Vietnamese migrants and asylum-seekers in Hong Kong ("boat people")

26 April 1993

Doc. 6818

1403-22/4/93-1-E

REPORT

on Vietnamese migrants and asylum-seekers

in Hong Kong ("boat people")

(Rapporteur: Mr ATKINSON

United Kingdom, Conservative)

Summary

In 1990, the Assembly expressed concern about the fate of Vietnamese asylum-seekers, in particular those "boat people" forcibly repatriated to Vietnam from Hong Kong after being "screened out" as not qualifying for refugee status. It was feared that returnees might be persecuted once back in Vietnam, a one-party communist state where the human rights situation was far from satisfactory. Moreover, human rights organisations strongly criticised the screening process operating in Hong Kong, as well as the treatment and detention conditions of asylum-seekers there.

The problem of the Vietnamese "boat people" has gone some way towards a solution. Many have been resettled elsewhere, many have returned voluntarily, and some have been forcibly repatriated under various international agreements. There is no substantiated evidence to show that returnees have been persecuted, although those accused of serious crimes may be prosecuted.

Growing prosperity, the introduction of democratic freedoms and observance of human rights in Vietnam would increase the incentive to return. Thus economic and political liberalisation should be encouraged through the prospect of an end to the United States trade embargo. The European Community's assistance programme and UNHCR involvement in Vietnam should be continued.

Specific steps should be taken to improve the screening process in Hong Kong, where the steady depopulation of the camps should allow living conditions to improve.

I. Draft resolution

1. The vast majority of Vietnamese migrants ("boat people") who sought asylum, refuge, or a better life in Hong Kong following the fall of Saigon in 1975 have, for the most part, been resettled in third countries. Others have returned to Vietnam in considerable numbers under the Voluntary Repatriation Programme organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or, to a lesser extent, been forcibly repatriated under the Orderly Return Programme negotiated by the Vietnamese, Hong Kong and United Kingdom Governments.

2. All returnees have been assured by the Vietnamese Government that they will not be persecuted for illegal exit, although those who have allegedly committed serious crimes are subject to prosecution. They receive cash grants from UNHCR, which monitors their safety, and are eligible for assistance in the form of job creation, vocational training and start-up loans under a European Community programme.

3. There appears to be no substantiated evidence that returnees have been persecuted or threatened, but the Assembly is concerned that they may nevertheless be subject to petty harassment, and that overall unemployment remains high.

4. The economic reform already underway in Vietnam must, in order to bear fruit, go hand in hand with political liberalisation, essential to the attraction of foreign investment, the expansion of trade, and the continued voluntary return of Vietnamese emigrants - the establishment of genuine democracy being the best and ultimate guarantee of safety for the returnees.

5. The Assembly emphasises that the refugee status determination procedure operated by the Hong Kong Government fulfils international standards for such procedures, but could still be improved.

6. The overcrowded conditions prevailing in the reception camps in Hong Kong, which verge on the intolerable, must be improved as soon as permitted by departures, and that the information provided to inmates concerning the situation in Vietnam must be made more credible.

7. The Assembly therefore calls upon:

i. the European Community, and UNHCR, where applicable:

a. to maintain their assistance programmes in Vietnam beyond November 1994 and to ensure that these apply to all returnees;

b. to encourage European companies to invest in Vietnam;

c. to improve their information services in the refugee camps so as to ensure more complete coverage, more frequent presentations and more authentic video productions;

ii. the Hong Kong Government:

a. to reduce overcrowding and lack of privacy in the refugee camps by dispersing residents as the camps become depleted;

b. to ensure that all remaining migrants are provided with legal representation, are permitted to appear before the Refugee Status Review Board, are provided with a copy of their interview record and the reasons for the decision at the time they are notified of it, and that tape recordings of their interviews are made;

c. to introduce more discretion into the screening process;

d. to establish a permanent consultative process between the UNHCR, the Hong Kong Immigration Department, the Refugee Status Review Board and representatives of lawyers and non-governmental organisations acting for migrants;

iii. the Vietnamese Government:

a. to continue to facilitate access to returnees by Amnesty International and other bona fide human rights organisations which so request in order to verify their safety;

b. to publish the actual text of its 1992 guarantee that returnees will suffer no persecution;

c. to end all censorship of the media, the postal services and the international press;

d. to introduce fair and open trial for political and religious dissenters and an amnesty for all "prisoners of conscience";

e. to develop contacts and dialogue with Vietnamese "exile" organisations abroad to discuss the conditions necessary to encourage their return with a view to contributing to national reconciliation and the reconstruction of a new Vietnam;

iv. the United States of America to lift its trade embargo so as to allow the normalisation of Vietnam's relations with the international financial institutions.

II. Explanatory memorandum

by Mr ATKINSON

I. Introduction

1. In 1990, two motions for a resolution on refugees and asylum-seekers from South-East Asia, principally Vietnam, were referred to the committee.

2. One (Doc. 6181) expressed concern for the Cambodian refugees in camps in Thailand and for Vietnamese migrants and asylum-seekers in the camps in Hong Kong. It invited the governments of member states to work together to find solutions to the causes of such migration and to increase support for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in providing humanitarian aid.

3. The other (Doc. 6182) was critical of the forcible repatriation of those asylum-seekers in Hong Kong who had been "screened out" as non-refugees (that is, determined as not qualifying for refugee status) despite the continuing persecution of dissidents in Vietnam. It pointed out that human rights organisations had reported that conditions in the detention centres in Hong Kong did not satisfy international standards and called on the United Kingdom Government to halt forcible repatriation until refugee determination procedures were acceptable. In response the committee appointed Mr Garrett as its Rapporteur.

4. In October 1991, the Vietnamese, British, and Hong Kong Governments agreed to the Orderly Departure Programme as a humane and durable solution to the Vietnamese migrant problem within the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which came into effect in June 1989 at the second International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees (ICIR), and within normal international practices. It should be noted that returnees are eligible for assistance under a European Community Programme.

5. In January 1992, Mr Garrett submitted a report on the Voluntary Repatriation Programme organised by the UNHCR in implementation of the CPA. This referred to the continuing lack of consensus on the future of "non-refugees" who did not volunteer for return to their country of origin. It also reported on the monitoring of the integration of those who had returned to Vietnam, and affirmed that the 1988 Memorandum of Understanding between Vietnam and the UNHCR on their treatment was being adhered to.

6. Mr Garrett's report also referred to the efforts being made to resolve the long-standing problem of Laos asylum-seekers within the CPA, the outcome of the comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia which was to enable the voluntary repatriation of Cambodians from Thailand, and the emergency relief programme for Sri Lankan refugees from India and the eventual repatriation of Tamils.

7. On 23 March 1992, the Parliamentary Assembly's Sub-Committee on Refugees held a hearing at which three Vietnamese refugee associations made representations. Mr Le Trung Cang, representative of the Committee of Action for the Defence of Boat-People explained that his organisation was fighting against the deportation of Vietnamese refugees, who were considered as "the heroes of freedom". The CPA adopted at the second ICIR in June 1989 had been designed to dissuade the Vietnamese from fleeing the totalitarian government. Also, access to the refugee camps had been made more difficult by the introduction of a screening procedure. Mr Le Trung Cang regretted the agreement on repatriation signed by the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Vietnam in 1991. True democratisation of Vietnam was the ideal solution to the problem. However, as this was not likely to happen in the near future, an urgent and temporary solution was necessary. His organisation had proposed that an accommodation centre for Vietnamese refugees be set up on Phu Quoc island, located in the close vicinity of Vietnam. Such a centre should have an international status and be placed under United Nations administration and supervision. Its infrastructure should be developed by the international community and foreign capital investments should be welcomed. He regretted the fact that this proposal had failed to receive positive attention.

8. Mr Nguyen Thieu, representative of the International Committee of Vietnamese Refugees, called on the international community to intervene with the responsible authorities of Hong Kong and the British Government to stop the forced repatriation of Vietnamese boat-people. Compulsory repatriation to a country whose leaders still observed Marxist-Leninist theories was contrary to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those repatriated risked imprisonment. Forced repatriation was a strategy of the Vietnamese government to discourage those still wanting to flee from Vietnam. In the long term, the best solution would be to install in Vietnam a real democratic and multiparty regime. He hoped that international organisations would continue to exert economic and political pressure on the Hanoi Government so that it would take steps towards democracy. Meanwhile, Phu Quoc island should be transformed into an accommodation centre for the boat-people under international control.

9. Mr Lai The Hung, representative of the Federation of Vietnamese Refugees in Europe, analysed the reasons for the present situation. Since 1975, the communist occupation of Vietnam had led to immense human suffering for its people. Despite this suffering, the term "Vietnamese refugees" was never used. Instead, they were referred to as "boat people". Yet several thousand Vietnamese had been forced to flee their country. He regretted the fact that the same countries which in 1979 had called for asylum for the Vietnamese refugees, had agreed ten years later on the closing of the refugee camps in South-East Asia and on the repatriation of the Vietnamese refugees. Repatriation was unacceptable since the reasons for their seeking refuge had not been eliminated: the totalitarian government was still in power.

10. Your Rapporteur was subsequently appointed to replace Mr Garrett who had retired from parliament. On 23 November 1992 he submitted an outline for a report which was approved by the committee which agreed that it should be confined to the situation of the Vietnamese boat-people in Hong Kong. It also approved the Rapporteur's request to undertake a fact-finding visit to Hong Kong and Hanoi. This took place from 10 to 13 January 1993.

II. Background to the problem

11. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, large numbers of people have left Vietnam. The so-called "boat people" are those who set out by sea to cross to Hong Kong or other non-communist territories in the region. Initially they were those who felt at risk because of their association with the former order in South Vietnam, or were ethnic Chinese residents of Vietnam.

12. Already in the 1970s the situation of the boat people was recognised as a profound crisis: they risked great suffering and death from disaster at sea and attack from pirates. Many were ignored by passing vessels or driven out to sea on landing. The influx to Hong Kong reached a peak in 1979 when over 66 000 people arrived in the first seven months of the year, of whom some 27% were Vietnamese and the rest Chinese. Their situation was addressed by the first International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees (ICIR) held in Geneva in 1979.

13. Under the agreement reached at that conference, all Vietnamese arriving in countries in the region were accorded temporary protection and offered resettlement in the west, principally in Australia, North America, and western Europe. In the early to mid-eighties the Vietnamese refugee population in Hong Kong steadily diminished as permanent resettlement took effect.

14. Until 1982 the refugees were housed in open centres and allowed out to work each day, but renewed pressure of numbers soon necessitated the building of closed camps, with minimal conditions of comfort, to deter future refugees.

15. Beginning in 1986, the situation deteriorated as arrivals began to exceed departures and the willingness of countries to take them also decreased. Thus, numbers in the camps rose sharply and it became clear that the majority of these arrivals were economic migrants, many from north Vietnam, seeking a better life, rather than genuine refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution.

16. In response to these circumstances, the Hong Kong Government decided, with the full support of the United Kingdom Government, that from 16 June 1988 all Vietnamese migrants arriving in Hong Kong would be treated as illegal immigrants unless determined by a screening procedure to be refugees as defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention. This procedure was developed to satisfy internationally accepted criteria in close consultation with the UNHCR so as to ensure that it was fair and thorough and that genuine refugees would not be returned to Vietnam.

17. Upon interception in Hong Kong waters, Vietnamese migrants are informed of this policy. They are also informed that they are free to leave but, if they do not, and are later found to be non-refugees under the screening procedures, they will be temporarily detained without access to resettlement and then promptly repatriated to Vietnam. The screening procedure is carried out by immigration officers under UNHCR guidelines. UNHCR officials monitor the screening procedures and participate in the preparation of appeals against refusal to grant refugee status. Those people screened in as refugees are accommodated in open centres together with other refugees whereas those screened out as non-refugees are held in detention centres pending repatriation to Vietnam. Most of those currently in Hong Kong who are officially accepted as refugees are those who arrived before screening was introduced.

III. The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)

18. On 13-14 June 1989, in Geneva, the second International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees (ICIR) adopted the current procedure in a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) which states that only refugees should be settled in third countries and that those persons found not to be refugees ("screened out") should return to their countries of origin.

19. The principal features of the CPA are as follows:

—le gal departures from Vietnam, for example under the existing Orderly Departure Programme, should be encouraged. This is organised by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the emigration of 90 000 Vietnamese a year, mostly "Amerasian" children (of United States troops) to the United States of America, and in the framework of family reunion;—

—al l asylum-seekers should be given temporary refuge;—

—th ere should be "a consistent region-wide refugee status determination process";—

—th is process should work to the criteria of the 1951 Convention and other international instruments and in a humanitarian spirit, and use the UNHCR handbook on refugee status as a guide;—

—th ere should be a right to an appeal;—

—pe rsons determined not to be refugees "should return to their country of origin in accordance with international practices. In the first instance, every effort will be made to encourage the voluntary return of such persons";—

—if voluntary repatriation did not make sufficient progress, then "alternatives recognised as being acceptable under international practices would be examined";—

—to encourage non-refugees to return to Vietnam a Voluntary Repatriation Programme has been organised by the UNHCR. The conference did not explicitly endorse compulsory repatriation, and the UNHCR has not been involved in mandatory return, except in so far as it has monitored all returnees at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 20

20. The effectiveness of the CPA was reviewed by officials in October 1989 and January 1990 at meetings of the Steering Committee of the ICIR. However, both meetings broke up when it became apparent that there would be no agreement on the repatriation of Vietnamese asylum-seekers who were not classified as refugees.

21. For over two years the United Kingdom and Hong Kong Governments made strenuous efforts to find ways of implementing the CPA fully and of increasing the rate of repatriation of non-refugees.

22. Following discussions in Hanoi between the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Vietnamese Governments, a Statement of Understanding was signed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Vietnam on 29 October 1991. The agreement confirms Vietnamese acceptance of all non-refugees from the camps in Hong Kong and outlines the arrangements for their return. Under the agreement, the "double backers" (those who had returned home under the voluntary scheme and then come back to Hong Kong) would be returned. In addition, all new arrivals from 29 October 1991 onwards would be screened on arrival and (following the outcome of any appeal) those found to be non-refugees would be promptly returned home.

IV. The Orderly Return Programme

23. Following further discussions with the Vietnamese Government, agreement was reached on 12 May 1992 on the details of an Orderly Return Programme for all non-refugees already in Hong Kong camps. All who return home, voluntarily or otherwise, will receive guarantees from the Vietnamese Government that they will not suffer persecution for leaving the country illegally, and that they will receive reintegration assistance from UNHCR who will monitor their treatment after return. They will also be eligible for assistance under the European Community programme whose aim is to provide job creation opportunities, start-up loans for businesses, vocational training courses, and other community assistance, both for returnees and for local residents.

24. In July 1992, the Hong Kong Government contributed 10 million Hong Kong dollars towards the international efforts currently underway to provide reintegration assistance for Vietnamese migrants returning to Vietnam. The contribution will be used to finance small-scale infrastructure projects in the poorer migrant producing areas in Vietnam in order to raise living standards and employment opportunities for the returnees.

25. The United Kingdom Government recognises that action was also necessary to tackle the root causes of the exodus from Vietnam. At a regional meeting of CPA participants in Manila in May 1990, Britain announced a £1 million contribution for activity by British non-governmental organisations in areas of Vietnam from which the asylum-seekers originate. At Britain's initiative, the Commission of the European Community (EC) inaugurated in February 1992 a six-month, 10 million ecus (£7 million); pilot programme of reintegration assistance for those returning to Vietnam. In September, the EC Commission announced that it would follow up this pilot programme with a two-and-a-half year programme costing 120 million ecus (£84 million). In addition to its share of the EC contribution, Britain has pledged a further £3 million to this programme, and has increased its bilateral aid to Vietnam.

V. The present position and the future

26. As of 1 February 1993 the total population of Vietnamese migrants in Hong Kong was 44 803, of whom 2 495 were refugees, 19 869 were awaiting screening or its results and 22 439 had been determined as non-refugees (illegal immigrants).

Last year (1992) only twelve Vietnamese migrants arrived in Hong Kong, compared with 20 206 in 1991, 6 595 in 1990, 34 503 in 1989 and 18 449 in 1988. By the end of 1992, 183 542 Vietnamese migrants had arrived in Hong Kong since 1975, of whom 138 023, including children born in the camps in Hong Kong, have been resettled in third countries, and 26 729 have been returned to Vietnam. A total of 418 were returned to Vietnam under the orderly return programme or other bilateral agreements.

27. The Hong Kong Government hopes that the agreement with the Vietnamese Government will make clear to those thinking of leaving Vietnam clandestinely that, in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan of Action, there is no point in those who are not genuine refugees leaving Vietnam other than through the Orderly Departure Programme. Non-refugees have no prospect of resettlement in the west and will be sent back to Vietnam once their status has been properly determined. The recent tragic incident at Shek Kong Detention Centre in which twenty-four people were killed and over one hundred injured in a violent disturbance underlines the danger of leaving people stuck in camps indefinitely and the urgency of returning people safely to their homes in Vietnam where their future lies. The Hong Kong Government hopes that with an orderly return programme for all non-refugees still in Hong Kong's camps starting in June 1992, the repatriation programme can be completed and the camps cleared within three to four years. The Hong Kong Government will be doing all it can, in cooperation with UNHCR, to encourage as many non-refugees as possible to participate in the existing UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Programme, which has already returned 25 375 people to Vietnam from Hong Kong alone.

VI. Rapporteur's visit to Hong Kong

28. Your Rapporteur's aims in Hong Kong were to establish the facts and hear opinions on conditions in the camps, the screening process and the appeal procedure as well as to obtain a background briefing on the European Community programme and UNHCR work in Vietnam.

a. Meeting with NGOs

29. His first meeting — with representatives of two NGOs providing supporting services to the refugees (Refugee Concern and Community and Family Service International) and with lawyers and interpreters acting for the refugees — was helpful in confirming those areas of concern which are the principal justification for this report. He was alerted to the following points:

—Po licy toward the boat-people was now based on the supposition that Vietnam was no longer a repressive regime and that there was no longer a well- founded fear of persecution.—

—Ho wever, most returnees were discriminated against, particularly if they were known to be "politically active" in the camps.—

—Th e overcrowded conditions in the camps, which denied any privacy, violated all internationally accepted standards.—

—Th e written records of interviews with each refugee were subject to distortion in translation (from Vietnamese to Cantonese to English) leading to unjust decisions.—

—Th e Refugee Status Review Board allowed only 4% of appeals which was contrary to the guide recommendation that "the spirit of justice and understanding" should be applied. The Board's membership was unchallengeable.—

—Th e screening process was a travesty and any speeding up of the process would lead to injustice. Most appellants could not afford to hire lawyers to represent them.b.

b. Meeting with Mr Brian Bresnihan, refugee co-ordinator, Hong Kong Government

30. Mr Bresnihan emphasised that the camps were run by the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department because it was the only body capable of doing so; but they were not prisons.

31. 1992 had been a "watershed year" with only twelve migrants arriving in Hong Kong (compared with 20 000 in 1991), while 12 000 volunteers and 396 non-volunteers had returned under the Orderly Return Programme.

32. Any discrimination against the returnees in Vietnam would be exposed. They were frequently seen by UNHCR staff. British Embassy staff visited each non-voluntary returnee. Foreign journalists abounded. The United States of America was suspicious of the Orderly Return Programme. Vietnam was desperate for international respectability and investment and for the United States of America to lift its trade embargo.

33. Any reports of persecution of returnees were investigated. While there was harassment there was no hard evidence of persecution. However, the Vietnamese authorities remained too secretive, and press and postal services were subject to censorship.

34. The Roman Catholic Church in Hanoi had been reopened and new churches were being built.

c. Meeting with Ms Lorna Workman, external information co- ordinator, European Community (EC) International Programme — Vietnam

35. As from 1 June 1992, following a successful year-long pilot scheme in three provinces, the European Community programme had been assisting the reintegration into their villages of origin of 80 000 returnees. Moreover, the programme was designed to improve the quality of life of people in their home communities by stimulating economic activity so as to discourage further illegal departures. The total cost of the programme was 102,5 million ecus.

36. The donor countries worked in cooperation with the Vietnam Government and the UNHCR to implement the following measures:

—Cr edit scheme: under this scheme, designed to create 80 000 jobs, loans for business start-ups and the expansion of existing family businesses in the private sector were obtainable from two state banks whose staff had been "western" trained, on the condition that half the jobs were filled by returnees and that loans were not used for personal consumption.—

—Vo cational training: new skills-training and courses were being introduced at existing training centres which issued nationally recognised qualifications; those qualifying could receive a bank loan, based on a business plan, and a starter kit of tools to maintain the trade studied.—

—Mi cro projects: designed to generate 28 000 jobs, for example in land reclamation and infrastructure projects run by NGOs, this scheme would create temporary jobs leading to permanent jobs in rural areas. These were regarded as "forced labour" by returnees and tended to go to local people.—

—Un accompanied minors: this scheme was designed to provide for the care and reintegration of young returnees, many of whom had been traumatized and were in need of counselling. They also needed help to resume their education.—

—He alth refurbishment programme: this included provision of diagnostic equipment and drugs supplied to hospitals, the setting-up of health centres, and primary health care education in the district.—

—In formation: four European Community regional headquarters had been established with offices in eighteen provinces; three-monthly information sessions were held in all the Hong Kong camps, a six-weekly newspaper and videos of returnees' experiences were produced, etc.d.

d. Visit to Whitehead Detention Centre

37. Opened in the New Territories, this camp houses half the migrant population, some 24 000, in ten sections, with 800 staff working four shifts. One third are employed in the camp. The UNHCR, Save the Children Fund, Hong Kong Christian Aid to Refugees and other NGOs run schools and other services. Medical services are provided by the Hong Kong Government and Médecins Sans Frontières. An elected Peace and Order Committee of residents was established for each section following disorders in 1990. The centre is surrounded by eighteen-foot high barbed wire fencing, as is each section, and is overlooked by guard huts.

38. The dormitories are divided into tiers of cubicles divided by curtains; a couple occupies the top section and up to six sleep in the one below. To your Rapporteur, privacy was at an absolute minimum with overcrowding verging on the intolerable.

39. Interviewing several residents awaiting screening, the response was identical: they had left the injustice of North Vietnam to seek a new life. They would face no future if they were compelled to return.

40. On 17 December 1992, The Guardian newspaper published an article by Simon Winchester, who said that he had spent six unauthorised hours in the camp; he reported that criminal gang bosses, currently dominated by the Hanoi triad organisation, the "Black Rose", ran the camp through the Peace and Order Committees by corrupt practices, systematic human rights abuses and a black market. Racism between Cantonese and Vietnamese was rife.

41. Whilst accepting that there was, inevitably, a criminal element among the refugees, your Rapporteur was assured that law and order in the camp was being maintained and that the continuing presence of so many NGOs ensured that all complaints were investigated.

e. Visit to Tai A Chau detention camp

42. Built as a self-contained temporary camp in 1989 on remote Soko Island, and run by a non-profit-making private company, Hong Kong Housing Service for Refugees, the camp has a capacity of 10 000, most of whom are from central and south Vietnam. Training is provided in motor mechanics and carpentry, while work experience is organised in (profitable) farming, poultry raising and fish breeding. The camp authorities anticipate increasing problems as the residents are reduced to a "hard core" of those to be returned who are alleged to have committed serious crimes or helped to organise the departure of the boat-people. Nevertheless, the UNHCR has evidence that some of the organisers who have returned have not been prosecuted by the Vietnamese authorities. If they are wanted for murder it is a different matter.

43. Your Rapporteur was extremely impressed by this "idyllic" island camp, where residents are free to roam until 6 p.m., by its facilities, and by the motivation of the staff who believed that they were training the "millionaires of the future in Vietnam". However, the residential blocks containing three tiers of cubicles were unacceptably overcrowded. Your Rapporteur was told of the need to establish a permanent United Nations/European Community information unit. More realistic and practical videos of life in modern Vietnam should be produced instead of "glossy" professional productions which were not believable. Direct flights should be available for returnees to Saigon instead of Hanoi, which they feared. Residents told him that they had fled persecution in 1989 and did not want to return to a communist state. They did not believe that they would be adequately monitored by the UNHCR.

f. Meeting with Mr Alex Yeung, assistant director, Vietnamese Refugee Division, Hong Kong Immigration Department

44. Before June 1988 all Vietnamese migrants arriving in Hong Kong had been automatically accorded temporary protection. Screening had been introduced to resolve the growing problem for Hong Kong of ever increasing numbers of boat-people by distinguishing economic migrants from genuine refugees "in fear of persecution" (such as former South Vietnam soldiers and active church leaders and priests) according to the criteria established by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

45. Today, those screened-in as refugees were transferred within three months to Bataan in the Philippines for onward resettlement in Canada, Australia, the United States of America and a number of European countries. These totalled 4 754 in 1989, 7 656 in 1990, 6 467 in 1991, and 3 192 in 1992 (to November).

46. Officials went regularly to Vietnam to study the undoubted progress of reform in the introduction of a free and open economy, the ownership of private property, and freedom of worship. Whilst one-party political control remained, there was no evidence today of the persecution, re-education and confiscation of property that had followed the end of the war in 1975. However, corruption remained widespread as in most Asian countries.

47. Returnees were taken to reception centres, with better conditions than those in Hong Kong, to register and to be transferred to their original village where they were registered locally. Children were issued with birth certificates and their education was resumed. Food subsidies were provided, work was offered to the qualified, and a simple life resumed.

48. There was no quota for screening-in: 12% to date, increasing to 16% with appeals. Hong Kong had a lower screening-in rate than for camps in Malaysia and Indonesia because it had received fewer migrants from South Vietnam, who would claim to be at risk if they were forcibly returned.

49. The system was not perfect because it was administered by humans and was subject to different interpretations of the UNHCR handbook. Each case could be subject to a judicial review if the appellant's legal representative was not satisfied with the procedure.

g. Meeting with Mr Francis Blackwell, Chairman of the Refugee Status Review Board

50. Board members were knowledgeable, highly competent and experienced and had visited Vietnam. They were civil and other public servants, mothers, academics, Australian lawyers, members of tribunals, and lawyers formerly with the Agency for Volunteer Service (AVS) (an organisation of lawyers who represent appellants).

51. The review process, which had been subjected to a judicial review in 1991, operated as follows:

i. Pre-screening counselling was provided by NGOs (the best of which was the Jesuit Refugee Service), and the UNHCR, with meetings and videos.

ii. First stage screening by the Immigration Department determined the migrant's status after a thorough investigation of his whole life based on interviews taking from one to seven days by members of the disciplined and experienced service. Copies of screened-out cases were sent to the Refugee Status Review Board, the Agency for Volunteer Service (AVS) and the UNHCR. AVS saw every appellant who was screened out and all of whom appealed, at a cost of 4 600 Hong Kong dollars each. Approximately 30% were considered to merit a review.

iii. Review stage. Cases were allocated on a random basis to one of six boards which would study a detailed file for some two to three weeks, sharing problem cases with other representations. The appellant was interviewed to test or clarify his case and to ensure that no genuine refugees were screened out, giving the benefit of the doubt where there was doubt.

iv. Appellants could apply for a further review by UNHCR, and for legal aid.

h. Meeting with Mr Robert Van Leeuwen, chief of mission, UNHCR

52. Following the 1979 crisis, the United Nations Secretary-General had convened the first International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees (ICIR) in Geneva in response to concern at the great loss of life suffered by the boat-people at sea. All who arrived had been automatically resettled as "de facto refugees". As more and more countries had questioned this encouragement to exodus, governments had reduced their donations and Hong Kong had introduced the cut-off date of 15 June 1988 for screening to determine refugee status and hence eligibility for resettlement.

53. The second ICIR (1989) had endorsed the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and the UNHCR had been given the task of arranging and promoting a voluntary return programme and a media campaign to dispel illusions among potential migrants.

54. In 1989 there had been 34 000 arrivals in Hong Kong alone, in 1992 only twelve. 42 000 remained in Hong Kong, representing half of all Vietnamese migrants in the region. Of these 15 000 were awaiting a decision, 28 000 had been screened out and awaited return. Since August 1991, 1 000 a month had returned under the Voluntary Repatriation Programme.

55. The problems which the UNHCR now faced were the following:

i. Unaccompanied minors in Hong Kong, without parents, for whom the Committee for Vulnerable Persons made recommendations on status and solutions. The NGO, Nordic Assistance to Repatriated Vietnamese, would supervise their return to families in Vietnam.

ii. Criminals who had risen to a position of influence in the camps and who would face prosecution in the courts, not persecution, if screened out for return to Vietnam.

iii. The "effect of time" on the migrants having spent more than three years with little to do but think about how to avoid returning to Vietnam, through marriage, political activity in the camps, etc. and encouraged by anti-communist propaganda from overseas, especially exile groups in the United States of America.

56. The UNHCR had the final say in implementing its very clear mandate on the boat-people: no refugee must be sent back against his will. This acted as a safety valve in response to any referrals made to it, from the Refugee Status Review Board, from individuals, NGOs and lawyers. The process was no travesty.

57. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Vietnam, the UNHCR investigated any allegations of mistreatment of returnees and had found no evidence to date. Criminals convicted in Hong Kong or Vietnam would, of course, have to face a court on return, but greater leniency was shown to deserters than in many other countries.

58. Monitoring of returnees was undertaken by six international Vietnamese-speaking staff (with one more to come) and by six more on a smaller scale. Some 25% of all returnees had been contacted to date. One monitor had personally visited 3 000 families who would have picked up any relevant information from others, and which was immediately checked. All "double backers" were visited.

59. Every returnee was given a United Nations point of contact, and was encouraged to write letters. Those on vocational training courses were regularly monitored at their centre. In addition to United Nations monitoring, both the United Kingdom and Hong Kong Governments had their monitoring teams.

VII. Rapporteur's visit to Vietnam

60. Your Rapporteur fully accepts that a thirty-six hour visit to Vietnam is totally inadequate to make value judgements on the situation of the returned boat-people. However, set against the background information he had obtained in Hong Kong recorded above, any on-the-spot visit is of some help in arriving at conclusions.

61. His programme was made up of briefings from officials attached to the British Embassy, the European Community Programme, and the UNHCR, a visit to Hai Phong for briefings from Vietnamese officials responsible for resettling the returnees, and discussions with some of the returnees themselves.

a. Briefing from the British Embassy

62. Vietnam was coming out of the "darkness of decades" and was "blinking". Following the collapse of Comecon and the end of Soviet subsidies, Vietnam's priority was economic stability and the establishment of a market economy to encourage international investment. Considerable economic progress had been achieved, as demonstrated by a stable currency, reduced inflation, a trade surplus, and a growing number of successful enterprises. All this encouraged predictions that Vietnam would be "the next Asian Dragon".

63. Without any tradition of political pluralism, Vietnam remained a one-party state committed to socialism. However, the party was becoming more accountable to parliamentary committees in the Assembly. Genuine debate (on, for example, the right to fair trial) would increase as a new generation from the south took over, perhaps by the time of the 1994 Party Congress.

64. Whilst there was no toleration of any political activity, and censorship remained, there was now no evidence of persecution. The UNHCR monitored every returnee, the British Embassy staff visited every compulsory returnee, and similar observation was carried out by NGOs such as the Ockendon Venture, Action Aid and Oxfam.

65. In addition to the European Community Programme, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong Governments contributed to micro-projects, job creation schemes, vocational training, land reclamation, and reafforestation, including joint funding schemes with NGOs, to raise living standards in the provinces.

b. Meetings with Mr Do Gia Phach, Vice-Chairman of the Hai Phong People's Committee (the "Vice-Mayor"), Chairman of the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Returnees; and Mr Hoeng Van Dinh, Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Returnees, Hai Phong City

66. Vietnam had faced great poverty after 1975: those who had left saw no future at home or were criminals. 37% of Hai Phong had been destroyed by B52 bombers in 1972. 50% of all returnees from Hong Kong were from Hai Phong.

67. Organisers of illegal departures bought boats, or even killed boat owners. Government policy to discourage such departures was to educate and to warn against such crimes. Over 30 000 people had left Hai Phong for Hong Kong and some 13 500 (in 150 flights) had returned to date. The remaining 15 000 were likely to be criminals, longer stayers, and not used to work. Some would bring back diseases. Some recent migrants had left a member to look after their family home just to claim the grant for returnees.

68. Returnees spent three days at the Hanoi Reception Centre to establish their original address to which they were taken. They were given 360 Hong Kong dollars and help to find a job. If they had sold their house they had to negotiate with the present owner with a view to living together for three months before either was entitled to a European Community/Hong Kong grant with which to buy materials and land for a new house.

69. Vocation centres and job creation schemes had been established in each district but 30% of returnees had not found jobs. Resources were not keeping up with the rate of return and were inadequate to educate the children.

70. Vietnam now had an open policy. There were many incentives to encourage international investment and joint ventures to create jobs. The private sector in the economy had been recognised since 1986 together with the right of private ownership, housing and business. All exiles were welcome to return to build a new Vietnam. There was no discrimination.

c. Meetings with returnees in Hai Phong

71. Mr and Mrs NTN with two children had arrived in Hong Kong in June 1988 and been compelled to return in October 1992. They were still unemployed with no prospect of restoring their business and had used up their UNHCR grant to repair their home. European Community retraining was not practical for their trade as merchants. They faced a hopeless future.

72. Mrs KZ, divorced, had returned voluntarily but her twenty-one year old son's return had been enforced. Both remained unemployed and were facing immense difficulties. They had not received any grants.

73. Mr PTN had left in 1989 for a better life and had been deported for attempting to escape from Hong Kong. No help had been offered to help him become an electrician. His entire family was in debt.

74. Mr PT had left in 1989 for a better life. He had spent his United Nations grant on his house and on food, and was still unemployed. He was aware of European Community training but was not interested.

d. Meetings with Mr Andy Batkin, European Community Programme Director — northern region — in the Project Office, Hai Phong; and with Mr Jorgen Gammelgaard, European Community Programme Director in the Project Office, Hanoi, and Mr Jean-Marie Warmon, Finance Director

75. Whilst the programme would achieve its target of aiding 80 000 returnees, there was a need for further funding. European Community monitors had found no evidence of discrimination or threats although there was a "bad attitude" shown towards returnees.

76. The objectives of the European Community Programme were short-term job creation for the returnees and the entire local community on a fifty-fifty basis, and long-term sustainable development. The three main components were credit for private business, training provided through government centres, and rural infrastructure. Training courses included motor cycle repair, agriculture, home sewing for women, language courses, and hotel catering and waiting in resort areas.

77. More resources were required for building infrastructure. The European Community should now be considering extending its programme beyond 1994 to build on what was being achieved. European companies should be encouraged to recognise the potential of Vietnam.

78. Determination of the viability of projects in order to qualify for means-tested loans and the achievement of an overall loan recovery rate of 80% were "liberating" the two state-owned banks. Banks with a low recovery rate could not extend further loans.

79. The German Government had established a 10 million German marks loan scheme of credits and training with the Vietnamese Ministry of Labour to encourage Vietnamese families in East Germany, totalling more than 30 000 people, to return to Vietnam.

e. Meeting with Ms Marie-France Sevestre, UNHCR representative in Vietnam, Hanoi

80. Because of the UNHCR campaign, the European Community Programme and the cut-off of entitlement to grants for Vietnamese who left their country after 29 September 1992, as well as the undoubtedly successful economic reform in Vietnam (which had ended food queues), the freedom to meet foreigners, freedom of movement, the availability of motor cycles and the improving overall situation, a total of 36 000 had returned from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and India by the end of 1992. Totals remaining as of October 1992 were 48 000 in Hong Kong, 10 000 in Thailand, 15 500 in Indonesia, 10 500 in Malaysia, 6 000 in the Philippines, that is a total of 92 000.

81. The UNHCR now had six monitors in the field who had complete freedom of movement and who investigated any threats or discrimination. They maintained good relations with the Government. Additional monitoring was undertaken by European Community Programme officers, British Embassy staff, Hong Kong officials and international journalists.

82. UNHCR project assistance amounting to 1 million dollars annually provided technology and expertise to areas not assisted by the European Community Programme.

VIII. Human rights in Vietnam today

83. In 1986 the Vietnamese Government adopted a policy of renewal — doi moi. In the economic sphere this represented a move away from a centrally planned economy towards a more market oriented programme the full development of which has been hampered by restriction on access to international credit by the continued economic embargo of the United States of America.

84. In the political sphere doi moi has resulted in reform of the legal system and general amnesties for thousands of political prisoners associated with the former government in the South, although some remained in detention. In April 1992 the National Assembly adopted a new constitution which allowed certain economic rights including the right of citizens to travel abroad freely and to make contact with foreign companies to do business. However, the new constitution also reaffirms the one-party rule of the Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV).

85. In late 1989, in the wake of the overthrow of communism in eastern Europe, the Council of Ministers authorised a clampdown on "all violations of national security" with a view to the maintenance of political stability. Magazines and newspapers were closed down. The National Assembly adopted a new press law which reasserted state and party control over the media.

86. From 1990, there have been many arrests of Buddhist monks and Roman Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, former detainees, writers and journalists, intellectuals, lawyers, poets and those who had been critical of the CPV of which Amnesty International and the International Society of Human Rights (ISHR) have detailed lists. In November 1991, the principal among them, the non-violent activist Dr Nguyen Dan Que, was sentenced by the People's Court in Ho Chi Minh City to twenty years' imprisonment to be followed by five years of house arrest for calling for democracy and human rights ("activities aimed at overthrowing the people's government").

87. A Sunday Times/South China Morning Post article on 10 and 11 January 1993 by Jane Kokan in Hanoi refers to rising complaints against persecution of the 1 800 year-old Unified Buddhist Church leading to new threats by monks to burn themselves in public — immolation — as was done in South Vietnam in the 1960s. Between sixty and one hundred monks and religious leaders are understood to be in prison camps for the peaceful expression of their religious beliefs.

88. Any religious group must belong to the state-controlled Vietnam Buddhist Church or the Committee for the Solidarity of Vietnamese Catholics. Those who worship outside state controls risk detention and persecution. Publication of religious literature and religious teaching in schools is banned. Permission is required to celebrate Catholic feast days.

89. Between 1 and 7 February 1993 the Pope's special envoy — the Vatican's Deputy Foreign Minister, Bishop Celli — visited Vietnam for meetings with ministers and the head of the Committee for Religious Affairs. These centred on the training of priests and filling vacant archbishopries and other points of past disagreement between the Holy See and Vietnamese authorities. "All of these problems are under consideration. I think together we are trying to find positive solutions", he said.

90. Your Rapporteur looks forward to a response from the Vietnamese Government on the current situation regarding human rights, which include freedom of political expression and association. He particularly seeks a response on their political and religious "prisoners of conscience", known to Amnesty International and ISHR, who remain in detention, before he can confirm that Vietnam today is free from persecution.

IX. Conclusions

91. This report is largely a consequence of the two motions of 1990 (Docs. 6181 and 6182) which are critical of the conditions in the detention camps in Hong Kong and of the forcible return of the boat people to a Vietnam which remains a one-party communist state and which continues to deny human rights. Bearing these in mind, your Rapporteur arrived in Hong Kong and Hanoi determined to establish the facts, to seek justification and to explore alternatives. He had been particularly impressed by the representations made at the Hearing by the Vietnamese refugee associations in Paris (see above I, paragraphs 7 to 9).

92. Now, having been given the fullest possible briefing and information on most aspects of the situation, he is able to come to some clear conclusions. Because of the controversial and sensitive nature of the important issues involved, he has undertaken a period of consultation on his proposed draft resolution with the parties concerned to seek to establish the widest possible consensus.

93. Regarding conditions in the camps in Hong Kong, there is no doubt that the overcrowding in the residential blocks in particular is an insult to human dignity. Children grow up in unsanitary huts without experiencing life outside the barbed wire or a world without fear. No one would want such a daily existence over years for oneself or one's family. It is insufficient to suggest that these boat people took a risk in leaving their homes and, despite the overcrowding, are probably experiencing a better life in the camps than the one they left at home.

94. It is, however, somewhat late in the day to challenge those conditions which have been in existence for more than four years for the most recently established camps, and for many more years for the rest. Such criticism is not very helpful to Hong Kong, which has had to bear the brunt of the arrival of so many migrants — 183 542 since 1975 — without much international acknowledgement and help and at considerable cost.

95. There should be sympathy, too, for Hong Kong's decision of 16 June 1988 following the renewed flow of migrants, mainly economic, to treat all such people as illegal immigrants to be returned unless "screened in" as refugees in the camps. There should be understanding for the agreement between Britain and Vietnam of 29 October 1991 to forcibly return boat people found not to be refugees who would not join the United Nations-sponsored voluntary return programme.

96. Thus, your Rapporteur believes that with so many migrants having been returned (27 000 to date, whilst 138 000 have been resettled elsewhere), there is growing scope to reduce the overcrowding and to improve conditions in the camps by maintaining an evenly balanced spread of residents in all of them instead of seeking to close them as they become depleted. Whilst such a policy might not be so simple in practice, your Rapporteur hopes that the Hong Kong Government will pursue it on humanitarian grounds now that the end of its boat people crisis is in sight. Indeed, it may be essential as the numbers that remain become a "hardcore" of difficult cases to determine, in order to avoid the tension and tragedy experienced at Shek Kong camp last Chinese New Year.

97. Your Rapporteur listened with concern to the criticisms of the screening process and the appeal procedure which he heard from the representatives of the migrants' lawyers and NGOs whose work is entirely voluntary. He was very impressed with their sincerity and compassion which is matched by those members of the Refugee Status Review Board who have the responsibility of making decisions which will determine the fate of the migrants and their families for the rest of their lives. He was also impressed by the professionalism of the immigration services.

98. Bearing in mind that the screening process was vindicated by a judicial review of 1991, he accepts the widely held, but not unanimous, view that it is as fair and as just as is humanly possible. However, there is room for improvements which he has recommended: as the numbers of migrants are reduced to the more difficult cases to screen, each of them should have the advice of, and be represented by, a lawyer. Moreover, each migrant should be entitled to a tape recording of all interviews so as to ensure that he is satisfied that his written record is accurate. Ideally, each appellant should be allowed a personal interview with the Board.

99. In addition, your Rapporteur believes that there should be closer and regular consultation regarding the entire screening and review process between officials, members of the Board, and the lawyers and representatives of the migrants, and recommends the establishment of a body to provide for this.

100. Turning now to the work of the UNHCR, the NGOs, and the European Community Programme in Vietnam together with the growing bilateral aid to assist the resettlement of the returnees, it is this which justifies the orderly return programme of all those boat people who failed to be "screened in" as refugees.

101. These efforts represent a considerable international investment in a poverty-stricken country and are unprecedented for one which is still a one-party communist state. Together they are responsible for introducing western standards and practices into banking and loan determination, small business enterprises, job creation, training in skills and qualifications, and micro infrastructure projects such as shrimp farming. Such measures apply not only to the returnees but also to their communities. A grant of 50 dollars when leaving Hong Kong and of 360 dollars from the UNHCR to each returnee on arrival in Vietnam represents a fortune to a typical family.

102. Was your Rapporteur unfortunate in being introduced to returnees in Hai Phong none of whom had found a job and who were facing a perilous situation? At least the local Sub-Committee for the Reception of Returnees could not be suspected of seeking to paint a rosy picture as to the prospects for returnees. Your Rapporteur is, however, aware that such criticism is being made of the European Community videos presented in the camps as well as of the information provided regarding the UNHCR assistance that awaits the returnees. This is reflected in his recommendations.

103. Your Rapporteur cannot fault the aim of the European Community Programme to create 80 000 jobs — more than the number of returnees from Hong Kong. He understands that the current official figure of returnees remaining unemployed is 30%. He hopes that continuous and sensitive monitoring of all returnees will ensure that they will, in due course, find jobs or create job opportunities for themselves and their families. This may take several years and will much depend on future international investment and on the encouragement of private sector involvement by European companies, which he recommends. The lifting of the United States trade embargo is essential for obtaining World Bank/International Monetary Fund assistance.

104. Your Rapporteur accepts the assurances he has received from all the officials he met of the UNHCR, the European Community Programme and the British Embassy in Hanoi that there is no evidence of persecution of the returnees although some local harassment is probably inevitable. Indeed, the Vietnamese Government would be extremely shortsighted to act against any returnee free of criminal conviction following its clear commitment to the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding. He is, however, aware of the well-reported cases of alleged mistreatment of a handful of returnees about whom he obtained plausible assurances from the UNHCR.

105. However, the continuing detention of a large number of political and religious prisoners following the 1990-92 clampdown is totally unacceptable and your Rapporteur expects the Vietnamese Government to declare an amnesty to allow their release. This initiative will do much to confirm Vietnam's commitment to reform and its determination to assume a positive role in the region alongside other countries which have moved much further towards the establishment of civilised societies.

106. As a further gesture in confidence-building your Rapporteur recommends that His Holiness the Pope be invited to pay a personal visit to the Roman Catholic community in Vietnam following the visit of his personal envoy Bishop Celli in February 1993.

107. He finally recommends that the Vietnamese Government develop contacts with the country's exiled communities abroad to discuss their continuing concerns and the conditions necessary to encourage them to return. This would allow them to apply their "westernised" experience to the country's renewal in a common cause, without discrimination and in a spirit of reconciliation.

108. Making these recommendations, your Rapporteur hopes and expects that there will no longer be support for the concept of an offshore island (Phu Quoc) under United Nations control, to which migrants could be transferred from the camps until Vietnam becomes a democracy and respects human rights. It should be added that such a plan would raise questions of sovereignty which Vietnam would fiercely dispute and would also raise fears concerning the island's use as a base for non-peaceful activity.

Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.

Reference to committee: Docs. 6181 and 6182 and Reference Nos. 1662 et 1663 of 21 March 1990.

Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 14 April 1993.

Members of the committee: MM. Flückiger (Chairman), Cucó, Gassner (Vice-Chairmen), Mrs Aguiar, Mrs Arnold, Mrs Astgeirsdottir, MM. Attard Montalto, Biefnot, Billing, Böhm, Brennan, Brito, Eisma, Fava, Fiorini, Foschi (Alternate: Visibelli), Fuhrmann (Alternate: Mrs Hawlicek) Galanos, Galley, Ghesquière, Gotzev, Grussenmeyer (Alternate: Worms), Mrs Hacklin, Mr de Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Aarts), Sir John Hunt, MM. Iwinski, Karcsay, Kiliç, Kiratlioglu, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Mr Atkinson), Mr Konen, Mrs Mascher, Mr Pahtas, Mrs Persson,

Mrs Robert, MM. Sarafopoulos, Siwek, Skaug, Stoilov, Miss Szelényi, Mr Vázquez.

N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries to the committee: Mr Newman and Ms Nollinger.