 January 2021, www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-jan-19-2021-1.5878672/western-nations-must-send-clear-message-to-russia-in-wake-of-opposition-leader-s-detainment-says-politician-1.5879054
Warsaw Security Forum, https://warsawsecurityforum.org/speaker/kara-murza-vladimir/
ABC News, 28 April 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-28/russian-mp-calls-for-laws-in-australia-against-corrupt-oligarchs/9706814