Doc. 8134

5 June 1998

Agreement on Northern Ireland

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Mr João Mota Amaral, Portugal, Group of the European People's Party

Summary

The Assembly welcomes the agreement on Northern Ireland of 10 April 1998 and the positive outcome of the referendum held on 22 May 1998. It considers that the agreement represents an exceptional opportunity for a lasting peaceful settlement of this conflict and calls on all political parties in Northern Ireland to work together for its implementation.

The Assembly has identified a certain number of principles, which were instrumental in reaching the agreement. It considers that these principles could be usefully applied to other conflicts in other member and applicant states and that their acceptance by the parties involved would be an indicator of political will to find a peaceful solution to such conflicts.

I.       Draft resolution

1. The Assembly welcomes the agreement on Northern Ireland of 10 April 1998 reached in the multi-party negotiations and concluded between the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

2. This agreement creates an exceptional opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement for the conflict in Northern Ireland.

3. The Assembly welcomes the positive outcome of the referendum held on 22 May 1998, which demonstrates the wide public and political support the agreement has received in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, which increases its chances of being successfully implemented.

4. The Assembly calls on all political parties in Northern Ireland to seize this opportunity to move forward in re-building trust and co-operation between the two communities.

5. The Assembly considers that the following principles were instrumental in reaching the agreement:

i.       clear set of commitments accepted prior to the talks (renouncing the use of force, agreeing to use peaceful means to resolve political issues and to abide by terms of any agreement reached);

ii.       an international mediator;

iii.       an open-ended agenda;

iv.       an agreed deadline to reach an agreement;

v.       agreed procedures on prisoners’ release on licence;

vi.       the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law;

vii.       a proposed bill of rights and action in the spirit of Council of Europe Conventions;

viii.       international involvement in the implementation of the agreement.

6. The Assembly, while recognising that all political conflicts are by their very nature multi-faceted, highly complex, and only comparable to a certain extent, considers that the above-mentioned principles could be usefully applied to other conflicts in Europe and elsewhere.

7. The Assembly resolves to examine how the above-mentioned principles can be applied to conflict situations in other member and applicant states. Their acceptance by the parties involved would be an indicator of political will to find a peaceful political solution to such conflicts.

II.       Explanatory Memorandum by Mr Mota Amaral

A.       Introduction

1. On 10 April 1998, an agreement on Northern Ireland was reached between the British and the Irish Governments. The agreement followed months of intensive negotiations with the participation of parties representing the unionist and the nationalist communities. It sets up a new assembly for the Northern Ireland, cross-border bodies and a Council of the Isles. The Irish Republic agreed to give up its claim to the territory of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom to amend its claim to supreme authority there. It is stipulated that the political status of Northern Ireland can only change through a freely exercised choice by a majority of its people.

2. The agreement, which was approved by a referendum on 22 May 1998 by over 71% of the votes in Northern Ireland and by over 94% in the Irish Republic, creates a unprecedented opportunity to end three decades of violence which took more than 3,600 lives.

3. The Assembly has dealt with the situation in Northern Ireland in the past, most recently in Resolution 859 (1986), adopted following the signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (The Hillsborough Agreement) on 15 November 1985.

4. The aim of this report is to examine whether lessons can be drawn from the agreement, and its negotiating process, which could be applied to other conflicts.

B.       Background

5. Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has an area of 13,483 sq km (covering six of the nine counties which made up the province of Ulster) and a population of 1,610,268 at June 1992, compared with 3,503,000 in the Republic of Ireland. Most of the population lives in the east, including about 490,000 in the urban area around the capital city, Belfast. Today, about 56% of the population of Northern Ireland are Protestants and 41% are Roman Catholics. Religious, cultural and political divisions in Northern Ireland tend to coincide. The Protestant majority largely regard themselves as British, wishing to remain in the United Kingdom; many of the Catholic minority think of themselves as Irish and support parties working with aspirations for a united Ireland.

i. History1

6. The formal connection between Great Britain and Ireland dates from the arrival of the Anglo-Normans in the 12th century, and was further augmented by plantations of Scottish and English settlers in the 16th and 17th centuries.

7. In the 19th century, pressure for limited self-government (Home Rule) for Ireland was met by increasing resistance among the Protestants in the northern counties. After the 1916 Easter Rising the nationalists took almost all the Irish seats (outside Ulster) in the 1918 Westminster general election and thereupon decided to set up their own Parliament in Dublin.

8. The unionists, concentrated in Ulster, were determined to remain in the United Kingdom. In 1920, in the face of the conflicting political aspirations of unionists and nationalists, the Government provided, under the Government of Ireland Act, for the establishment of two "Home Rule" Parliaments in Dublin and in Belfast. The Act was implemented in Northern Ireland but was ignored in the south, where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) continued to fight for complete "independence".

9. After a truce had been signed in June 1921, negotiations with the southern Irish led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921, which resulted in the establishment in 1922 of the Irish Free State with dominion status. The boundary with Northern Ireland was confirmed in 1925. In 1949, the Free State became a Republic, leaving the Commonwealth.

10. From 1921 to 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional Government based at Stormont outside Belfast. In a referendum in Northern Ireland in 1973 an absolute majority of the electorate favoured the existing union with Britain. In all subsequent Westminster elections, a solid majority of the votes cast have consistently been for political parties favouring this position.

11. The unrest began in late 1968, after the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement which sought to attract attention through demonstrations and marches. Serious violence erupted after a civil rights march on 5 October 1968 in Londonderry. From August 1969 militant nationalists, principally the Provisional IRA, and also "loyalist" terrorist groups, sought to exploit the historical divisions in the community and engaged in campaigns of violence. This then led to the Government authorising the deployment of units of the Armed Forces in support of the civil power. In 1972, with inter-communal violence and terrorist actions continuing, the Government first suspended and then, in 1973, abolished the regional Parliament at Stormont and introduced the present arrangements for direct rule from Westminster. These were never intended to be permanent, and successive efforts have been made to restore a measure of devolved government. The 1982 Northern Ireland Act provided a framework within which legislative and executive functions might eventually be resumed by a 78-seat Northern Ireland Assembly and executive, and elections to the Assembly took place in October 1982. The Assembly was not, however, supported by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the main nationalist party (founded in 1973), and was finally dissolved by the Government in June 1986 (although the powers for convening a new Assembly were retained).

ii.       Northern Ireland political parties

12. Northern Ireland is currently represented at Westminster by 18 MPs and elects 3 MEPs to the European Parliament. Local powers are exercised by 26 District Councils. Most Protestants support either the Ulster Unionist Party (UPP) or Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) while Catholics support the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) or Sinn Féin. The main Northern Ireland political parties are:

Ulster Unionist Party (unionist)

Leader: David Trimble

Members of parliament: 10 (33% of the vote at the 1997 general elections)

Social Democratic and Labour Party (nationalist)

Leader: John Hume

Members of parliament: 3 (24%)

Sinn Féin (nationalist)

Leader: Gerry Adams

Members of parliament: 2 (16%)

Democratic Unionist Party (unionist)

Leader: The Rev Ian Paisley

Members of parliament: 2 (14%)

Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) - formed by both Roman Catholics and Protestants

Leader: Lord Alderdice

Members of parliament: none (8%)

13. In addition there are a number of smaller political parties. Some were represented in the recent talks: the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) (1 MP: Robert McCartney); the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC); Labour (not associated with the British Labour Party); the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP); and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). The PUP and UDP have links to loyalist paramilitaries (the PUP to the Ulster Volunteer Force and the UDP to the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters).

iii.       Paramilitary groups

14.       Paramilitary groups exist in both communities, many with strong links to some of the political parties. On the nationalist side, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has links with the Sinn Féin, while on the unionist side the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) are close to the Ulster Democratic party. Paramilitaries on both sides have a long record of terrorist activities. In the run-up to the agreement, a number of them, including the above-mentioned, observed, with interruptions, a cease-fire, and after the conclusion joined the “yes” campaign. Several splinter groups persist in their opposition to the agreement and continue with violence.

C.       Peace initiatives leading to the agreement

i. Governmental

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

15. On 15 November 1985, the United Kingdom and Irish Governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement, also known as the Hillsborough Agreement, with the aim of promoting lasting peace and stability, healing the divisions between the Nationalist and Unionist communities and strengthening security.

16. In this agreement, both governments explicitly recognised that any change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about with the consent of the majority of its people. It also set up an Intergovernmental Conference (serviced by a joint Anglo-Irish secretariat located near Belfast) to provide a framework for regular meetings between the two governments at ministerial and official level.

The Downing Street Declaration

17. On 15 December 1993, the then Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, and the then British Prime Minister, John Major, agreed to the Downing Street Declaration. The Declaration reasserted the principle of consent to a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It committed the Irish government to introduce and support changes in the Irish Constitution as part of a settlement, and declared that Britain had no economic or strategic interests in Northern Ireland.

18. The two governments agreed that, following a cessation of violence, democratically mandated parties, which had established a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods, and which had shown that they would abide permanently by democratic process, would be free to participate fully in democratic politics and, in due course, to join dialogue between the governments and the political parties on the way ahead.

The «Frameworks for the Future»

19. In February 1995, the British and Irish governments published «Frameworks for the Future».

20. «A new Framework for Agreement» described a shared understanding between the British and Irish governments as to how relations within the island of Ireland and between the two governments might be based on co-operation and agreement to the mutual advantage of all.

21. «A Framework for Accountable Government» set out the British government’s proposals for possible new democratic institutions in Northern Ireland.

22. In their entirety, the frameworks set out a possible comprehensive settlement across all the relevant relationships. They did not predetermine any outcome, advocate an internal settlement or establish a joint authority. The aim of the documents was to assist the resumption of multilateral dialogue, with a view to reaching widespread agreement on an overall political settlement.

ii.       Intra-community talks

Hume-Adams talks

23. In 1988 the leader of the nationalist Social Democratic & Labour Party in the North, John Hume, began a series of informal talks with the leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams. In April 1993, he renewed his intensive contact with Gerry Adams, and decided to open a dialogue with Sinn Féin.

24. Mr Hume’s objective was to persuade the Sinn Féin leader that the real problem in Ireland was not so much the British presence in Northern Ireland, but the divisions between the people of Ireland themselves. A solution had to be found in new relationships between unionists and nationalists, north and south, the British and Irish governments. It was clear that this approach needed an IRA renunciation of violence.

25. In October 1993, the IRA welcomed the Hume-Adams talks. On 31 August 1994 it announced a «complete cessation of military operations». This was followed by the Loyalist Military Command cease-fire announcement on 13 October. Later in the same month, the British government made «a working assumption» that the IRA cease-fire was intended to be permanent. This allowed the government in December 1994 to move towards exploratory dialogues with Sinn Féin and the Loyalist representatives, on the understanding that this would facilitate progress on the question of decommissioning illegal arms.

iii.       Involvement of the United States

Mr Adams’ visit to the United States

26. In late 1993, the United States decided to grant the leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, an entry visa after ten refusals in twenty years. The British government had made it clear that it opposed granting Mr Adams a visa because Sinn Féin had not renounced the use of violence and the IRA had not formally declared a cease-fire.

27. In February 1994, Mr Adams visited the United States, winning valuable publicity. The visit strengthened the recognition of Sinn Féin as a necessary interlocutor in the peace process. It helped Gerry Adams to win over hard-liners in his party and to prepare for Sinn Féin’s participation in the talks.

28. However, during his stay, Mr Adams made no concessions concerning renunciation of violence and acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Downing Street Declaration as the basis for negotiation.

US President Clinton’s visit to Northern Ireland

29. On 30 November 1995, President Clinton visited Northern Ireland, the first serving US President to do so. He had separate talks with the leaders of the main political parties, particularly with Unionist leader David Trimble and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams.

30. He called on Sinn Féin and the IRA to back the Twin Track plan, agreed between the British and Irish Prime Ministers on the eve of his visit. He appealed for political leaders to be ready to «take risks» to accelerate the stalled peace process.

D.       The Agreement

i.       Talks

The Twin Track Initiative

31. On 28 November 1995 the two governments launched the Twin Track initiative, aimed at creating the confidence necessary for substantive all-party negotiations to begin by the end of February 1996.

32. It established, on the one hand, an International Body, chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell, to examine the decommissioning of illegal arms. It also established a parallel phase of preparatory talks designed to examine the framework for all-party negotiations.

33. The initiative led to the publication, on 24 January 1996, of the Report of the International Body, which proposed six principles of democracy and non-violence and a number of confidence-building measures. It also proposed that the question of disposing of paramilitary weapons could be dealt with in parallel political negotiations.

The Mitchell Principles

34. The Mitchell report recommended participants in all-party negotiations to affirm their commitment:

Sinn Féin enters into talks

35. The British and Irish governments agreed that, in the light of ending the IRA cease-fire with the Docklands bombing on 9 February 1996, Sinn Féin’s participation would depend on an unequivocal restoration of the IRA cease-fire. They also agreed that all parties would need to make a clear commitment to the Mitchell principles.

36. Following the elections to negotiation, held on 30 May 1996, the multi-party talks opened on June 1996, under the chairmanship of George Mitchell. Sinn Féin was excluded because they did not meet the requirements for entry.

37. Following the 1997 United Kingdom general elections, the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, authorised initial meetings between British officials and Sinn Féin. However, the British government published an Aide Mémoire, which reiterated the conditions for Sinn Féin’s entry to the negotiations.

38. Shortly after the resumption of the talks in June 1997, on 19 July 1997, the IRA announced an unequivocal restoration of its cease-fire. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Mrs Mo Mowlam, announced six weeks later that she had decided that Sinn Féin now met the legal requirements for entry to the talks.

39. On 9 September Sinn Féin joined the talks process and affirmed their total and absolute commitment to the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence. Significantly, all sides sat down at Stormont around the same table for the first time in 25 years.

The April 9 deadline

40. On 7 October 1997 talks began on three separate «strands» i.e. a Northern Ireland assembly, a North-South council and British-Irish institutions.

41. On 13 October, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, met the delegations involved in the talks. On 16 December Mr Adams visited the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. Mr Blair was the first British Prime Minister to meet a Sinn Féin representative in 76 years.

42. On 12 January 1998, the British and Irish governments presented «Propositions on Heads of Agreement Paper». It set out propositions for debate and discussion and offered an outline of an agreement. Sinn Féin rejected the two governments’ proposal as unbalanced.

43. Following confirmation of the Ulster Freedom Fighters’ (UFF) involvement in recent murders, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which has strong links to the UFF, faced suspension and left the talks on 26 January. It was re-admitted on 23 February 1998.

44. In a statement of 5 February 1998, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mo Mowlam, expressed her hope that an agreement could be reached in the talks by May.

45. On 20 February 1998, the British and Irish governments, in the light of the IRA’s involvement in recent murders, suspended Sinn Féin from the talks. It was re-admitted on 9 March 1998.

46. In mid-March the peace talks entered a critical phase. Mr Blair said that an overall agreement could be reached by Easter and could then be put to simultaneous referendums in Northern Ireland and in the Republic by the end of May.

47. On 25 March, Mr Mitchell and other participants in the talks agreed on a 9 April deadline to reach an agreement. The number of sessions was stepped up.

48. On 10 April, the talks concluded with an intensive 48-hour session at Stormont. The parties agreed to a political settlement setting up a new assembly, cross-border bodies and a Council of the Isles. The Republic agreed to give up its claim to the territory of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom to amend its claim to supreme authority there.

ii.       The content of the agreement

49. The agreement’s two fundamental principles are those of consent and North-South co-operation. Northern Ireland will be a part of the United Kingdom unless a majority of its people want to change that status. On the other hand, the agreement will create three interconnected bodies of government within Northern Ireland, between the north and the rest of Ireland, and between the Irish Republic and United Kingdom as a whole.

The status of Northern Ireland

50. The British and Irish governments have formally resolved their historical differences through the mutual acceptance of the principle of consent.

51. They will recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.

52. Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom as long as that is the wish of a majority of the people who live there.

Northern Ireland Assembly (Strand One)

53. A new 108-member Assembly will be elected by proportional representation. It will exercise full executive and legislative authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments.

54. The Assembly will operate on a cross-community basis, with safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected. Key decisions are to be taken on a cross-community basis, either by parallel consent or by a weighted majority of both nationalist and unionist votes.

North-South Council (Strand Two)

55. A North-South Ministerial Council will be established, consisting of persons with executive authority in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, to work together by agreement on matters of mutual interest.

56. Members of the Council from North and South will act within the mandate of the Assembly and the Irish Parliament respectively, and remain accountable to them.

57. Implementation bodies are to be established to carry out policy decisions of the Council in a number of areas.

British-Irish Institutions (Strand Three)

58. There will be a British-Irish Council, comprising the two governments and representatives of devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and from the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. It will promote consultation, co-operation and possibly joint decision-making on a wide range of matters of common interest.

59. A new British-Irish agreement will replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in November 1985. It sets out the new shared understanding on constitutional matters. It also creates a new British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference which will deal with all bilateral issues between the two governments.

Constitutional issues

60. The Irish Constitution will be amended, abandoning the Republic’s territorial claim on Northern Ireland, formally recognising that it is legitimately part of the United Kingdom.

61. If the people of Northern Ireland were formally to consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the British government will introduce constitutional change, undertaking to bring forward proposals to give effect to that wish.

Rights, Safeguards and Equality Issues

62. The European Convention on Human Rights will be incorporated into Northern Ireland Law, and a new independent Human Rights Commission will be created in Northern Ireland. The Irish government will establish an equivalent Human Rights Commission in the Republic.

63. A public consultation is underway about the proposals in the Partnership for Equality White Paper, including the establishment of a powerful new Equality Commission. Those proposals are reflected in the agreement along with other proposals to encourage parity of esteem between the two main political and cultural traditions.

Decommissioning

64. The agreement establishes a clear process for total disarmament of paramilitary organisations within two years, and a commitment by all the parties to work in good faith with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning.

65. It commits both governments to reducing the profile of security measures and emergency legislation as the threat to peace and good order reduces.

Policing and Justice

66. An Independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland. The Commission, which will include international representation, will report by summer 1999.

67. A parallel review of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland will be undertaken by the British government.

Prisoners

68. The agreements commits both governments to put in place mechanisms to provide for a programme for the release of prisoners affiliated with organisations maintaining a complete and unequivocal cease-fire. The intention is to release any qualifying prisoners still in custody two years after the scheme begins.

iii.       Reactions

69. The first of the Northern Ireland political parties to endorse the agreement was the Ulster Unionist Party, when its executive committee voted by a substantial majority to endorse the agreement. The vote marked a significant victory for the party’s leader, David Trimble, over a number of prominent party members, including some MPs.

70. The peace deal was also endorsed by the Ulster Democratic Party, as well as by two of the loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters, which have strong links with the UDP.

71. The Democratic Unionist Party, led by Rev. Ian Paisley, vociferously attacked the peace deal, calling it a “sell-out” and a “betrayal of the union”. The party will lead a “no” campaign for the up-coming referendum. It hopes to win the votes of the Protestant Orange Order, one of the province’s most influential groups, also opposed to the agreement.

72. On the nationalist side, the peace agreement received unequivocal support from the SDLP and its leader, John Hume, who called on voters to “vote for hope”.

73. Sinn Féin called on its members to study the terms of the new agreement carefully. The Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, committed himself to urge his party members to support the agreement. At an extraordinary party conference on 10 May 1998, Sinn Féin endorsed the agreement.

74. The IRA has described the peace agreement as significant, but said it fell short of “presenting a solid basis for a lasting settlement”. However, in a later expression of support for Sinn Féin’s peace deal strategy, the IRA amended its rules to allow members who are Sinn Féin representatives to take seats in the proposed new Northern Ireland Assembly. The IRA, however, refused to yield to British, Irish and unionist requests for immediate decommissioning.

75. Members of rival republican paramilitary groups, the Irish National Liberation Army and Continuity IRA, denounced the settlement.

76. In an attempt to gather momentum for a yes, the British Prime Minister succeeded in ensuring cross-party support for the peace deal. Joint visits to Northern Ireland with former Prime Minister John Major, as well as with the leaders of the opposition Conservatives, William Hague, and of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, took place. Some prominent Conservatives, including the former Prime Minister Lady Thatcher, expressed their dissent. Their main objections concern the release of paramilitary prisoners.

iv.       Implementation timetable

77. The agreement was approved in separate referendums in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic on 22 May 1998. In Northern Ireland, where the turn-out was over 80%, 71,12% voted yes, and in the Irish Republic the turn-out was over 55% and support 94,4%. Elections to the new Assembly are likely to take place in June.

78. The new Assembly’s first responsibility would be to set up the North-South Ministerial Council for joint cross-border co-operation.

79. The decommissioning of weapons is expected to begin in the summer – in spite of the resistance among paramilitary groups.

E.       Conclusions

80. The agreement between the British and Irish governments on Northern Ireland creates a unique opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It therefore deserves the Assembly’s wholehearted support.

81. In addition the agreement, and the negotiating process that led to it, contain a number of elements which could serve as an example for the resolution of conflicts elsewhere in Europe.

82. It would appear that the following principles were essential to the successful outcome of the talks:

83. While recognising that all political conflicts are by their very nature multi-faceted, highly complex and only comparable to a certain extent, it would appear that the elements described above could be usefully applied in a search for a political solution to several other conflicts in Europe.

84. The Assembly should resolve to examine, how the above-mentioned principles can be applied to conflict situations in other member and applicant states. Their acceptance by the parties involved would be an indicator of political will to find a peaceful political solution to such conflicts.

Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be assessed.

Reference to committee: standing mandate

Draft resolution adopted by the committee unanimously on 25 May 1998.

Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairman), Mr van der Linden (Vice Chairman), Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Baumel(Vice-Chairman), MM Antretter, Atkinson, Mrs. Belohorska (alternate: Mr Slobodnik), MM Bergqvist (alternate: Mr Andnor), Bernardini, Björck (alternate Mr Hagard), Bloetzer, Chircop, Chornovil, Daly, Davis, Diacov, Dokle, Domljan, Gjellerod, Gül (alternate: Mr Akçali), Hadjidemetriou, Hornhues (alternate: Mr Bühler), Mrs Iotti (alternate: Mr Evangelisti), Irmer, Iwínski, Kalus, Mrs Kautto, MM Kirilov, Krzaklewski (alternate: Mr Wielowieyski), Kuzmickas, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Lopez-Henares, Lupu, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martínez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Mota Amaral, Mühlemann, Musto, Mutman, Nallet, Oliynik, Pahor, Palmitjavilo Ribo, Popovski, Prusak (alternate: Mr Zhebrovsky), Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, Mrs Roudy, MM Schieder, Schwimmer, Seguin, Selva (alternate: Mr Contestabile), Shokhin, Sinka, Mrs G Smith, Mrs Stanoiu, Mrs Stepova, MM Thoresen, Toshev, Urbain, Volcic, Vrettos, Woltjer, Ziuganov.

N.B. The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich, Mr Gruden


1 Source: British Information Services