10 September 1998
Drawing up a European code of conduct on arms sales
Political Affairs Committee
Rapporteur: Mr Borut Pahor, Slovenia, Socialist Group
An effective and comprehensive control of transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies is indispensable to ensure a lasting democratic stability in Europe.
The recently adopted European Union Code on arms exports attempts to set high criteria for arms exports from the EU member states. It contains eight criteria, including the respect of human rights in the country of final destination, to be taken into account when export licences are being considered. The Council of Europe has been given a specific role in this respect.
Considering that a number of Council of Europe member states are major producers and exporters of conventional arms, it is essential that principles and operative provisions of the European Union Code be applied in all Council of Europe member states, preferably in the form of a European-wide code of conduct.
I. Draft recommendation
1. The Assembly stresses that, in addition to arms of mass destruction, conventional arms also represent a significant threat to international stability.
2. The Assembly notes that a number of Council of Europe member states are major producers and exporters of conventional arms. In addition, difficult economic conditions and absence of effective state control in some countries have led to a significant increase in illicit trade of conventional arms.
3. The Assembly recalls that accumulation and availability of conventional arms have played a major role in all recent regional conflicts in Europe. Moreover, arms produced in Europe are sometimes being used for domestic repression as well as for the violation of human rights in the country of final destination.
4. The Assembly considers that an effective and comprehensive control of transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies is indispensable to ensure a lasting democratic stability in Europe.
5. While recognising that, at present, the control of such transfers is largely carried out by national authorities, the Assembly stresses the urgent need to harmonise national legislation and administrative practices and establish multilateral mechanisms on conventional arms trade at pan-European level.
6. In this respect, the Assembly recalls its Resolution 928 (1989) which called for, inter alia, the setting up of an international register on the production and trade in conventional arms, the establishment of common criteria for arms transfers and the harmonisation of national arms control legislation.
7. Considering that in a democratic society it is essential that governments are held responsible for their legislature on arms export policy, the Assembly stresses the need to strengthen parliaments' role in the control of arms.
8. The Assembly supports the efforts to increase the exchange of information and develop common guidelines which are being carried out by the United Nations, the OSCE and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Conventional Arms Exports.
9. The Assembly welcomes the recent adoption of a political agreement on a European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on arms exports by the EU Council of Ministers. The Code is intended to strengthen the exchange of information relevant to the export of conventional arms, with the aim of setting high common standards for arms exports from all EU member states.
10. The Assembly expresses its particular satisfaction with the fact that the respect of human rights in the country of final destination is listed among the criteria to be considered in authorising arms exports. It also welcomes the specific role given to the Council of Europe in criterion two of the code of conduct to assess the respect of human rights.
11. The Assembly considers it essential that the principles and operative provisions of the EU Code of Conduct be applied in all Council of Europe member states. The Assembly also calls for the elaboration of a pan-European list of military equipment, including dual-use equipment, which should be subject to transfer control. Such a list should include equipment which might be used for internal repression leading to the violation of human rights.
12. Consequently, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. establish a mechanism of communication with the European Union, with a view of informing it as to the respect of human rights in the country of final destination within the Council of Europe area, in accordance with criterion two of the EU Code;
ii. elaborate, in co-operation with the European Union and other competent bodies, a list of equipment which might be used for internal repression, torture and other means of human rights violation, and, in case of uncertainty, criteria which determine whether a specific type of equipment might be used for such purposes in a particular case;
iii. carry out a survey of the legislation and administrative practices regulating conventional arms exports in Council of Europe member states with a view to their harmonisation, preferably by means of a Council of Europe convention;
iv. examine in close co-operation with the European Union possible mechanisms for the application of principles and operative provisions contained in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export at the pan-European level, preferably in the form of a European-wide code of conduct;
v. call on Council of Europe member, observer and applicant states:
a. to elaborate a truly accountable system which would allow national parliaments, or committees thereof, to monitor proposed arms exports;
b. to respect and, if they have not yet done so, sign the existing international agreements regulating the production, transfer and use of conventional arms, and in particular the Ottawa convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, as well as the United Nations Convention on prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
c. to respect the criteria contained in the EU Code, pending the adoption of a European-wide code of conduct.
II. Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur
1. In recent years, international transfers of conventional arms have reached such a level, representing a significant threat to international stability.
2. The European Union, together with the United States, is one of the major arms suppliers (they account for about 80 percent of the global arms trade). In addition, some of the recent member states of the Council of Europe are important producers or exporters of conventional arms.
3. The accumulation and widespread availability of arms have aggravated the situation in areas of political tensions, contributed to the outbreak of conflicts, and facilitated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. They have also increased the suffering of civilians both during and after armed conflicts.
4. There is clearly a need for a more responsible approach to arms exports and, in particular, for an effective and comprehensive control procedure of transfers of conventional arms, in order to ensure a lasting democratic international stability in Europe.
5. Until now, only few countries have taken unilateral steps to restrict their conventional exports towards arms exports, because of the risk of leaving markets to competitors.
6. Arms sales are currently subject to minimal co-ordination and control. Arms exporters exercise little restraint over their own sales, and participate in only vague and non-binding international co-operation.
7. Inadequacy or absence of control in arms transfers has contributed to an increase in the illicit traffic of arms. In particular, common control of international arms dealers activities and licensed production is needed.
8. National parliaments do not have a substantial role in the control of arms sales, as governments have not allowed them any authority in this matter. In many cases, a mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny to hold governments accountable to their policies on arms export is not provided.
9. Differences existing in national procedures to control armament transfers need to be reduced by harmonising national legislation and administrative practices and setting up multilateral mechanisms.
10. A European code of conduct on arms sales would prevent the export of weapons to repressive and non-democratic governments and to countries involved in regional conflicts. In recent years, several initiatives were put forward in various fora to harmonise national legislation, and to increase the exchange of information, as well as to develop common standards.
11. The adoption by the European Union, in May 1998, of a Code of Conduct on Arms Export represents an important step taken to provide discipline in arms export to third countries. This code is a compromise agreement between member states prefering a more precise code and those, on the other hand believing it was the maximum acceptable agreement.
12. The control of arms trade on a pan-European scale has been the subject of two motions tabled in the Parliamentary Assembly in 1991 (motion for a resolution on the international arms trade) and in 1998 (motion for a recommendation on drawing up a European code of conduct on arms sales). Given the close link between these two motions, it has been decided to present a single report on this subject.
II. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
13. In September 1989, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution No 928 on arms sales and human rights. The resolution called for the strengthening of the control of international arms sales, and for the establishment of common criteria and definitions for such sales, in order to enhance international security.
14. In particular, the Assembly called for the setting up of an open register on the production of and trade in conventional weapons and encouraged member states to take measures to harmonise national legislation controlling and licensing arms exports.
15. In September 1997, the Assembly adopted Recommendation No 1343 condemning the use, production, transfer and stock-piling of anti-personnel mines, calling on the member states for a total ban of these weapons, considering their minimal military value against their high humanitarian implications. In July 1998, the Committee of Ministers, in its reply to the recommendation, although concerned by the use of anti-personnel landmines, decided not to undertake this problem, as the United Nations was already dealing it with.
16. During the 1998 June part-session, the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe held a hearing on the drawing up of a European code of conduct on arms sales. It emerged that the Council of Europe was ideally placed to contribute, on one hand, to the harmonisation of legislation on arms sales in its member states, including non members of the -EU, and on the other hand, throught this harmonisation to get the Central and Eastern European countries more involved in the pan-European integration process.
17. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Council of Europe’s comparative advantage in the field of human rights should be used to develop a mechanism of information on the respect of human rights in the country of destination that could be applied in national decisions on arms exports.
III. Other international initiatives
18. In November 1993, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) adopted a series of principles governing the transfer of conventional arms and related technology, with the aim of developing a new co-operative and common approach to security. The principles were of a general nature and focused on transparency and restraint as well as on respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country and on the internal and regional situation in and around the recipient country.
19. In June 1995, the FSC decided to hold an OSCE seminar in order to ensure the follow-up to the decision adopted in November 1993, giving further impetus to the Document on principles governing conventional arms transfers. The seminar offered the opportunity to exchange information on national legislation and practices, control lists, licenses and on the mechanisms to control the transfers of arms.
20. In December 1996, the FSC adopted a Framework for Arms Control. Its principal purpose was to contribute to consolidate the OSCE region as an indivisible common security space by, inter alia, creating a web of inter-related arms control obligations and commitments. The Framework lists a number of negotiating principles to guide future arms control negotiations.
The UN Disarmament Commission
21. Conventional arms control is one of the three issues currently before the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). The Commission does not have the authority to negotiate conventions. Its goal is to produce, by consensus, guidelines on disarmament strategies.
22. The Commission adopted a set of guidelines on international arms transfers in 1996. It has also established a series of principles to be respected by states in their international arms transfers, in an effort to promote transparency.
The Wassenaar Arrangement
23. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is the first global multilateral arrangement on export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. It received final approval by 33 co-founding countries in July 1996 and began operations in September 1996. It became fully operational in 1997 and began to play an important role in combating the risks associated with the destabilising accumulation of armaments and sensitive dual-use items. It includes almost all the most important arms suppliers, who meet on a regular basis in Vienna, where the Arrangement’s Secretariat is based.
24. The aim of the WA is to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency, the exchange of views and information and increased responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Participating states seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfer of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities, which undermine international and regional security and stability.
25. The WA countries maintain effective export controls of the items on the approved lists of arms, but develop common understandings of the risks associated with their transfer and assess the scope for co-ordinating national control policies to combat these risks.
IV. European Union initiatives
The 1991 common criteria
26. In June 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the European Council of Ministers agreed on seven common criteria to govern arms exports, adding an eighth in 1992. These criteria concern the sale of military equipment to regions of tension, countries with poor human rights record, and governments which spend a disproportionate amount of their gross domestic product on their armed forces. These criteria were not legally binding and have so far been insufficient in ensuring a common approach on the basis of member states.
27. Subsequently, several European governments have supported the adoption of an EU code of conduct on the arms trade, to provide a common, restrictive interpretation of the eight criteria. Specifically, the Code initiative sought to:
- strengthen the eight criteria already agreed upon by providing a restrictive interpretation of them and making them legally binding in all EU countries;
- increase accountability and transparency in the arms trade by providing a means for parliaments to monitor governments’ practice against objective standards.
The 1998 British-French proposal
28. Although several EU states have been advocating an EU code for many years, it only formally emerged on the agenda when the UK assumed the EU Presidency in January 1998.
29. On 17 February 1998 the British Presidency of the European Union, in co-operation with the French government, put forward a draft proposal for a code of conduct for arms exports. In the absence of any previous rules in this area, it was welcomed as a first significant attempt to align member states’ policies on arms exports, since the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers in 1991 and 1992.
30. The guidelines set out in the British-French proposal were mainly based on the UK government’s July 1997 Guidelines for arms exports and the 1993 OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. They were organised under each of the eight existing EU criteria governing arms exports. For the first time, the proposal introduced basic consultation mechanisms between the member states related to the granting of export licences. However, the draft Code fell short of what many EU States had hoped for, and showed several weaknesses in particular concerning the professed aim to achieve transparency and the safeguards related to the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The EU Code of Conduct
31. On 8 June 1998, after being debated by the Member States as well as by a number of humanitarian organisations and think tanks, an amended version of the draft Code of Conduct on arms exports was formally adopted by the EU Council of Ministers as a legally non-binding Council Declaration. (see appendix)
32. Agreement on an EU Code is an important step towards the development of a common, responsible approach to arms exports by the EU member states. The Code is intended to establish “high common standards” for arms exports and “strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency”. Based on the criteria agreed in 1991 and 1992, it outlines eight detailed criteria to govern the process by which EU states grant or refuse applications for arms export licences. The issues addressed include human rights, regional stability, sustainable development and terrorism. It also establishes consultation mechanisms and requires all EU countries to submit annual reports on arms exports.
33. However, many question whether the final text, watered down in negotiations, can meet the objectives which guided the drafting of the Code. Many denounced that the Code fails to provide full respect for international humanitarian law and falls short of establishing adequate EU mechanisms and procedures for member states to take co-ordinated action to effectively monitor and control transfers of military, paramilitary and security equipment and services. Moreover, there are virtually no provisions to address the current deficiencies in most EU member states’ arms control regimes. Finally, the Code fails to provide any mechanisms for parliamentary accountability or public scrutiny, and does little to foster greater transparency and accountability over the arms trade across Europe as a whole.
34. The annual review of the Code within the Council of Ministers represents a crucial opportunity to ensure that it is rigorously implemented and enforced in the future. The first review of the Code is expected to take place in June 1999 during the German Presidency of the EU.
35. In the next six months, during the Austrian Presidency of the EU, it is likely that the common control list of military equipment, which the Code is to apply to, will be adopted during this time.
36. During the 27 May 1998 plenary session, the European Parliament welcomed the Code’s adoption, but criticised weaknesses and loopholes in the document. It decided to play an important role in monitoring member states’ implementation of the Code and hold them accountable for the commitments they have made.
37. In recent years, several initiatives were put forward by the international community in an attempt to control conventional arms transfers, and to develop a common approach to international security.
38. The Council of Europe, the OSCE, the United Nations and the contracting parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Conventional Arms Exports have been involved in efforts to establish common criteria, mechanisms of information exchange and measures to harmonise national control systems.
39. Despite the weaknesses and loopholes, these initiatives represent an important achievement in the international control of arms exports. They stress the importance of transparency and safeguards related to the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the need to establish mechanisms for parliamentary or public scrutiny and a common list of military equipment subject to transfer control.
40. The EU Code of Conduct represents an important basis on which the European States should develop wider consensus in regulating the arms trade. Considering that a substantial part of conventional arms export in the Council of Europe area originates from countries that are not members of the EU, it is essential that the Code’s principles and operative provisions are carried out by all of the Council of Europe's member states.
41. Given the role that has been specified in criterion two of the EU Code to assess respect of human rights, a mechanism of communication should be established with the EU with a view to informing it concerning the respect of human rights in the country of final destination within the Council of Europe member states.
42. Pending the adoption of a European-wide code, Council of Europe member, observer and applicant states should respect the criteria contained in the EU Code and act in accordance with the existing international treaties concerning conventional arms.
43. To facilitate an emergence of a Europe-wide control mechanism for conventional arms, an effort should be made to harmonise national legislation in Council of Europe member states.
44. An essential element of such a future mechanism would be a common list of military equipment subject to control. This list should include equipment that might be used for internal repression and lead to violations of human rights. The Council of Europe and its specialised bodies, such as the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading treatment of Punishment, have a unique expertise in this field which could be used in the drawing up of such a list.
2097th COUNCIL Meeting – GENERAL AFFAIRS
Brussels, 25 May 1998
CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORT
The Council reached political agreement on an EU Code of Conduct on arms exports (see below). The Code builds on the Common Criteria for arms exports adopted in 1991 and 1992 and also includes a denial notification and consultation mechanism, the first such mechanism ever applied to conventional arms exports. The adoption of this Code marks a qualitatively new stage in the EU's development of a common approach to arms exports as an important element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council will assess implementation of the Code annually.
EU CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS ()
The Council of the European Union,
BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,
RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,
DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,
DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,
WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,
NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,
ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,
RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter,
have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:
Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations
An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:
a) the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes;
b) the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine.
The respect of human rights in the country of final destination
Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will:
a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU;
For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.
Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts
Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.
Preservation of regional peace, security and stability
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia:
a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries
Member States will take into account:
a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states;
c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.
The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law
Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to:
a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.
The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions
In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:
a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).
The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources
Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.
1. Each EU Member State will assess export licence applications for military equipment made to it on a case-by-case basis against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.
2. This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.
3. EU Member States will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.
The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.
4. EU Member States will keep such denials and consultations confidential and not to use them for commercial advantage.
5. EU Member States will work for the early adoption of a common list of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where appropriate elements from relevant international lists.
6. The criteria in this Code and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions will also apply to dual-use goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.
7. In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports.
8. Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an annual report on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States.
9. EU Member States will, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.
10. It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.
11. EU Member States will use their best endeavours to encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct.
12. This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.
ANNEX to the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
("Pro forma" for notification of refused licences)
.......... (name of Member State) has the honour to inform partners of the following denial under the EU Code of Conduct:
Destination country: ...............
Short description of equipment, including quantity and where
appropriate, technical specifications: ..............
Proposed consignee: ..............
Proposed end-user (if different): .................
Reason for refusal: ................
Date of denial: ..................
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee
Reference to committee: Doc. 8003 and Reference No. 2253 of 18 March 1998
Draft recommendation: adopted unanimously by the committee on 3 September 1998.
Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairperson), Mr van der Linden, Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairpersons), MM. Antretter, Atkinson, Mrs Belohorská, MM. Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzer, Chircop, Chornovil, Daly, Davis, Dokle, Domljan, Gjellerod, Gül, Hadjidemetriou, Hornhues, Mrs Iotti, MM. Irmer, Iwínski, Kalus, Mrs Kautto, MM. Kirilov, Krzaklewski, Kuzmickas, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. Lopez Henares (Alternate: Puche), Lupu, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martinez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Mota Amaral, Mühlemann, Mutman, Nallet (Alternate: Baumel, Vice-Chairperson), Nedelciuc, Nemeth, Oliynik, Pahor, Palmitjavila Ribo, Popovski, Prusak, Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, Mrs Roudy (Alternate: Mr Lemoine), MM Schieder, Schwimmer (Alternate: Mautner Markhof), Séguin, Selva, Shokhin, Sinka, Mrs Smith, Mrs Stanoiu (Alternate: Mr Badulescu), Mrs Štepova, MM. Thoresen, Toshev, Urbain, Volcic, Vrettos, Woltjer, Ziuganov.
N.B. The names of those members who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: MM. Kleijssen, Gruden, Sich.