1. Introduction
1. The present report derives
from a motion for a resolution tabled by the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights on 4 March 2024 with the proviso that it
should be debated during the Parliamentary Assembly April 2024 part-session
as an urgent debate. The same day, the committee appointed me as
rapporteur subject to the Bureau referring the motion to the committee
for report. The Bureau referred it to the committee for report on
7 March 2024 and this reference was ratified by the Assembly.
2. The motion recalls that Mr Navalny died on 16 February 2024,
on the third anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights’
decision to indicate an interim measure and order the Russian authorities
to release him, due to a risk to his life. It notes that his arbitrary
detention on fabricated charges and the 2020 assassination attempt
with a nerve agent, orchestrated by an FSB (Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation) death squad, leave little doubt that
Vladimir Putin’s regime bears full responsibility for his death. The
motion further states that “Mr Navalny’s death comes at a time when
the Russian invaders are still waging their war of aggression against
Ukraine; Russian civil society is essentially forced to work underground
and the number of political prisoners in the Russian Federation
is constantly rising. Political prisoners include not only Vladimir
Kara-Murza
–
a well-known Russian opposition politician and associate of the
assassinated politician Boris Nemtsov, and Ilya Yashin, another
high-profile opposition figure, but also ordinary people brave enough to
object to the war.” Since the date on which the motion was tabled,
the Russian Federation has detained Oleg Orlov – a renowned human
rights defender and chair of the Memorial Human Rights Centre, a
Nobel Peace Prize co-laureate. Mr Orlov’s conviction for “repeatedly
discrediting the Russian armed forces” can only be described as
a parody of justice, which was accurately noted by Mr Orlov himself,
who pointedly read Franz Kafka’s
Trial throughout
the proceedings. Clearly, the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation
by the international community are still insufficient to counter
its totalitarian leadership. The motion concludes that the Assembly
“should consider new ways to stop the Russian Federation’s war machine
and ensure that the Russian State, its leaders and enablers of Vladimir
Putin’s apparatus of oppression are fully held to account for their
brazen contempt of human rights and the international legal order.
The Assembly should find ways to establish dialogue with the legitimate
representatives of the Russian people opposing the Putin regime.
The Assembly owes it to the memory of Alexei Navalny to follow the
unfolding information surrounding his death and draw the necessary
conclusions, including the possible need for additional and more
stringent sanctions to deter and weaken the regime’s criminal repressive
apparatus and to hinder the pursuit of the war of aggression against
Ukraine.”
3. The present report will thus not only focus on the death of
Mr Navalny and the need to impose targeted sanctions (“Magnitsky
sanctions”) against the persons responsible for his persecution,
ill-treatment and demise, but also consider this crime in its wider
context and present a series of measures necessary to counter Vladimir
Putin’s totalitarian regime and its war on democracy.
2. Alexei Navalny’s unlawful imprisonment,
ill-treatment and death
4. Alexei Navalny, a prominent
Russian opposition politician, civil society activist, lawyer, anti-corruption campaigner
and political prisoner, survived an attempt on his life perpetrated
in 2020 by an FSB death squad with the use of a banned chemical
nerve agent.
Following his recovery, on 17 January
2021 he took the courageous decision to return to the Russian Federation,
where he was detained upon arrival on the basis of a suspended sentence
which the European Court of Human Rights had already found to be
in breach of Article 7 (no punishment without law) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
5. The details of Mr Navalny’s arrest and subsequent detention
were set out in a report by our former colleague – Mr Jacques Maire.
Without
repeating what was stated therein, I will focus on the subsequent events.
6. On 9 June 2021, Mr Navalny's regional network offices and
his Anti-Corruption Foundation (the “FBK”) were designated as extremist
organisations and liquidated by the Moscow City Court.
The assets of these entities were
liquidated and confiscated. In January 2022, Mr Navalny and 11 of
his associates were formally designated as “extremists and terrorists”
(on a par with militants of Al-Qaeda and Daesh).
This move succeeded the prior designation
of Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov, key associates of Mr Navalny,
as such.
7. On 22 March 2022, Mr Navalny was found guilty of contempt
of court and embezzlement and given a 9-year sentence in a maximum-security
prison. His trial, held in a makeshift courtroom inside the penal
colony where he was being held, was correctly described by Amnesty
International as a “sham”.
In June 2022, Mr Navalny was transferred
to the maximum-security penal colony IK-6 in Melekhovo, Vladimir
Oblast (235 km east of Moscow).
8. On 4 August 2023, after another sham trial held in camera, Mr Navalny was convicted
of publicly inciting and financing extremist activity and “rehabilitating
Nazi ideology” and sentenced to an additional term of 19 years in
a “special regime” colony.
9. In December 2023, Mr Navalny was removed from the IK-6 penal
colony in Melekhovo, and went missing for several weeks, sparking
fears that he had been subjected to an enforced disappearance. After spending
19 days incommunicado during transit, Mr Navalny arrived at the
remote Siberian FKU IK-3 penal colony in the evening of 23 December
2023. The facility (also known as “Polar Wolf”) was built in 1961
on the site of the 501st Gulag, one of
the Stalin-era labour camps that housed millions of prisoners during
Soviet times. It is located in the settlement of Kharp, above the
Arctic Circle in north-central Siberia. According to human rights
activists, the prison holds serial killers, rapists, paedophiles,
repeat offenders, and other dangerous criminals with lengthy sentences.
However, Mr Navalny was not the first political prisoner to be sent
there. Platon Lebedev, a former business partner of the ex-Yukos
owner and former political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, spent
two years in “Polar Wolf” in 2005-2006. The colony is notorious
for its harsh conditions of detention.
10. Based
inter alia on
the testimony of a former prisoner of the IK-3 colony, prisoners’
rights activists have shed light on the practices akin to torture
routinely applied by its staff. For instance, in winter, prisoners
would be summarily assembled in the courtyard in light clothing,
ordered to stand still in formation and not allowed to clap or rub
their hands together. They would be forced to stand immobile for
30 or 40 minutes in temperatures of minus 45 degrees Celsius or
colder. If one person moved, the whole group was doused with water.
11. During his unlawful imprisonment, Mr Navalny – as well as
being deprived of sleep or proper medical care – was often punished
for alleged minor infractions with placement in a punishment cell
(shtrafnoy izolyator or “SHIZO”).
Just a few days before his death, Mr Navalny was again punished
with placement in SHIZO for 15 days. According to Ms Kira Yarmysh
(Mr Navalny’s friend and ally), this was the 27th time since his incarceration
3 years earlier. Including this term, Mr Navalny would have spent
308 days in SHIZO. This measure, which is a form of “imprisonment
within the prison”, is officially meant to be resorted to only exceptionally
and after every precaution has been taken. Yet Mr Navalny was placed
in SHIZO regularly and arbitrarily.
12. The conditions in SHIZO can be compared to those experienced
by political prisoners in the Soviet era in the vast network of
gulags. In a post published on X (formerly Twitter) in August 2022,
Mr Navalny described the punishment cell in which he was placed
in the IK-6 penal colony as follows: “The SHU is a 2.5x3 meter concrete
kennel. Most of the time it's unbearable in there because it's cold
and damp. There’s water on the floor. I got the beach version –
it's very hot and there's almost no air. The window is tiny, but
the walls are too thick for any air flow – even the cobwebs don't
move. There's no ventilation. At night you lie there and feel like a
fish on the shore. The iron bunk is fastened to the wall, like in
a train, but the lever that lowers it is outside. At 5 am they take
away your mattress and pillow (they call it “soft equipment”) and
raise your bunk. At 9 pm the bunk is lowered again and the mattress
is returned. There's an iron table, an iron bench, a sink, a hole
in the floor and two cameras under the ceiling. No visits, no letters,
no parcels. This is the only place in the prison where even smoking
is prohibited. They only give me paper and pen for 1 hour and 15
minutes a day. The “walk” is just one hour in a similar cell, but
with a piece of sky above. There are constant searches, I always need
to keep my hands behind my back.”
13. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) considers that the maximum
period of placement in solitary confinement should be no greater
than 14 days for a given offence, and preferably lower. Further,
there should be a prohibition of sequential disciplinary sentences
resulting in an uninterrupted period of solitary confinement in
excess of the maximum period.
Similarly, in a judgment
concerning the disciplinary punishments in Russian prisons, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the repeated solitary placement
in isolation cells amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary
to Article 3 of the Convention.
14. On 16 February 2024 at 2:19 pm Moscow time (12:19 pm CET),
the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous
District issued a press release, stating that Mr Navalny had “felt
unwell after a walk, almost immediately losing consciousness” and
died. According to the official message dispatched to Mr Navalny’s
mother, the time of his death was 2:17 pm local time (10:17 pm CET)
earlier that day. The official cause of death communicated to Mr Navalny’s
mother and her lawyer was “sudden death syndrome”. An anonymous
source told the State-controlled Russia Today that Mr Navalny had
died due to a blood clot.
15. Novaya Gazeta Europe – an independent Russian outlet – reported
that they had contacted one inmate who said that a “mysterious commotion”
had broken out in the “Polar Wolf” the evening before Mr Navalny’s death.
Subsequently, security measures were tightened and cells thoroughly
searched. According to the news outlet’s source, the ambulance arrived
only after Mr Navalny’s death was publicly announced.
Gulagu.net (a human rights group)
reported that several cameras in the IK-6 penal colony were not
operating on the day of Mr Navalny’s death. According to its source,
on 14 February 2024, FSB officers visited the colony where they disconnected
and dismantled listening devices and hidden cameras “that could
have recorded what happened to Alexei Navalny on 15-16 February”.
Gulagu.net also claims that on the evening of 16 February, the expert conducting
the autopsy was verbally instructed to describe the bruises on Alexei
Navalny’s body as having occurred
post
mortem.
16. There is no information available as to any genuine investigation
being launched into the circumstances surrounding Mr Navalny’s death.
3. The aftermath of Alexei Navalny’s
death
17. Despite the harsh laws introduced
in the aftermath of the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, aimed
at dissuading the Russian society from holding protests, and in
the face of well-known police brutality, thousands of people laid
flowers at monuments dedicated to victims of the Soviet repression,
in a spontaneous reaction to Mr Navalny’s death. According to data
gathered by OVD-Info (a Russian human rights watchdog), 649 people
were detained by the police during the various vigils held all over
the Russian Federation to commemorate Mr Navalny.
Polish media reported that in Saint
Petersburg, Consuls General of Germany, Norway and Poland were threatened
with arrest for participating in an “unauthorised event”, when they
decided to lay flowers in front of the Solovetsky Stone, a monument
dedicated to the inmates of the Gulag, the victims of Communist
Terror and those who fought for freedom.
Multiple videos emerged showing people
carrying flowers in the vicinity of monuments dedicated to victims
of the Soviet regime being violently apprehended by riot police
and taken away.
3.1. Withholding Mr Navalny’s body and
obstructing the organisation of his funeral
18. One day after Mr Navalny’s
death, his mother (Ms Lyudmila Navalnaya), accompanied by a lawyer, visited
the “Polar Wolf” and was told that her son’s body had already been
taken to a morgue in Salekhard. Upon her arrival there, she found
the morgue to be closed and was told over the phone that Mr Navalny’s
body had not been brought there. The forensic medical examination
bureau in Salekhard also denied having received any bodies from
penal colonies in the region.
According to Ms Yarmysh, Mr Navalny’s
lawyers were told by the State Investigative Committee that the
investigation into his death was closed and that “no criminal activity
had been detected”. One hour later, the same Investigative Committee
stated that the cause of Mr Navalny’s death had “not been determined”
and that his body would not be given to his family until the investigation
was completed.
Then, on 19 February 2024, the State
Investigative Committee announced that the body had been sent for
a “chemical examination” which could take 14 days. Ms Yuliya Navalnaya (Mr Navalny’s
wife) argued that the delay in releasing Mr Navalny’s body was caused
by the need to ensure that any traces of banned chemical substances
used to poison him would disappear.
19. On 22 February 2024, Ms Lyudmila Navalnaya released a recording
in which she stated that the authorities had allowed her to see
the body of her son (in a morgue in Salekhard), where she had also
signed a death certificate that indicated “natural causes” as the
cause of death. Ms Navalnaya also stated that she had been threatened
by the officials, that unless she would agree to hold a secret funeral,
they would allow Mr Navalny’s body to decompose or bury him in the
penal colony, even though the law obliged the authorities to release
the body to the family.
20. Eventually, Mr Navalny’s body was handed over to his family
on 24 February 2024. In the following days, attempts were made to
organise a funeral, however many funeral homes based in Moscow refused
to hold it on their premises, apparently after an intimidation campaign
orchestrated by the Kremlin.
On 27 February 2024, a lawyer who
assisted Ms Navalnaya in her attempts to have her son’s body released,
Mr Vasily Dubkov, was briefly detained in Moscow and released.
21. Alexei Navalny was finally laid to rest on 1 March 2024 at
the Borisovskoye cemetery in Moscow after a ceremony at the Church
of the Icon of the Mother of God in the Maryino district. It was
attended by Mr Navalny’s parents, a number of Western diplomats,
opposition presidential candidates Boris Nadezhdin and Yekaterina Duntsova
(who were disqualified for standing in the elections) and – despite
a heavy police presence and threats of reprisals – thousands of
Russians, many of whom chanted anti-Putin and anti-war slogans.
3.2. Promotions of officials responsible
for the persecution and ill-treatment of Mr Navalny
22. On 19 February 2024, just three
days after Alexei Navalny’s death, the deputy director of the Russian Federation's
Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN), Valery Boyarinev, was promoted
to the rank of colonel general.
According to Mr Zhdanov, Mr Boyarinev
personally supervised the systemic ill-treatment of Mr Navalny in
detention and his promotion was a reward for his zealous fulfilment
of this task. Several days later, an investigator responsible for
persecuting Mr Navalny and the FBK, Mr Roman Vidyukov, was promoted to
the position of deputy head of the State Investigative Committee
of the Russian Federation.
On 22 March 2024, Mr Vidyukov and
Mr Boyarinev were among the individuals sanctioned by the European
Union for their involvement in Mr Navalny’s persecution.
3.3. Negotiations to have Mr Navalny swapped
in a prisoner exchange
23. Shortly after Alexei Navalny’s
death, Maria Pevchikh (his associate) revealed that Mr Navalny was
about to be exchanged (along with two unnamed American citizens)
for Vadim Krasikov, a Russian assassin serving a life sentence for
murder in Germany. In an interview with the Financial Times, Dmitry
Peskov (the Kremlin’s spokesperson) refuted this information. On
17 March 2024, Vladimir Putin himself confirmed that he had agreed
to swap Mr Navalny, on a condition that he would never return to
the Russian Federation.
4. Transition of Vladimir Putin’s Russia
to a totalitarian State
24. Benito Mussolini, the fascist
dictator of Italy, once summarised the basis for totalitarianism
as “everything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing
against the State”, emphasising the total control of the State over
all aspects of society. After more than 20 years of Vladimir Putin’s
iron grip over the Russian Federation, its transition to a totalitarian
State appears complete.
25. Vladimir Putin enjoys unrestricted power and influence in
the Russian Federation, with the State propaganda machine promoting
the cult of his personality, portraying him as a strong, hyper-masculine
leader that Russian men should aspire to emulate. The role of the
Russian State Duma and Federation Council (both firmly controlled
by the United Russia party, chaired by Vladimir Putin’s loyal servant
and former President and Prime Minister – Dmitry Medvedev) is limited
to providing a bare appearance of democratic legitimacy by approving
all the decisions taken by Vladimir Putin. Any form of dissent is
considered a hostile act and the existence of a meaningful political
opposition is not tolerated. The judiciary is anything but independent,
with its top priority being the fulfilment of the will of its political
masters. Media freedom in the Russian Federation is non-existent
and expressing dissident views can
result in a term of imprisonment of 25 years (as was the case of
Vladimir Kara-Murza who was jailed for criticising the Russian Federation’s
war of aggression against Ukraine). The omnipresent security apparatus
ensures mass compliance with the State’s policies and the police
are allowed to operate outside the constraints of laws. The use
of torture and other forms of ill-treatment is widespread, as will
be described below.
26. Vladimir Putin’s Russia pursues a goal of imperialistic conquest
and imposes the false vision of a “Western threat” on its society,
through the systematic use of propaganda, going so far as the indoctrination
of children. Each week, schools in the Russian Federation begin
their classes with a flag-raising ceremony followed by a lesson
entitled “Important Conversations”. Its curriculum stipulates that
the State is the most authoritative source of information about
everything and teachers or headmasters who refuse to obey or punish independent
thinking (non-compliant with the State policy) are summarily dismissed
or labelled as “foreign agents”.
27. Just as was the practice of Nazi Germany, the Russian Federation
has recruited thousands of dangerous criminals to fight in its unlawful
invasion of Ukraine. Similarly to the Dirlewanger Brigade of the
Waffen SS (composed of criminals and commanded by a convicted paedophile,
responsible, among others, for the massacre of 100,000 civilians
during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944), the Russian Wagner Group has
been implicated in a vast number of atrocities and likely acts of
terror in Ukraine, which are the subject of an upcoming report.
28. The so-called “Russian presidential election” of 15-17 March
2024 included polling stations opened in the illegally occupied
Ukrainian territories, as well as in the Moldovan Administrative-Territorial
Units of the Left Bank of the Dniester – a gross violation of the
Charter of the United Nations and the principle of sovereign equality
of States. The official “result” was hardly a surprise – Vladimir
Putin was formally allocated 87,28% of the votes cast.
In Chechnya (a region ruled by another
radical ally of Mr Putin – Ramzan Kadyrov), Vladimir Putin obtained
98,99% of the votes with 97% turnout.
Any serious opponents – including
Mr Nadezhdin – were excluded from standing for the election.
29. Despite the crackdown on political opposition, thousands of
Russians followed Alexei Navalny’s call and peacefully, yet symbolically,
protested against Vladimir Putin’s rule by coming to the polling
stations precisely at noon. Numerous images showing long lines of
people queuing in front of polling stations testify to this adherence
to Mr Navalny’s memory and to an overt repudiation of the regime
on the part of at least some of the population.
5. Further measures to counter Vladimir
Putin’s totalitarian regime and its war on democracy
30. Alexei Navalny’s death came
at a time when Russian troops were making significant advances in eastern
Ukraine, having captured the ruins of Avdiivka and several other
Ukrainian towns. Ukrainian troops continue put up a heroic resistance
to the Russian invaders but remain heavily outgunned by their enemy
and are suffering from severe and growing shortages of ammunition.
The timing of Mr Navalny’s death can hardly be considered accidental.
The message of Vladimir Putin seems to be that he can do whatever
he wishes, and nobody will be able to oppose him. The death of Alexei
Navalny was followed on 12 March 2024 by an attack by hammer and
tear gas of his associate Mr Volkov outside his house in Vilnius.
Lithuania’s intelligence agency
has determined that this was likely an operation organised and implemented
by the Russian Federation. In such a context, the proposals contained
in my report aim therefore to hold to account those responsible
for the killing of Alexei Navalny, but also to address the wider
context of his passing.
5.1. The Magnitsky sanctions
31. In its
Resolution 2252 (2019), the Assembly called upon all member States to consider
enacting legal instruments enabling their governments to impose
targeted sanctions on individuals believed to be personally responsible
for serious human rights violations for which they enjoy impunity
on political or corrupt grounds. Given that many of those involved
in the persecution and ill-treatment of Alexei Navalny are well-known
and enjoy impunity as enablers of Vladimir Putin’s regime, there
is no doubt that they should be targeted with such measures. The
European Union has recently sanctioned 32 individuals directly involved,
some of whom are also included in
the list attached to this report.
5.2. Holding the Russian Federation accountable
for its grave and systemic breaches of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
32. The Russian Federation’s systemic
use of torture and inhuman conditions of detention are well-known. Political
prisoners and enemies of the regime are, however, particularly harshly
punished. In 2015, a Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov was sentenced
by a Russian court to 20 years’ imprisonment after a sham trial
on charges of “terrorism” (voicing his opposition to the Russian
Federation’s occupation of Crimea). During his detention, the Russian
prison authorities physically abused him, including by near suffocation,
and threatened him with torture, rape, and murder in an attempt
to extract a confession.
In October 2021, Gulagu.net published
over 40 gigabytes of covert videos documenting beatings, rape, and
torture of inmates in prisons and pretrial detention centres in
the Russian Federation.
A harrowing account of the systemic
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in places
of detention in the Russian Federation has been set out in a report
prepared by our colleague – Mr Constantinos Efstathiou (Cyprus,
SOC).
Only last month, the UN Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) published a report, revealing
a surge in credible allegations of torture and executions of captured
Ukrainian prisoners of war at the hands of their Russian captors.
According to the head of the HRMMU, almost every single one of the
Ukrainian prisoners of war interviewed described how Russian service
persons or officials tortured them during their captivity, using repeated
beatings, electric shocks, threats of execution, prolonged stress
positions and mock execution. Over half of them were subjected to
sexual violence.
33. The above examples clearly show that the Russian Federation
is systemically using torture and other forms of ill-treatment across
its prison system, in gross violation of its obligations under the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (the “Convention against Torture”). At the
same time, it is not allowing international experts access to investigate
the allegations of victims.
The Convention
against Torture provides for a series of obligations, whenever there
is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
committed. These include obligations to investigate, prosecute (or extradite)
and prevent such future acts. It is beyond any doubt that the Russian
Federation is deliberately and consistently failing to fulfil these
obligations.
34. The Russian Federation is a member of the United Nations and
is bound by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
including Article 36(1), which provides that the jurisdiction of
the ICJ “comprises … all matters specially provided for ... in treaties
and conventions in force.” It is also a Party (since 1987) to the
Convention against Torture, whose Article 30(1) includes a relevant
compromissory clause.
Accordingly, the draft
resolution proposes to ensure that the Russian State is held accountable
for its gross violations of the Convention against Torture, including
by lodging an application with the ICJ, should it be necessary.
It is a well-established principle in the jurisprudence of the ICJ,
that any State party to the Convention against Torture may invoke
the responsibility of another State party with a view to having
the Court determine whether the State failed to comply with its
obligations
erga omnes partes,
and bringing that failure to an end.
5.3. Further sanctions against Vladimir
Putin’s cronies and the Russian Federation’s war economy
35. In line with Yulia Navalnaya's
proposal to treat Vladimir Putin's enablers as mafia, with which
I fully concur, innovative strategies focusing on investigating
financial networks and associates are crucial. This involves conducting
thorough investigations into the financial dealings and money laundering
activities of Vladimir Putin's inner circle, including his friends,
associates, and those involved in hiding illicit funds of the Russian
oligarchs. In particular, the draft resolution proposes to adopt
where necessary and to apply legislation permitting non-conviction
based confiscation of illegal assets of regime’s enablers, with
a reversal of the burden of proof, as recommended by the Assembly
in its
Resolution 2218
(2018).
Nevertheless,
additional measures are necessary to impact the Russian Federation’s
macro-economy and industries that continue to generate profit, used
by the Russian State to finance its war against Ukraine.
36. Following the introduction of the oil price cap, the Russian
Federation has devised various means to sell its crude oil at prices
exceeding this cap. In particular, it has used a “shadow fleet”
composed of hundreds of small, often aging tankers operated by little-known
companies, with no experience in the oil trade and lacking standard
industry insurance. Many of these shadow vessels turn off their
automatic identification systems to disguise their activities and
engage in risky ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned Russian oil.
As a result of the shadow fleet’s operation, it has become increasingly
difficult to police the trade of Russian oil, with the price cap
becoming largely ineffective. Official Russian statistics show the
average price received was above the $60 per barrel price cap in
2023.
In order to counter these practices
to evade the cap, the draft resolution proposes to expand the number
of sanctioned tankers and enforce the existing oil spill insurance
requirements for all tankers passing through member States waters.
Additionally, it is proposed to further sanction services to the
Russian oil and gas industry, thus restricting their future production
and depriving the Russian budget of another source of revenue.
37. One of the largest Russian companies not yet sanctioned is
Rosatom, which is the central holding company for the Russian Federation’s
nuclear energy sector and the world’s top uranium enrichment entity, controlling
36% of the market and supplying fuel to 78 power reactors in 15
countries (17% of the global nuclear fuel market).
Rosatom has been in charge of operating
the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, after its capture
by the Russian army. Council of Europe member States that operate
nuclear power plants should, as a matter of priority, search for
alternative sources of nuclear fuel and adopt restrictive measures
against Rosatom. In 2023 alone, Rosatom generated US$2 billion in
revenues from US and European sources.
6. Conclusions
38. By way of conclusion, I should
like to stress the link between the death of Alexei Navalny, a fearless fighter
against the criminal regime of Vladimir Putin on the “home front”,
and the urgent need to counter the spread of this regime beyond
the Russian Federation’s borders. The latter requires first and
foremost unwavering political and concrete support to Ukraine’s
heroic defence against the invaders. Most urgently, we must ensure
that Ukraine rapidly receives all the weapons and ammunition needed
for this fight. We must also continue to strengthen the sanctions
regime against the Russian war machine, by plugging any loopholes, going
after all those enabling the violation and circumvention of sanctions
and developing new, creative ways to restrict the flow of revenue
and technology to the Russian Federation.
39. The outcome of this fight is critical to the future of Europe.
Will Europe remain free and prosperous, safe in its democratic values
and respect of international law? Or will tomorrow Europe – like
the people of the Russian Federation today – fall under the heel
of Vladimir Putin’s regime, to be oppressed and exploited for the
benefit of the “crooks and thieves” against whom Alexei Navalny
lost his life?