The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union

Doc. 7721
7 January 1997

REPORT[1]

Rapporteur: M. Jean-Pierre MASSERET, France, Socialist Group

Summary

Of the Council of Europe's 40 member states, 15 are members of the Union; 11 are candidates for membership of the Union; and all others have relations with the Union through bilateral or multilateral programmes, including certain programmes of the Council of Europe.

The future of the European Union is accordingly a legitimate foreign policy concern of all Council of Europe member states.

The Political Affairs Committee presents some observations on the agenda and context of the Intergovernmental Conference established to revise the Union treaties as foreseen in the Treaty of Maastricht.

The committee calls for the opportunity to be taken to adjust the Treaties to permit the European (Community) Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

I. Draft resolution

1. The Assembly welcomes the prospect of a stronger, wider and more democratic European Union. The Union and the Council of Europe should work in a complementary way in the interest of the whole continent.

2. Of the Council of Europe's 40 member states, 15 are members of the Union; 11 are candidates for membership of the Union; and all others have relations with the Union through bilateral or multilateral programmes, including certain programmes of the Council of Europe.

3. It follows that the future of the European Union is a legitimate foreign policy concern of all Council of Europe member states. This interest is natural as the Council of Europe is the only European structure in which 40 European states have equal status and in which their national parliaments are represented.

4. The Intergovernmental Conference of member states of the European Union (IGC) opened on 29 March 1996. Its purpose is to revise the Union Treaties as foreseen in the Treaty of Maastricht.

5. The IGC is taking place in parallel to discussions on a single European currency, and also on its agenda is the definition of a European defence identity related to the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

6. The Assembly wishes the Conference to continue until it is clear that

i. enlarging the Union's membership will not weaken the Union's capacity for decision,

ii. that the decision process of the Union is democratic,

iii. that relations with the Council of Europe are formally strengthened and clarified - especially in regard to the protection of human rights and the definition and verification of respect for democratic principles in the functioning of European states.

7. The Assembly takes note of the prospect of a single currency for the European Union. However, the currency must be introduced on a reasonably broad geographical basis and its introduction should not be a divisive factor for pan-European relations. To safeguard the project of European integration, the social dimension must be preserved and extended, notably for employment and working conditions. Social protection, as set forth in the Social Charter of the Council of Europe, is a key factor for the commitment of citizens to a properly functioning democracy.

8. The wars in the former Yugoslavia illustrate the need for the emergence of a credible European defence identity, in conformity with the OSCE's "common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21st century" as set forth in Lisbon on 3 December 1996. The Western European Union is the sole European institution competent for security and defence matters; an expansion of its membership, as expected, should establish it as the platform from which a credible European security identity can take shape.

9. The Dayton Agreements for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina show the potential for concerted action between the international institutions. For greater efficiency, joint programmes between the Union and the Council of Europe should be further developed. Moreover, political dialogue within the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should be structurally related to the CFSP.

10. The Assembly re-affirms its view that there must be no competing human rights protection mechanisms in Europe, with the risk of divergent case-law. The institutions of the European Convention on Human Rights, operating within the frame of the Council of Europe, are competent to examine all questions of human rights under the Convention.

11. The Assembly recalls its Resolution 1067 (1995) and Recommendation 1279 (1995) in favour of accession of the European (Community) Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. The IGC provides an opportunity for adjusting the treaties so that action can be taken following the opinion of 28 March 1996 of the European Court of Justice on possible accession of the European (Community) Union to the European Convention on Human Rights.

12. The Assembly further considers that there should be no competing mechanisms for evaluation of respect of democratic principles by European states. In this regard, the quality of the monitoring procedures carried out by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should be recognised.

13. The Assembly resolves to increase its efforts for concordant and complementary action with the European Parliament. The contributions of national parliaments of Council of Europe member states to all subjects dealt with by the European Union which affect the democratic functioning of the continent should be enhanced.

14. The Assembly welcomes the ratification by the Russian Federation of its agreement on partnership and co-operation with the European Union, and supports its entry into force as an important step forward in the creation of "a common European home".

15. The Assembly requests its President to transmit this resolution to the governments of those of its member states which are members of the European Union, with a view to its presentation to the Intergovernmental Conference.

II. Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur

I. Introduction

1. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU) opened on 29 March 1996 in Turin.

2. In the context of the conference, the EU member states meet monthly on the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and weekly on the level of Ministers' representatives. The IGC has also been discussed by Heads of State and Government of the EU on several occasions[2]

3. A draft revised Treaty was presented to the European Council meeting in Dublin on 13 and 14 December 1996. The Conference is expected to close with the Amsterdam summit in June 1997, at the end of the Dutch Presidency to the EU.

4. The purpose of the Conference is to reform the Union, prepare it for enlargement, adjust to a new economic, social, political and security environment in a post-cold war Europe and make it ready to meet global challenges of growing economic interdependence coupled with political instability.

5. The outcome of the Conference is certain to have important implications for Europe as a whole. It will also have an important impact on the Council of Europe, which has developed close co-operation with the EU. Moreover, 26 of its 40 member states are members or candidates for membership in the EU. All others also have some sort of contractual relationship with the Union or are the beneficiaries of bilateral or multilateral programmes.

6. In September 1995 the Assembly had adopted Recommendation 1279 (1995) and Resolution 1067 (1995) on the IGC, drawing the attention of the EU Governments to the Council of Europe's achievements in many of the fields that the forthcoming IGC was to deal with. It made a number of concrete proposals on closer links between the Council of Europe and the European Union. Resolution 1068 (1996) had been adopted at the same time, calling for an accession of the European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights.

7. The EU Governments' response to these proposals has been very limited.

8. With regard to European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Justice ruled on 28 March 1996, that an accession by the European (Community) Union to the Convention was not possible without a revision of the Treaties. The question since has remained open.

9. The European Union has been reluctant to set up an Observatory on racism and xenophobia together with the Council of Europe. In general, however, inter-institutional and sectoral co-operation has developed positively in 1996.

10. The institutional arrangement of 16 June 1987 was supplemented by a new exchange of letters between the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the President of the European Commission on 5 November 1996. In addition, quadripartite meetings between the Chairman in Office of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the Presidency of the EU and the President of the EU Commission resumed on more or less regular basis.[3]

11. This report has been drafted before the Summit of EU Heads of State in Government in Dublin on 13-14 December 1996, and is therefore based only on information available prior to the meeting at which a draft revised Treaty, prepared by the Irish Presidency to the EU, has been discussed.

II. The IGC in 1997

A. What is at stake?

12. The Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European Union provided for its own revision in 1996. In fact, the original agenda for the IGC was rather limited, and only few specific articles of the Treaty were set for revision.

13. A prospect for enlargement, a pressing need to strengthen EU's role in foreign and security matters and the expected introduction of a common currency added considerably to the political weight of the Conference.

14. The EU member states are expected to prepare the EU for enlargement by reforming its institutions and making them more effective. Among the most important issues are the scope of qualified majority voting and the weighing of votes in the Council of Ministers, the manner of appointing and the composition of the EU Commission, a reduction in the number of legislative procedures and the scope of the co-decision procedures involving the European Parliament, as well as the role and functioning of the European Court of Justice.

15. Another important institutional issue is the idea of a so called "flexibility clause" which would allow an inner group of member states to integrate more closely.

16. The IGC should strengthen and enlarge the scope of the Union's common foreign and security policy, increase the effectiveness of its co-operation in justice and home affairs and review its relations with the Western European Union (WEU).

17. There is widespread agreement that the democratic legitimacy of the EU has to be strengthened. Its work should become more transparent and open. the Treaties should be simplified so as to make the Union's goals and functioning easier for the public to understand. The role of national parliaments in shaping EU policies should be strengthened. The protection of human rights has to be further improved. The Union has to be brought closer to its citizens, by providing effective answers to their needs for security, employment and protected environment.

18. Discussions at the Conference are parallel to preparations for stage 3 of the Economic and Monetary Union, aimed at introducing a common currency among a number of EU member states by 1 January 1999.

B. Preparation for enlargement

19. The preparation for the enlargement is not one of the original items on the IGC agenda. The Maastricht Treaty came too early after the events in 1989 to foresee the political, security and economic inevitability of an EU enlargement with former communist countries. It was not until June 1993 when the European Council agreed on a principle of such enlargement, set a number of political and economic criteria, although without any fixed agenda. A year later in Corfu, the EU Heads of State or Government agreed that negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would start 6 months after the conclusion of the IGC. In December 1995, the same decision was taken for central and east European candidates.

20. Cyprus, Malta and ten central and east European countries, which have concluded a Europe agreement on associated membership with the EU[4], had already applied for accession. The Council of Ministers instructed the EU Commission to prepare an opinion on their candidature. Preliminary opinions have already been prepared for Cyprus and Malta. The latter has recently suspended its candidature, following the recent general elections and the victory of the Labour party which campaigned against EU membership. The membership of Cyprus is related to the question of relations with Turkey, which has an agreement on a customs union without an evolutionary clause on full membership, contained in Europe agreements on associated membership. Switzerland, which also suspended its candidature, is currently negotiating a number of bilateral agreements with the Union.

21. Although it is not expected that all 11 candidates would enter the EU simultaneously, it is clear that the enlargement will have far-reaching institutional, financial, political, social and other implications for the EU.

22. For the time being, talks at the Conference are reportedly blocked on several key issues of institutional reform. The President of the EU Commission had warned that an enlargement without a progress on institutional changes risks to paralyse the Union for a long time[5]. Mr Marcelino Oreja, the member of EU Commission responsible for institutional affairs, has recently stated that enlargement-related issues have been completely absent from negotiations until now and criticised the attempts to settle those issues immediately prior to the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 or even to postpone them to the next round of enlargement negotiations.

23. To what extent a possible insufficient progress on institutional reform by June 1997 would cause a delay in accession of new member states remains to be seen. It would certainly seem necessary to reach satisfactory conclusions by June 1997 or, alternatively, to continue the Conference until all institutional pre-conditions for enlargement are met. Any other outcome would represent a serious blow to EU's credibility with negative political and economic consequences for whole Europe and beyond.

C. A stronger role in foreign policy and security matters

24. If previous inter-governmental conferences of EU member states dealt primarily with internal matters of the Union (Community), the present one is clearly an attempt to strengthen the Union externally.

25. The Union, with its accumulated economic power, needs a greater say in determination of political conditions in which it is exercises this power.

26. The Treaty of Maastricht equipped the Union with an inter-governmental institutional mechanism for consultation on foreign policy matters. It works primarily through resolutions and declarations and less through joint actions, which would be more expected to be a tool of a common foreign policy.

27. A yawning gap between what was expected from a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and what this policy was able to provide was most obvious in a painful experience of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU, although being the most important contributor of humanitarian assistance, was forced to leave the political initiative to resolve the conflict to the United States and other countries, including some of its member states.

28. The IGC has to provide answers how to make the CFSP work. On the other hand, it cannot go beyond what member states are at present ready to agree upon. Although it is highly improbable that the IGC will result in giving the CFSP a supranational character, it is admitted even by the strongest opponents of any further transfer of powers that the existing mechanisms has to be changed and made more effective[6].

29. Without any doubt the EU, a global economic power with a common commercial policy, diversified development co-operation policy and a number of other instruments, already has an important political role in the world. The reform of the CFSP is therefore needed not to invent an EU foreign policy, but to make it more efficient, coherent, consistent and visible.

30. The original IGC agenda also included a review of relations with the Western European Union (WEU). Although a merger between the two organisations does not seem to be feasible for the time being, the efforts continue to develop WEU in stages as the defence component of the Union.

31. Following the experience of the war in Bosnia, there is a general understanding among all EU member states that a European defence identity has to be developed in concordance with NATO. The transatlantic link clearly continues to be central to stability and security in Europe. This, however, does not preclude European countries to take on a significantly larger share of responsibility for their security than it the case today. There are a number of developments which are making this possible.

32. A concept of the WEU as a European pillar of NATO is benefiting from an agreement between the two organisations on WEU's use of NATO's military assets to conduct "European-only" operations in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992.

33. The announced re-integration of France and Spain into the NATO military command structure and the accession of former communist countries is further strengthening the European side of the Alliance. The NATO enlargement should be seen as a step to increase security in Europe and should be carried out accordingly.

34. A development of closer links between the EU and the WEU, manifested, for example, in parallel policy towards candidates for membership in the two organisations, as well as recent first contacts between the EU and NATO, are also contributing to this process.

35. The emergence of a credible European defence identity should find expression according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) "common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21 century", adopted at the OSCE Summit in Lisbon on 3 December 1996.

D. A need to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union

36. After the conclusion of the inter-governmental conference in Maastricht in February 1992, a new born Union was faced with growing scepticism with regard to further integration. This was clearly manifested in the first Danish referendum on 2 June 1992 in which Danes rejected the Treaty of Maastricht, but signs of growing discontent were also apparent in other member states.

37. There is a clear correlation between the popularity of the EU and the state of economy in Europe. The recession thus partly explains the phenomenon of a switch from "euro-euphoria" to "euro-realism". Nevertheless, the criticism of the functioning of the EU, which quickly spread also to central and east European countries, is not only economically generated. The EU's institutions are regarded as overly bureaucratic, its procedures too complex to understand and its activities alienated from its citizens.

38. The EU, in the context of the IGC, is trying to react on several fronts. It is doing so, firstly, through a wide public relation campaign, explaining the goals and means of European integration to EU citizens.

39. In addition, the Treaties and the functioning of EU institutions should be simplified to make them easier for the general public to understand.

40. The number of decision making procedures should be drastically reduced[7] in order to make EU's functioning more transparent.

41. The role of national parliaments in the EU legislative processes is under revision and their influence on shaping the EU decisions should be strengthened.

42. The principle of subsidiarity, aimed at limiting EU action only to matters that cannot be more appropriately dealt with on national level, should be more strictly applied. It may be noted that the principle of subsidiarity refers to a level of decision making and as such does not exclude inter-governmental co-operation from a notion of an action on a national level .

43. Finally, the EU should concentrate more on issues that are of closest interest to its citizens. These include more effective measures to combat unemployment, closer co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs and sustainable development policies. Incidentally, these are the areas where the IGC has had most progress until now, although opposition to further transfer of powers remain.

E. Protection of Human Rights

44. The Treaty of Maastricht refers to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) in the preamble and in the chapter on co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs. It does not, however, confers any specific powers on the European (Community) Union in the field of human rights.

45. The European Court of Justice has upheld the protection of human rights by way of general principles of Community law, referring to common constitutional traditions and to international instruments, in particular the Convention.

46. In order to clarify the question of jurisdiction of the human rights control mechanisms, established by the Convention, the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the European Parliament and the European Commission, repeatedly called for the accession by the European (Community) Union to the Convention[8].

47. Seized by the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, on 28 March 1996, ruled that the European (Community) Union, at present, had no competence to accede to the Convention.

48. In spite of a support by a majority of EU member states for amendments to the Treaty which would allow for such accession, some countries remain strongly opposed to such a move.

49. In light of this, a proposal has been made for an amendment of the Treaty conferring an exclusive right to review the conformity of Community acts with the Convention to the European Court of Justice.

50. The risk for divergent case law is particularly important. There should not be two Courts which independently supervise the application of the same Convention.

51. Moreover, the proposed exclusive right of the Court of Justice to review the observance of the Convention with regard to Community acts would seem to introduce a notion that EU member states have exonerated themselves of a part of obligations under the Convention by transferring some of their powers to the Community institutions. This is evidently not the case, as the European Court and the Commission of Human Rights have competence to examine all questions of human rights under the Convention involving relations between states that are parties to it and persons within their jurisdiction, including questions which arise from member states' participation in the EU.

52. The IGC should therefore continue with the efforts to reach a consensus on amendments to the Treaty, allowing for an accession to the Convention by the European (Community) Union.

F. A single currency for Europe

53. The third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union, introducing a single currency by 1 of January 1996 formally does not require any further decisions on the inter-governmental level. However, final preparations for the introduction of the Euro are running in parallel with discussions at the IGC and a single currency will require a more effective decision making and implementation of EMU related policies. This makes the EMU also relevant for this report.

54. Moreover, all Council of Europe member state have close economic and trade links with the EU. A single currency will therefore have important consequences for economic and social conditions for Europe as a whole.

55. The EU has difficulties in clarifying the application of criteria for the participation in the third phase of the EMU. It has also repeatedly failed to reach an agreement on detailed "rules of the game" in particular with regard to a role and prerogatives of a European Central Bank and on a "stability pact" guaranteeing a long term respect of EMU participation criteria.

56. The fate of EU member states that will not qualify to join the single currency in a first wave is also not full clarified. This is even more so for countries that are not members of the EU, but will nevertheless feel the consequences of EU's monetary reform.

57. The single currency is a landmark in the process of European integration. It should bring benefit to all countries taking part in this process in one form or another. Continuous efforts should be made to ensure as wide as possible participation which should not exclude strict observation of conditions necessary for its success. It should be regarded as an instrument of strengthening the social dimension of European integration, benefiting employment and improvement of working conditions and implemented accordingly.

58. A report on this matter is being prepared by the Committee on economic affairs with a view to its presentation at the January 1997 part session, together with the present report, in relation with the visit of the President of the European Commission.

III. Conclusions

59. The outcome of the IGC will have significant consequences for Europe as a whole.

60. The Council of Europe and the EU have developed a close co-operation in a number of areas such as human rights, media, social and socio-economic problems, culture and education, sport, youth, health, environment and regional planning, local democracy and legal co-operation. This list includes matters which are highly relevant in the context of the IGC.

61. In 1996 marked a significant step forward in terms of number of joint activities as well as with regard to inter-institutional co-operation.

62. Joint programmes for co-operation with countries of central and eastern Europe have given very positive results. Both sides are determined to continue and expand these programmes in favour of Russia and Ukraine and to consider the possibility of extending this co-operation to countries such as Moldova and the Transcaucasian Republics. The European Commission is ready to contribute 4 million ECUs over a two year period to these programmes.

63. The implementation of the Dayton Agreements for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an evident example of how useful a concerted action of the EU, the Council of Europe, OSCE and other international organisations and agencies can be.

64. On the inter-institutional level, the Arrangement of 16 June 1987 on co-operation between the European Community and the Council of Europe has been revised by an exchange of letters between the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 5 November 1996. The European Commission may henceforth be invited to the meetings and activities of the Committee of Ministers, Minister's Deputies, rapporteur groups of the deputies and any other working party. In exchange, the Commission expressed its willingness to consider requests for participation by the Council of Europe in Commission's departmental meetings whose work has not yet been submitted to the Community internal decision-making process.

65. This upgrading of institutional relations, which needs to be further develop, in particular to include contacts with the Council of Ministers, should also lead to opening of a Commission's representation with the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

66. On a more critical note one should mention the issue of an observatory on racism and xenophobia which the EU, in spite of the Council of Europe's proposal for a joint venture, insists to establish on its own.

67. Very little consideration has also been given, with some exceptions, to proposals contained in Assembly's recommendation 1279 (1995). These included, among others, a revision of Article 230 of the Treaty of Rome, aimed at recognition of the Council of Europe's achievements in a number of areas, a proposal to establish appropriate links between the Council of Europe's political dialogue and the CFSP and invitation to the Community to accede to all the treaties which allow it to accede. These proposals, which have not lost any of their relevance, should be reiterated.

68. With regard to the Council of Europe's contribution to the implementation of the IGC results, the following suggestions can be made.

69. The Council of Europe has a significant role in the preparation of candidate countries for EU membership. With its process of legal harmonization of social, cultural and other policies, it is helping these countries to bring their legislation in line with EU standards. The Council of Europe's role has been particularly important in the preparation with regard to democracy, human rights and protection of minorities, which was one of the key criteria for membership defined by the Copenhagen summit in June 1993[9]. This was recognized by the European Parliament, which has, in a resolution adopted in April 1996[10], urged the Council and Commission, in their policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, to take full account of political activities of other international bodies with regard to the rule of law, democracy and respect for the rights of minorities.

70. The Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers' 's monitoring mechanism may be used to review the observance of the human rights clause, which, in addition of being a criterion for membership, exist in all association, partnership, trade, and other agreements that the EU has concluded with third countries.

71. The Council of Europe's experience in the development of democratic security in the countries of central and eastern Europe may be put at the disposal of the European Union in its co-operation with Mediterranean countries and other regional groupings.

72. The Parliamentary Assembly, through a regular debate on issues also dealt with by EU institutions, may contribute to an enhanced role of national parliaments in shaping EU decisions with a pan-European dimension. This is fully concordant with the efforts to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union.

73. A Second Summit of the Council of Europe's Heads of State and Government, planned for the second half of 1997, provide an opportunity to consider and complement the results of the IGC with a view to a strengthened co-operation between the Council of Europe and the Union.

Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be assessed.

Reference to committee: See Recommendation 1279 (1995) and Resolution 1067 (1995)

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 18 December 1996 unanimously.

Members of the committee: Mr B�rsony (Chairman), Mr. van der Linden (Vice-Chairman), MM. Aloglu, Antretter, Baumel, Mrs Belohorska, MM. Bergqvist (Alternate: Andnor), Bernardini, Bj�rck, Bloetzer, Bokov, B�chel, B�hler (Alternate: Fischer), Cem, Cerqueda Pascuet, Chornovil, Deasy, Desyatnikov, Diacov, Domljan, Sir Anthony Durant, MM. E�rsi, Evangelisti, Gjellerod, Gotzev, Gricius, Hardy, Irmer, Iwi_ski, Kalus, Kaspereit, Kyprianou (Alternate: Christodoulides), Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. Lopez Henares, Maginas, Masseret, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral, Muehlemann, Mrs Ojuland, MM. Oliynik, Paasilinna, Pahor, Popovski, de Puig (Alternate: Martinez), Radulescu Botica, Mrs Ragnarsd�ttir, MM. Risari, Schieder, Schwimmer, Selva, Severin, Sinka, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Spahia, Mrs Stepova, Mrs. Suchocka, MM. Thoresen (Alternate: Berg), Urbain, Van der Maelen (Alternate: Staes), Vella, Vrettos, Woltjer, Zhirinovsky (Alternate: Glotov), Ziuganov (Alternate: Lukin).

N.B. The names of those members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the committee : Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen, Mr Gruden.

[1]. by the Political Affairs Committee

[2]. Since the launch of the IGC, the following EU summits took place: Turin, March 1996 (informal summit, inaugural session of the IGC), Florence, June 1996 (regular summit at the end of the Italian Presidency to the EU), Dublin, October 1996 (informal summit on the IGC), Dublin, December 1996 (regular summit at the end of the Irish Presidency to the EU).

[3]. While there were no meetings in 1994, two meetings took place in 1995 and one in 1996.

[4]. Poland, Hungary, Czech republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.

[5]. Jacques Santer in an interview in Handelsblatt of 5 December 1996.

[6]. "A more clear-cut and effective decision making procedures should be introduced" (a British government memorandum of 2 March 1995 on the approach to be adopted to European security matters at the IGC )

[7]. There are presently 22 procedures involving the European Parliament. These should be reduced to only three; co-decision, assent and consultation.

[8]. The Parliamentary Assembly has done so most recently in its recommendation 1279 (1995) and resolution 1068 (1995). See also the European Parliament's resolution on relations between the Union and the Council of Europe of 15 December 1993 (Dury Report), the resolution of 11 December 1996 on the preparation for the meeting of the European Council on 13 and 14 December 1996 in Dublin; and the European Commission's Communication on the European Union and the external dimension of human rights policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond (COM(95)567 final).

[9]. "Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".

[10]. Resolution (A4-0101/96) on the White Paper "Preparing the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union"